Stigmatisation of EU mobile citizens: a ticking time bomb for the European project. EPC Commentary, 24 January 2014

The 2013 European Year of Citizens was profoundly marked by escalating attacks against one of the EU’s major achievement for EU citizens: freedom of movement. In April 2013, Home Affairs Ministers from Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK were party to a letter claiming that “a significant number of new immigrants draw social assistance in the host countries, frequently without genuine entitlement, burdening host societies’ social welfare systems”. This letter laid the groundwork for a “battle plan”, presented by David Cameron in November, which aimed to make the free movement of persons “less free” and put forward the idea of capping “EU migration”. Furthermore, in December, the German conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) took up a similar petty political discourse. After the end of the transitional period for Romania and Bulgaria on 1 January 2014, the debate continues with Chuka Umunna (British Labour Party) proposing to restrict the freedom of movement to highly skilled EU citizens and to citizens in possession of a firm job offer. Alongside this, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel announced the formation of a committee to investigate “poverty migration” in Germany. This wave of resentment has been more recently followed by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron, expressing his intention to re-negotiate EU law in order to be able to withdraw child benefits from EU citizens working in the UK, citing Polish citizens working in the UK as an example. Seeing this as a stigmatisation of the Polish population, the Polish foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, qualified Cameron’s discourse as “unacceptable”. The debate over limiting freedom of movement has continuously escalated and reached a worrying level. With the EP elections approaching in May 2014, this debate is likely to become worse.

Immigration and free movement in an unusual electoral race: what implications for the next political cycle? EPC Policy Brief, 20 May 2014

Immigration and freedom of movement of EU citizens are among the main issues debated throughout the European Parliament election campaign and have some potential in determining who tomorrow’s EU leaders will be. This Policy Brief looks at how the two policies are debated at national level – in France, Germany and the UK – and at EU level between the ‘top candidates’ for European Commission Presidency – Jean-Claude Juncker (EPP), Ska Keller (Greens), Martin Schulz (PES) and Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE) – who have participated in several public debates. Two different campaigns have been unfolding in front of EU citizens’ eyes. The tense debate that can be identified at national level on these issues, is not transferred to the EU level, where immigration and free movement are less controversial topics. Furthermore, although participating in European elections, national parties present agendas responding exclusively to the economic and social challenges of their Member State, while the candidates for the Commission Presidency bring forward ‘more European’ programmes. Hence, several aspects need to be reflected upon: What will the consequences of this discontinuity be? How will this impact the future European agenda in terms of immigration and free movement? What institutional consequences will there be? Answering these questions is not a simple task, however, this paper aims to identify the parameters that need to be taken into account and the political landscape which will determine the future EU agenda in terms of immigration and free movement.

The radical Islamic militants of Central Asia. OSW Report, November 2013

Radical Islamic militants from Central Asia have ceased to be a local phenomenon. The organisations created by those groups (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union) engage in propaganda, recruitment, fundraising and terrorist operations in states distant from their traditional area of interest, such as European Union countries, South Asia and the United States. Their ranks contain not only Central Asian Islamists, but also those from other countries, such as Russia, Pakistan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, Turkey and even Myanmar. These organisations’ current activities and forms are multidimensional and complicated, characterised by combat versatility, structural amorphism, operational mobility and simultaneous operations in different fields and theatres. As a result of the universalization of Islamic terrorism, these organisations have been intensifying contacts with other international Islamic terrorist organisations based in Waziristan (mainly al-Qaida, Taliban and the Haqqani Network). A specific system of mutual cooperation has developed between them, involving the specialisation of various terrorist organisations in particular aspects of terrorist activity. The IMU and IJU specialise in the recruitment and training of Islamic radicals from around the world, and have thus become a kind of ‘jihad academy’.

Eurasian integration. Russia's attempt at the economic unification of the post-Soviet area. OSW Study 44/2013

In 2009, Vladimir Putin, the then Russian prime minister, gave impetus to the establishment of closer relations within what was then a still narrow group of three countries: Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Russia was determined in embarking on the implementation of the principles of the Customs Union among these three states and, since 2012, within the Common Economic Space as well. This process of integration is intended to bring about the introduction of ‘four freedoms’ in this area: the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. From Moscow’s point of view, building up such integration structures is especially necessary in order to counteract the economic expansion of the European Union and China. It also feels it is important to take measures against the loosening of the bonds between the CIS countries and Russia. At the same time, close co-operation is expected to guarantee for Russia that the strong politico-economic influences in this area will be maintained. Despite the numerous limitations of the integration process, such as the small number of the participating states or limited progress in implementing the CES, this is still the most advanced integration programme in the region seen since the collapse of the USSR. Progress in putting the rules of the Customs Union into practice can be seen as a success for Moscow. In turn, the formation of the CES is still at an early stage, and it is difficult to determine at this point to what extent the three countries will harmonise their markets.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part III: More reform than renegotiation or repatriation. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 42/December 2014. [see Abstract for I and II]

This paper, the third in a series for a CEPS project on the ‘The British Question’, is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. The reviews considered in this paper cover the following EU policies: the single market for services, financial markets, the free movement of people, cohesion, energy, agriculture, fisheries, competition, social and employment policies, and fundamental rights. The declared objective of Prime Minister Cameron is to secure a ‘new settlement’ between the UK and the EU. From political speeches in the UK one can identify three different types of possible demand: reform of EU policies, renegotiation of the UK’s specific terms of membership, and repatriation of competences from the EU back to the member states. As most of the reviews are now complete, three points are becoming increasingly clear: i) The reform agenda – past, present or future - concerns virtually every branch of EU policy, including several cases reviewed here that are central to stated UK economic interests. The argument that the EU is ‘unreformable’ is shown to be a myth. ii) The highly sensitive cases of immigration from the EU and social policies may translate into requests for renegotiation of specific conditions for the UK, but further large-scale opt-outs, as in the case of the euro and justice and home affairs, are implausible. iii) While demands for repatriation of EU competences are voiced in general terms in public debate in the UK, no specific proposals emerge from the evidence as regards competences at the level at which they are identified in the treaties, and there is no chance of achieving consensus for such ideas among member states. Michael Emerson and Steven Blockmans, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-i-%E2%80%98competences-about-right-so-far%E2%80%99)(http://aei.pitt.edu/45599/); Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Steve Peers and Michael Wriglesworth, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 40, June 2014 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-ii-again-huge-contradiction-between-evidence-and-eurosc)(http://aei.pitt.edu/52452/).

The EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation: an assessment of Ukraine's readiness. OSW Commentary No. 45, 2011-01-17

The Action Plan on visas adopted during the recent EU-Ukraine summit is a success for Ukraine. It is the first time that Kyiv has succeeded in obtaining a definition of the conditions and criteria whose fulfilment will enable Ukraine to apply for the lifting of EU visas for its citizens. Ukraine's strong point has been its political will; the lifting of this visa regime has been a priority for all Ukrainian governments since 2005. Since Viktor Yanukovych became president, Ukraine has adopted or prepared key legal acts that brought it nearer to European standards in the area of border and migration management. One of Kyiv's strengths is also its relatively well reformed and efficiently managed border service. Moreover, illegal transit migration via Ukraine is decreasing, and fewer Ukrainians are trying to enter or stay in the EU illegally. Also, Kyiv has efficiently implemented the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement. The hardest task for Ukraine will be to meet the EU’s expectations concerning values, the condition of Ukrainian democracy, and the rule of law. Corruption remains the main barrier to Ukraine's development and modernisation; the courts are weak and the judicial system inefficient. The main undertaking of the new migration service that is being formed at the moment will be to create a civil system of registration, monitoring and regulating the stays of foreign nationals. This may prove difficult, as the supervisory authority (the Ministry of the Interior) remains an unreformed, police-type bureaucratic institution. Ukraine is lagging behind countries such as Russia, Belarus and Moldova when it comes to the introduction of biometric documents. Another problem is the lack of an electronic information system on foreign nationals, visas and border crossings which would be accessible to all the relevant services and institutions. For these reasons, the complete abolition of visas seems to be a longterm perspective, especially considering that many EU countries, which themselves are faced with the problem of migrants’ integration, are rather sceptical about the further liberalisation of movement of people with their eastern neighbours. In the immediate future, if Ukraine meets some of the requirements set by the EU, it will be able to seek the extension of the visa facilitations that have been in operation since 2008.

One money with several cycles? Evaluation of European business cycles using cluster analysis. ACES Cases No. 2009.3

Optimal currency area theory suggests that business cycle comovement is a sufficient condition for monetary union, particularly if there are low levels of labour mobility between potential members of the monetary union. Previous studies of co-movement of business cycle variables (mainly authored by Artis and Zhang in the late 1990s) found that there was a core of member states in the EU that could be grouped together as having similar business cycle comovements, but these studies always used Germany as the country against which to compare. In this study, the analysis of Artis and Zhang is extended and updated but correlating against both German and euro area macroeconomic aggregates and using more recent techniques in cluster analysis, namely model-based clustering techniques.

From Lampedusa to the Post-Stockholm Programme: Difficult European solidarity in the field of migration. European Policy Brief No. 24, March 2014

Solidarity is a founding principle of the European migration policy. To hold true, Member States must be faithful to their common commitment to European migration rules and implement fair burden sharing of the costs attached to border controls. However, solidarity among Member States appears altogether fragile and under threat, a situation that could jeopardise the founding principle of the free movement of persons in the European Union’s space. The recent solidarity crisis among Member States was solved by an increased externalisation of the European migration policy. Consequently, for the EU to live up to its values, it will have to prove itself generous towards third countries.

Analysis of developments in EU capital flows in the global context. Bruegel Final study Bruegel N° 2015.2574, November 2015

Free movement of capital, which is one of the four fundamental economic freedoms of the European Union, can enhance welfare if it leads to better allocation of financial and productive resources. However, it can also be a source of vulnerability, with far-reaching spillovers. Monitoring and assessing capital flows is therefore crucial for policymakers, market participants and analysts.

Europeanization and the inclusive strategies of executive actors

In Europeanized policy domains, executive actors are considered especially powerful because they are directly responsible for international negotiations. However, in order to avoid failing in the ratification process, they are also highly dependent on the support of domestic, non-state actors. We argue that in Europeanized decision-making processes, state actors are not passively lobbied, but actively seek collaboration with - and support from - domestic actors. We apply stochastic actor-based modelling for network dynamics to collaboration data on two successive bilateral agreements on the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the European Union (EU). Results confirm our hypotheses that state actors are not passively lobbied, but actively look for collaboration with other actors, and especially with potential veto players and euro-sceptical actors from both the conservative Right and the Left.

Sources and seasonality of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons transported to Alert, Canadian Arctic

A probabilistic function (integrated source contribution function, ISCF) based on backward air mass trajectory calculation was developed to track sources and atmospheric pathways of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) to the Canadian High Arctic station of Alert. In addition to the movement of air masses, the emission intensities at the sources and the major processes of partition, indirect photolysis, and deposition occurring on the way to the Arctic were incorporated into the ISCF. The predicted temporal trend of PAHs at Alert was validated by measured PAH concentrations throughout 2004. The PAH levels in the summer are orders of magnitude lower than those in the winter and spring when long-range atmospheric transport events occur more frequently. PAHs observed at Alert are mostly from East Asia (including Russia Far East), North Europe (including European Russia), and North America. These sources account for 25, 45, and 27% of PAHs atmospheric level at Alert, respectively. Source regions and transport pathways contributing to the PAHs contamination in the Canadian High Arctic vary seasonally. In the winter, Russia and Europe are the major sources. PAHs from these sources travel eastward and turn to the north at approximately 120°E before reaching Alert, in conjunction with the well- known Arctic haze events. In the spring, PAHs from Russia and Europe first migrate to the west and then turn to the north at 60°W toward Alert. The majority of PAHs in the summer are from northern Canada where they are carried to Alert via low- level transport pathways. In the fall, 70% of PAHs arriving at Alert are delivered from North American sources.

Statistical grain size parameter of surface samples from Kiel Bay

Geological observations, using "free-diving" techniques (Figure I) were made in September, 1960 and March 1961 along two continuous profiles in the outer Kiel Harbor, Germany and at several other spot locations in the Western Baltic Sea. A distinct terrace, cut in Pleistocene glacial till, was found that was covered with varying amounts and types of recent deposits. Hand samples were taken of the sea-floor sediments and grainsize distribution determined for both the sediment as a whole and for its heavy mineral fraction. From the Laboratory and Field observations it was possible to recognize two distinct types of sand; Type I, Sand resulting from transportation over a long period of time and distance and Type 11, Sand resulting from little transportation and found today near to xvhere it was formed. Several criterea related to the agent of movement could be used to classify the nature of the sediment; (1) undisturbed (the sediment Cover of the Pleistocene Terrace is essentially undisturbed), (2) mixed by organisms, (3) transported by water movements (sediment found with ripple marks, etc., and (4) "Scoured" (the movement of individual particles of sediment from around larger boulders causes a slow downward movement or "Creeping" which is due to both the force of gravity and bottom currents. These observations and laboratory studies are discussed concerning their relationship to the formation of residual sediments, the direction of sand transportation, and the intensive erosion on the outer edge of the wave-cut platform found in this part of the Baltic Sea.

Planktonic foraminiferal faunas and stable isotope ratios of sediments from the Benguela Upwelling System

Two sediment cores retrieved from the continental slope in the Benguela Upwelling System, GeoB 1706 (19°33.7'S 11°10.5'E) and GeoB 1711 (23°18.9'S, 12°22.6'E), reveal striking variations in planktonic foraminiferal abundances during the last 160,000 years. These fluctuations are investigated to assess changes in the intensity and position of the upwelling centres off Namibia. Four species make up over 95% of the variation within the core, and enable the record to be divided into episodes characterized by particular planktonic foraminiferal assemblages. The fossil assemblages have meaningful ecological significance when compared to those of the modern day and the relationship to their environment. The cold-water planktonic foraminifer, Neogloboquadrina pachyderma sinistral [N. pachyderma (s)], dominates the modern-day, coastal upwelling centres, and Neogloboquadrina pachyderma dextral and Globigerina bulloides characterize the fringes of the upwelling cells. Globorotalia inflata is representative of the offshore boundary between newly upwelled waters and the transitional, reduced nutrient levels of the subtropical waters. In the fossil record, episodes of high N. pachyderma (s) abundances are interpreted as evidence of increased upwelling intensity, and the associated increase in nutrients. The N. pachyderma (s) record suggests temporal shifts in the intensity of upwelling, and corresponding trophic domains, that do not follow the typical glacial-interglacial pattern. Periods of high N. pachyderma (s) abundance describe rapid, discrete events dominating isotope stages 3 and 2. The timing of these events correlates to the temporal shifts of the Angola-Benguela Front (Jansen et al., 1997) situated to the north of the Walvis Ridge. Absence of high abundances of N. pachyderma (s) from the continental slope of the southern Cape Basin indicates that Southern Ocean surface water advection has not exerted a major influence on the Benguela Current System. The coincidence of increased upwelling intensity with the movement of the Angola-Benguela Front can be interpreted mainly by changes in strength and zonality of the trade wind system.