How to indirectly assess transaction costs to evaluate market integration: evidence from the international ethanol market

Mercados são instituições criadas para facilitar uma atividade de comercialização. Isto é possível porque um mercado é constituído por instituições que foram desenhadas para reduzir os custos de transação associados a este processo de troca. A partir dessas duas ideias, esta tese possui três objetivos principais. (i) Analisar por que a literatura de análise de cointegração tem mensurado estes custos de forma imprecisa. A principal razão é certa confusão entre os conceitos de custos de transação, de transporte e de comercialização. (ii) Propor um procedimento para mensurar indiretamente os custos de transação de mercado variáveis combinando os modelos de cointegração com mudança de regime e a estrutura teórica oferecidas pela Nova Economia Institucional. Este procedimento é aplicado para quantificar quanto custa comercializar etanol no mercado internacional usando suas atuais instituições. (iii) Por fim, usando os mesmos modelos e a mesma estrutura teórica, esta dissertação contesta a hipótese de que já existe um mercado internacional de etanol bem desenvolvido, tal qual a literatura tem assumido. De forma semelhante, também é avaliada a hipótese de que a remoção das barreiras comerciais norte-americanas para o etanol brasileiro seria uma condição suficiente para o desenvolvimento deste mercado internacional. Os testes aplicados rejeitam ambas as hipóteses.

A dynamic model of simultaneous price competition with switching and search costs

Esse artigo apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição em precos que incorpora tanto custos de procura quanto custos de switching e onde que as decisões do consumidor e das firmas são simultâneas. Dadas as hipóteses feitas n ós veremos que este modelo possui equilí brio. As principais propriedades do equil íbrio deste modelo são: Se os custos de procura forem baixos o suficiente, em equilí brio o consumidor vai procurar todas as firmas no mercado enquanto que o aumento dos custos de procura vai reduzir a propor cão de firmas que o consumidor busca. Um resultado contraintuitivo e que os pre cos esperados pagos pelo consumidor normalmente decresce em nossas computa cões numéricas do equil íbrio quando os custos de procura aumentam. Enquanto que aumentar os custos de switching tamb ém vai produzir o resultado contraituitivo que as firmas unmatched vão diminuir suas ofertas de modo a atrair o consumidor.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century and beyond

The main objective of this paper is to propose a novel setup that allows estimating separately the welfare costs of the uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and from economic-growth variation, when the two types of shocks associated with them (respectively,transitory and permanent shocks) hit consumption simultaneously. Separating these welfare costs requires dealing with degenerate bivariate distributions. Levis Continuity Theorem and the Disintegration Theorem allow us to adequately de ne the one-dimensional limiting marginal distributions. Under Normality, we show that the parameters of the original marginal distributions are not afected, providing the means for calculating separately the welfare costs of business-cycle uctuations and of economic-growth variation. Our empirical results show that, if we consider only transitory shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles is much smaller than previously thought. Indeed, we found it to be negative - -0:03% of per-capita consumption! On the other hand, we found that the welfare cost of economic-growth variation is relatively large. Our estimate for reasonable preference-parameter values shows that it is 0:71% of consumption US$ 208:98 per person, per year.

The macroeconomics of price adjustments under information frictions and menu costs

Esta tese se dedica ao estudo de modelos de fixação de preços e suas implicações macroeconômicas. Nos primeiros dois capítulos analiso modelos em que as decisões das firmas sobre seus preços praticados levam em conta custos de menu e de informação. No Capítulo 1 eu estimo tais modelos empregando estatísticas de variações de preços dos Estados Unidos, e concluo que: os custos de informação são significativamente maiores que os custos de menu; os dados claramente favorecem o modelo em que informações sobre condições agregadas são custosas enquanto que as idiossincráticas têm custo zero. No Capítulo 2 investigo as consequências de choques monetários e anúncios de desinflação usando os modelos previamente estimados. Mostro que o grau de não-neutralidade monetária é maior no modelo em que parte da informação é grátis. O Capítulo 3 é um artigo em conjunto com Carlos Carvalho (PUC-Rio) e Antonella Tutino (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas). No artigo examinamos um modelo de fixação de preços em que firmas estão sujeitas a uma restrição de fluxo de informação do tipo Shannon. Calibramos o modelo e estudamos funções impulso-resposta a choques idiossincráticos e agregados. Mostramos que as firmas vão preferir processar informações agregadas e idiossincráticas conjuntamente ao invés de investigá-las separadamente. Este tipo de processamento gera ajustes de preços mais frequentes, diminuindo a persistência de efeitos reais causados por choques monetários.

Inequality of opportunity in daycare and preschool services in Brazil

In this paper we measure inequality of opportunity in daycare and preschool services in Brazil. For this purpose, we construct an opportunity index that modifies the human opportunity index proposed in the literature and used in Barros et al. (2009) to measure inequality in basic opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Specifically, we construct an opportunity measure that includes not only attendance but also parental choice not to enroll children in daycare or preschool, using data from a supplementary questionnaire included in the 2006 version of Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). The results show that there are large differences between our opportunity index and the human opportunity index for children aged 0-3 years old and considerably smaller differences for children aged 4-6 years old, which suggests that preschool may be closer to a basic opportunity than daycare.

Bailey's measure of the welfare costs of infiation as a general-equilibrium measure

Lucas (2000) has ShO\nl t hat Baile,\"'s formula for t hc \\'elfare costs of inflatioIl caIl bc rcgardpd as an approximation to t hc gcneral-equilibriuIll IllCaSllH'S \\"hich emerge from thc Sidrauski anrl the shopping-time models, In this paper \\'c shm\' that Baile~"s mcaSllrc can bc cxactly obtairlf'd in tllf' Siclrauski geIleral-equilibri1lIn framp\\'ork under the assUIllption of quasilinpar prefpreIlC'cs, The rpslllt. based on ",heter or not \\'Palt h pffpcts are incorporatccl into t hp analysis, is also helpful in darif\'ing \\'hy Lucas' Illeasurp clerin'd from the Siclrauski model turns 01lt to be aIl upper bOllIlcl to Bailp~"s, T,,'o eXaInplcs arp used to illustratc t he main C'ondusions,

Avoiding some costs of inflation and crawling toward hyperinflation : the case of the Brazilian domestic currency substitute

The pattem of a classical hyperinflation is an acute acceleration of the inflation levei accompanied by rapid substitution away from domestic currency. Brazil, however, has becn experiencing inflation leveis well above 1,000% a year since 1988 without entering the classical hyperinflation path. Two elements play key roles in differcntiating the Brazilian case from other hyperinflationary experiences: indexation and the provision of a reliable domestic currency substitute, Le., the provision of liquidity to interest-bearing assets. This paper claims that the existence of this domestic currency substitute is lhe main source of both lhe inability of the Brazilian central bank to fight inflation and of the unwillingness of Brazilians to face the costs of such a fight. The provision of the domestic currency substitute through the banking sector is modeled, and the main macroeconomic consequences of this monetary regime are derived. Those are: the lack of a nominal anchor for the price system due to the passive monetary policy; the endogeneity of seignorage unlikc traditional models of hyperinflation; and lhe ineffectiveness of very high real interest rates.

Sequential auctions with continuation costs

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "when do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this modele Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this modele

Portifolio selection with random transaction costs

Transaction costs have a random component in the bid-ask spread. Facing a high bid-ask spread, the consumer has the option to wait for better terms oI' trade, but only by carrying an undesirable portfolio balance. We present the best policy in this case. We pose the control problem and show that the value function is the uni que viscosity solution of the relevant variational inequality. Next, a numerical procedure for the problem is presented.

WeIfare costs of inflation the case for interest-bearing money and empiricaI Estimates for Brazil

We provide in this paper a closed fonn for the Welfare Cost of Inflation which we prove to be closer than Bailey's expression to the correct solution of the corresponding non-separable differential equation. Next, we extend this approach to an economy with interest-bearing money, once again presenting a better appoximation than the one given by Bailey's approach. Finally, empirical estimates for Brazil are presented.

Monopolies life cycle, bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian growth

This paper analyzes the links between the internaI organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the opportunity of internaI collusion, firms go through a whole life cycle, getting more bureaucratized and Iess efficient over time. vVeak creative destruction in the economy facilitates informal collusion inside firms and exacerbates bureaucratization. As bureaucratization affects the firms' profitability and the return to innovation, stationary equilibrium growth depends in turn on the efficiency of collusive side-contracts within firms.

A restatement of the welafare costs of inflation. The wast of scarce resources in the manufacturing , banking and household sectors

Lucas (2000) estimates that the US welfare costs of inflation are around 1% of GDP. This measurement is consistent with a speci…c distorting channel in terms of the Bailey triangle under the demand for monetary base schedule (outside money): the displacement of resources from the production of consumption goods to the household transaction time à la Baumol. Here, we consider also several new types of distortions in the manufacturing and banking industries. Our new evidences show that both banks and firms demand special occupational employments to avoid the inflation tax. We de…ne the concept of ”the foat labor”: The occupational employments that are aflected by the in‡ation rates. More administrative workers are hired relatively to the bluecollar workers for producing consumption goods. This new phenomenon makes the manufacturing industry more roundabout. To take into account this new stylized fact and others, we redo at same time both ”The model 5: A Banking Sector -2” formulated by Lucas (1993) and ”The Competitive Banking System” proposed by Yoshino (1993). This modelling allows us to characterize better the new types of misallocations. We …nd that the maximum value of the resources wasted by the US economy happened in the years 1980-81, after the 2nd oil shock. In these years, we estimate the excess resources that are allocated for every speci…c distorting channel: i) The US commercial banks spent additional resources of around 2% of GDP; ii) For the purpose of the firm foating time were used between 2.4% and 4.1% of GDP); and iii) For the household transaction time were allocated between 3.1% and 4.5 % of GDP. The Bailey triangle under the demand for the monetary base schedule represented around 1% of GDP, which is consistent with Lucas (2000). We estimate that the US total welfare costs of in‡ation were around 10% of GDP in terms of the consumption goods foregone. The big di¤erence between our results and Lucas (2000) are mainly due to the Harberger triangle in the market for loans (inside money) which makes part of the household transaction time, of the …rm ‡oat labor and of the distortion in the banking industry. This triangle arises due to the widening interest rates spread in the presence of a distorting inflation tax and under a fractionally reserve system. The Harberger triangle can represent 80% of the total welfare costs of inflation while the remaining percentage is split almost equally between the Bailey triangle and the resources used for the bank services. Finally, we formulate several theorems in terms of the optimal nonneutral monetary policy so as to compare with the classical monetary theory.