On games corresponding to sequencing situations with precedence relations

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Fair procedures. Evidence from games involving lotteries

Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.

Environmental management problems, future generations and social decisions

The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.

Entrepreneurship, management services and economic growth

We model the joint production of entrepreneurs and workers where the former provide both entrepreneurial (strategic) and managerial (coordination, motivation) services, and management services are shared with individual workers in an output maximizing way. The static equilibrium of the model determines the endogenous share of entrepreneurs in the economy in a given moment of time. The time dynamics of the solution implies that a given growth rate in quality of entrepreneurial services contributes to productivity growth proportionally to the share of entrepreneurs at the start of the period and improvement in quality of entrepreneurial services is convergence enhancing. Model predictions are tested with data from OECD countries in the period 1970-2002. We find that improvements in quality of entrepreneurial services over time explain up to 100% of observed average productivity growth in these countries.

Repeated games played in a network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.

Cooperative Transmission and Radio Resources Management for Wireless Networks

Report for the scientific sojourn at the Multimedia Communications Laboratory, University of Texas at Dallas, USA, from September to December 2005. The cooperative transmission has been analyzed taking a broadcast relay channel which assumes a scenario with one source and multiple destinations. Moreover, in order to improve the performance in terms of mutual information, it has been considered that for each destination there is another nearby terminal (called relay) which will help to improve the performance of the destination. This scheme combines different types of channels considered in the information theory, such as the relay channel, broadcast channel and interference channel (if the relays transmit information intended only to its associated destination). In this work, the author has studied the optimal way to encode the signals for the different users, known as capacity region (i.e. related to radio resources management ), of the broadcast relay channel.

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Frames and games

Decision-makers are sometimes influenced by the way in which choice situations are presented to them or "framed" This can be seen as an important challenge to the social sciences, since strong and pervasive framing effects would make it difficult to study human behavior in a synthetic or theoretic manner. We present results from experiments with dilemma games designed to shed light on the effects of several frame variations. We study, among others, the particular public bad frame used by Andreoni (1995) and two more naturalistic frames involving stories. Our results show that none of the frame manipulations have a significant effect on average behavior, but we do find some effects on extreme behavior. We also find that incentives do matter where frames do not matter.

Communication, cultural identities and the Olympic Games: the Barcelona’92 experience

This document includes the results of the research undertaken by the author on the media planning and coverage of the Barcelona'92 and its cultural implications.

La información y documentación deportiva y los grandes eventos deportivos

Ponencia presentada en la Jornadas de Documentación Deportiva organizadas por el Instituto Andaluz del Deporte en 2003, centrada en el papel de la gestión de la información de los acontecimientos deportivos, en particular los Juegos Olímpicos.

Symbol and logo of Barcelona’92 Olympic Games

This text has been published in the book Jocs Olímpics, comunicació i intercanvis culturals: l’experiència dels últims quatre Jocs Olímpics d’estiu, gathering the communications presented in the international Symposium that was celebrated in Barcelona from 3 to 5 april of 1991.

The Olympic Games as a tool for urban renewal: the experience of Barcelona’92 Olympic Village

Paper discussing on the impact of the Games on the urban development of host cities, analysing in particular the Barcelona'92 Olympic Village. This article was published in the book entitled "Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences" compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).