Planktonic foraminiferal stratigraphy of sediments from ODP Leg 173 sites

Planktonic foraminifers recovered from five sites drilled off western Portugal during Ocean Drilling Program Leg 173 are documented. Hole 1065A yielded planktonic foraminifers from Miocene sediments in Sections 173-1065A-1R-1 through 6R-2. Hole 1067A penetrated middle Eocene sediments containing planktonic foraminifers in Section 173-1067A-1R-1 through Lower Eocene planktonic foraminiferal horizons to Section 12R-CC. Hole 1068A yielded planktonic foraminiferal assemblages from middle Eocene sediments at Section 173-1068A-1R-1 to Maastrichtian sediments at Section 173-1068A-15R-3, whereas Hole 1069A contained middle Eocene taxa in Section 173-1069A-1R-1 through Campanian/Maastrichtian forms in Section 173-1069A-15R-2. All of the planktonic foraminifers recovered from these sites are of poor to moderately good preservation and are variable in abundance. Hole 1070A yielded only six planktonic foraminifers, with the assemblages being dominated by benthic foraminifers and fish teeth. The co-occurrence of other microfossil groups, including benthic foraminifers, are only briefly discussed here. The lower Miocene biosiliceous facies recorded in Hole 1065A is considered to be coeval with a similar facies found in onshore sections farther to the east, in southern Spain.

As redes sociotécnicas da comunidade gamer : Habilidades cognitivas, capitalismo cognitivo e pirataria no orkut

In the perspective of the so called 'cognitive capitalism', this paper intends to analyze the sharing and customization strategies developed in Brazilian online game communities. Under Bruno Latour's Actor-Network Theory (ANT), this work describes these socio-technical networks electing the human and non human relevant actants for their role on what could also be depicted as an distributed cognitive process (HUTCHINS, 2000). This alternative way of participative consumption deals with the social and creative production of tutorials; in-game and out-game editing and all sorts of gathering, organization and distribution of virtual data. The communities studied are related to the game Pro Evolution Soccer (PES) in their multiple platforms

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

El juego recreativo y el deporte social como política de derecho : Su relación con la infancia en condiciones de vulnerabilidad social

Actualmente son reconocidos los beneficios del deporte, la actividad física y la recreación para el desarrollo humano y social de las poblaciones y su afirmación como derechos humanos en diferentes instrumentos legales. Este derecho al deporte y al juego recreativo en la infancia se hace explícito en la Convención de los Derechos del Niño (ONU, 1989), en la Ley de Educación Nacional, y en la Ley de Protección Integral (Ley 26.061). El propósito de este trabajo es estudiar la implementación de políticas públicas mediante el estudio de caso en el Partido de La Matanza, en tres espacios socio-residenciales de villa o asentamientos urbanos, que tuvieron como población participante principal niños/as entre 4 y 14 años. Mediante la triangulación de perspectivas cualitativas se realizó un análisis en paralelo entre el enfoque teórico y metodológico del programa, y las prácticas objetivas desarrolladas en el territorio. Se reconocen los límites que tienen los programas orientados al "deporte social" para traducir en prácticas concretas el ideario del desarrollo humano desde un enfoque de derechos, los desafíos de cobertura y en particular de construcción e implementación de ofertas educativas de calidad en el campo del juego recreativo y el deporte

Aprender a enseñar juegos motores con otros : De saber jugar a intervenir como profesor de Educación Física

Durante la formación inicial, los estudiantes del profesorado de Educación Física construyen conocimientos teóricos y prácticos alrededor de prácticas corporales ya conocidas y vivenciadas. Aprenden sobre lo aprendido. Redefinen conocimientos prácticos en un nivel mayor de complejidad y abstracción asignándoles valor educativo que fundamentará su intervención profesional. Cuando le enseñan a proponer 'juegos no juegos' (actividades o deportes que presenta como juegos aunque no todos pueden jugar) el estudiante de Educación Física dispone de elementos teóricos que fundamentan el uso del juego como un recurso pedagógico (ya sea, como contenido de otros ejes, o como estrategia metodológica para la enseñanza de deportes o habilidades motoras). Sin embargo, cuando le enseñan a proponer juegos populares para divertirse, encuentra dificultad para planificar y justificar su futura intervención. Los resultados finales de una investigación cualitativa, presentada como tesis de maestría, muestran que en Educación Física se enseñan múltiples formas de juego motor con otros pero un solo modo de jugarlos: el no lúdico. Se enseña a subordinar el modo de jugar a la forma de los juegos propuestos por el profesor. Se enseña a moverse en el marco de lo permitido por las reglas del juego, a poner el cuerpo al servicio del juego

El juego recreativo y el deporte social como política de derecho : Su relación con la infancia en condiciones de vulnerabilidad social

Actualmente son reconocidos los beneficios del deporte, la actividad física y la recreación para el desarrollo humano y social de las poblaciones y su afirmación como derechos humanos en diferentes instrumentos legales. Este derecho al deporte y al juego recreativo en la infancia se hace explícito en la Convención de los Derechos del Niño (ONU, 1989), en la Ley de Educación Nacional, y en la Ley de Protección Integral (Ley 26.061). El propósito de este trabajo es estudiar la implementación de políticas públicas mediante el estudio de caso en el Partido de La Matanza, en tres espacios socio-residenciales de villa o asentamientos urbanos, que tuvieron como población participante principal niños/as entre 4 y 14 años. Mediante la triangulación de perspectivas cualitativas se realizó un análisis en paralelo entre el enfoque teórico y metodológico del programa, y las prácticas objetivas desarrolladas en el territorio. Se reconocen los límites que tienen los programas orientados al "deporte social" para traducir en prácticas concretas el ideario del desarrollo humano desde un enfoque de derechos, los desafíos de cobertura y en particular de construcción e implementación de ofertas educativas de calidad en el campo del juego recreativo y el deporte

Aprender a enseñar juegos motores con otros : De saber jugar a intervenir como profesor de Educación Física

Durante la formación inicial, los estudiantes del profesorado de Educación Física construyen conocimientos teóricos y prácticos alrededor de prácticas corporales ya conocidas y vivenciadas. Aprenden sobre lo aprendido. Redefinen conocimientos prácticos en un nivel mayor de complejidad y abstracción asignándoles valor educativo que fundamentará su intervención profesional. Cuando le enseñan a proponer 'juegos no juegos' (actividades o deportes que presenta como juegos aunque no todos pueden jugar) el estudiante de Educación Física dispone de elementos teóricos que fundamentan el uso del juego como un recurso pedagógico (ya sea, como contenido de otros ejes, o como estrategia metodológica para la enseñanza de deportes o habilidades motoras). Sin embargo, cuando le enseñan a proponer juegos populares para divertirse, encuentra dificultad para planificar y justificar su futura intervención. Los resultados finales de una investigación cualitativa, presentada como tesis de maestría, muestran que en Educación Física se enseñan múltiples formas de juego motor con otros pero un solo modo de jugarlos: el no lúdico. Se enseña a subordinar el modo de jugar a la forma de los juegos propuestos por el profesor. Se enseña a moverse en el marco de lo permitido por las reglas del juego, a poner el cuerpo al servicio del juego

As redes sociotécnicas da comunidade gamer : Habilidades cognitivas, capitalismo cognitivo e pirataria no orkut

In the perspective of the so called 'cognitive capitalism', this paper intends to analyze the sharing and customization strategies developed in Brazilian online game communities. Under Bruno Latour's Actor-Network Theory (ANT), this work describes these socio-technical networks electing the human and non human relevant actants for their role on what could also be depicted as an distributed cognitive process (HUTCHINS, 2000). This alternative way of participative consumption deals with the social and creative production of tutorials; in-game and out-game editing and all sorts of gathering, organization and distribution of virtual data. The communities studied are related to the game Pro Evolution Soccer (PES) in their multiple platforms

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

As redes sociotécnicas da comunidade gamer : Habilidades cognitivas, capitalismo cognitivo e pirataria no orkut

In the perspective of the so called 'cognitive capitalism', this paper intends to analyze the sharing and customization strategies developed in Brazilian online game communities. Under Bruno Latour's Actor-Network Theory (ANT), this work describes these socio-technical networks electing the human and non human relevant actants for their role on what could also be depicted as an distributed cognitive process (HUTCHINS, 2000). This alternative way of participative consumption deals with the social and creative production of tutorials; in-game and out-game editing and all sorts of gathering, organization and distribution of virtual data. The communities studied are related to the game Pro Evolution Soccer (PES) in their multiple platforms

El juego recreativo y el deporte social como política de derecho : Su relación con la infancia en condiciones de vulnerabilidad social

Actualmente son reconocidos los beneficios del deporte, la actividad física y la recreación para el desarrollo humano y social de las poblaciones y su afirmación como derechos humanos en diferentes instrumentos legales. Este derecho al deporte y al juego recreativo en la infancia se hace explícito en la Convención de los Derechos del Niño (ONU, 1989), en la Ley de Educación Nacional, y en la Ley de Protección Integral (Ley 26.061). El propósito de este trabajo es estudiar la implementación de políticas públicas mediante el estudio de caso en el Partido de La Matanza, en tres espacios socio-residenciales de villa o asentamientos urbanos, que tuvieron como población participante principal niños/as entre 4 y 14 años. Mediante la triangulación de perspectivas cualitativas se realizó un análisis en paralelo entre el enfoque teórico y metodológico del programa, y las prácticas objetivas desarrolladas en el territorio. Se reconocen los límites que tienen los programas orientados al "deporte social" para traducir en prácticas concretas el ideario del desarrollo humano desde un enfoque de derechos, los desafíos de cobertura y en particular de construcción e implementación de ofertas educativas de calidad en el campo del juego recreativo y el deporte

Aprender a enseñar juegos motores con otros : De saber jugar a intervenir como profesor de Educación Física

Durante la formación inicial, los estudiantes del profesorado de Educación Física construyen conocimientos teóricos y prácticos alrededor de prácticas corporales ya conocidas y vivenciadas. Aprenden sobre lo aprendido. Redefinen conocimientos prácticos en un nivel mayor de complejidad y abstracción asignándoles valor educativo que fundamentará su intervención profesional. Cuando le enseñan a proponer 'juegos no juegos' (actividades o deportes que presenta como juegos aunque no todos pueden jugar) el estudiante de Educación Física dispone de elementos teóricos que fundamentan el uso del juego como un recurso pedagógico (ya sea, como contenido de otros ejes, o como estrategia metodológica para la enseñanza de deportes o habilidades motoras). Sin embargo, cuando le enseñan a proponer juegos populares para divertirse, encuentra dificultad para planificar y justificar su futura intervención. Los resultados finales de una investigación cualitativa, presentada como tesis de maestría, muestran que en Educación Física se enseñan múltiples formas de juego motor con otros pero un solo modo de jugarlos: el no lúdico. Se enseña a subordinar el modo de jugar a la forma de los juegos propuestos por el profesor. Se enseña a moverse en el marco de lo permitido por las reglas del juego, a poner el cuerpo al servicio del juego

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Mesozooplankton investigations in Bornholm Basin, Baltic Sea

Mesozooplankton production was estimated by using a new sampling technique and two alternative calculation methods. In essence, production estimates are based on significantly higher abundances. The contribution of juvenile stages to copepod and fish dynamics was generally low, so that the omission of juvenile stages in budgets will result in a small error. The situations reported in this study present a unique food web szenario, which in detail, however, was strongly dependent on methodology. Furthermore relations between trophic levels were considered with respect to vertical distribution.

Relative abundance of pteropod species of the plankton pump samples in the surface water of the eastern North Atlantic Ocean (Table 4)

Plankton pump samples and plankton tows (size fractions between 0.04 mm and 1.01 mm) from the eastern North Atlantic Ocean contain the following shell- and skeleton-producing planktonic and nektonic organisms, which can be fossilized in the sediments: diatoms, radiolarians, foraminifers, pteropods, heteropods, larvae of benthic gastropods and bivalves, ostracods, and fish. The abundance of these components has been mapped quantitatively in the eastern North Atlantic surface waters in October - December 1971. More ash (after ignition of the organic matter, consisting mostly of these components) per cubic meter of water is found close to land masses (continents and islands) and above shallow submarine elevations than in the open ocean. Preferred biotops of planktonic diatoms in the region described are temperate shallow water and tropical coastal upwelling areas. Radiolarians rarely occur close to the continent, but are abundant in pelagic warm water masses, even near islands. Foraminifers are similar to the radiolarians, rarer in the coastal water mass of the continent than in the open ocean or off oceanic islands. Their abundance is highest outside the upwelling area off NW Africa. Molluscs generally outnumber planktonic foraminifers, implying that the carbonate cycle of the ocean might be influenced considerably by these animals. The molluscs include heteropods, pteropods, and larvae of benthic bivalves and gastropods. Larvae of benthic molluscs occur more frequently close to continental and island margins and above submarine shoals (in this case mostly guyots) than in the open ocean. Their size increases, but they decrease in number with increasing distance from their area of origin. Ostracods and fish have only been found in small numbers concentrated off NW Africa. All of the above-mentioned components occur in higher abundances in the surface water than in subsurface waters. They are closely related to the hydrography of the sampled water masses (here defined through temperature measurements). Relatively warm water masses of the southeastern branches of the Gulf Stream system transport subtropical and southern temperate species to the Bay of Biscay, relatively cool water masses of the Portugal and Canary Currents carry transitional faunal elements along the NW African coast southwards to tropical regions. These mix in the northwest African upwelling area with tropical faunal elements which are generally assumed to live in the subsurface water masses and which probably have been transported northwards to this area by a subsurface counter current. The faunas typical for tropical surface water masses are not only reduced due to the tongue of cool water extending southwards along the coast, but they are also removed from the coastal zone by the upwelling subsurface water masses carrying their own shell and skeleton assemblages. Tropical water masses contain much more shelland skeleton-producing plankters than subtropical and temperate ones. The climatic conditions found at different latitudes control the development and intensity of a separate continental coastal water mass with its own plankton assemblages. Extent of this water mass and steepness of gradients between the pelagic and coastal environment limit the occurrence of pelagic plankton close to the continental coast. A similar water mass in only weakly developed off oceanic islands.