Russian army justifies its reforms. OSW Commentary No. 109, 2013-06-25

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been more active than usual since mid- -February this year, holding a number of previously unannounced military exercises aimed at testing combat readiness. They have also maintained, for many months, a Russian warship task force in the Mediterranean in connection with the civil war in Syria. Those activities stand out of the usual training routine of the Russian army. They have no precedent in Russia’s recent history in terms of the size of the forces involved, the measures employed, the territorial span, the number of exercises, or the scheduling and mode of carrying out the drills. The last combat-readiness tests on this scale were carried out by the Soviet army in the 1980s. The intensity of the Russian Navy’s activities in the Mediterranean and the military means engaged are comparable, in due proportion, with the activities of the Soviet fleet during the Vietnam war. The Russian leadership, including president Vladimir Putin, has been directly following the recent activities of the Russian Armed Forces and their evolution.

Counter-reforms in times of prosperity. OSW Point of View, September 2006

In 2000, Vladimir Putin came to power after nearly a decade of the rule of the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin. As prime minister, and later as a candidate for president, Putin announced that he would reform the state. The main assumptions of this reform were presented during a congress of the pro-Kremlin Unity movement, in Putin's address entitled 'Russia at the turn of the millennium' which was delivered on 29 December 1999, and later in a open letter to voters published on 25 February 2000. Both declarations were rather general, but they gave a clear picture of the principal directions of and priority areas for the future president's efforts: they outlined Russia's development path as pro-market and democratic. Nearly seven years have passed since Vladimir Putin came to power, a time for a summary of his achievements. In a way, Vladimir Putin has partially delivered on his initial declarations; indeed, Russia has undergone a deep transformation. However, when seen in the light of the president’s initial promises, the changes appear to be no more than 'counter-reforms', because instead of putting into practice the policy he outlined seven years ago, they have largely followed a different, if not entirely opposite direction.

The invisible hand... of the Kremlin. Capitalism 'a la russe'. OSW Point of View, February 2007

This study describes the two main economic processes observed in Russia during President Vladimir Putin's second term; renationalisation, and the concentration of economic assets. As a result of these processes, the share of state-owned property has increased and the position of the state in the economy has strengthened. According to the authorities, the wide-range renationalisation of the assets and the construction of superholdings based on the state enterprises are intended to boost Russia's potential and stimulate the development of the whole economy. However, in practice the current ruling elite are using these superholdings to strengthen Russia's position on the international arena and to promote their vested interests.

'The power gained, we will never surrender': Russian ruling elite versus the succession and economic crisis. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), October 2009

Even though the economic crisis proved harmful to the Russian economy and people's living standards, it has nonetheless failed to make the elite revise its policy. Despite some problems, the government has managed to sustain economic and political stability, thanks to the reserves it amassed in the times of prosperity, and to the propaganda campaign that protected it, above all Vladimir Putin. The crisis failed to force the elite to implement deeper structural and political reforms. Moreover, it has actually reinforced existing tendencies, such as state control over the economy and its oil-oriented character, the elite's economic expansion at the expense of private businesses, and the preservation of political power. Thus, the crisis has so far failed to dismantle Putinism, indeed quite the reverse - it has in fact contributed to its becoming 'set in stone'.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Turbulence ahead: disputes within the Russian ruling elite are gathering force. OSW Commentary No. 91, 2012-09-27

The last month has seen a public confrontation between Igor Sechin, the president of Rosneft, and Arkady Dvorkovich, the deputy prime minister, concerning the consolidation of the energy sector. This is the latest in a series of disputes between the Kremlin & businessmen from Putin’s inner circle on one side, and the government & Prime Minister Medvedev on the other. These disputes have been wide-ranging in nature, concerning economic policy, the scope of competency of individual members of the elite, but also the ‘tough line’ adopted by the Kremlin since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency. The Kremlin, which is still the main decision-making centre in Russia, has been effectively forcing its opinions through in its short-term disputes with the government. However, a new element in the ongoing conflicts, which is unfavourable to President Putin, is their exceptional strength, their much more public nature, and their wide range (which has included criticism of the president himself) and ever-changing context, especially the worsening socio-economic situation. These conflicts have been overlapping with signs of dissent among Putin’s business supporters, and their declining political willingness to support the leader unconditionally. The Kremlin’s response to the unrest consists of intensifying efforts to discipline the elite and weakening those groups in which Vladimir Putin has limited confidence. The elite’s support is crucial to the stability of his government; to maintain this support, the Kremlin is ready to introduce restrictive and repressive actions against both parliamentarians and government officials. In the short term, such a policy will force the Kremlin’s supporters back into obedience, but fears of a further increase in repression are also starting to be expressed on the sidelines.

Potemkin conservatism. An ideological tool of the Kremlin. OSW Point of View 48, February 2015

Since the beginning of his third presidential term, Vladimir Putin has consistently invoked conservative ideology. Thus he legitimises the Kremlin’s new political strategy, the aim of which is to stabilise the regime and prevent any political mobilisation in Russia around a liberal agenda. This strategy is also intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the current model of government, by portraying it as ‘traditional’ for Russia; and to justify the government’s repressive and anti-Western policies. It also includes the policy of reintegrating the post-Soviet space under the auspices of Moscow, as evidenced by the annexation of Crimea and the Novorossiya project. This strategy was devised as a response to the galvanisation of adherents of liberalisation in Russia, namely the new middle class and a part of the business and administrative elites who publicly demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the regime in 2011 and 2012. However, the dissonance between the conservative slogans mouthed by the ruling elite and its actual conduct suggest that the Kremlin’s ‘conservative project’ is purely instrumental in nature, which in the longer term will undercut its effectiveness by undermining its credibility in the eyes of Russian society.

Turkish Stream and its implications for the EU. European Policy Brief No. 34, March 2015

“A first assessment is that this would not work”, EC Vice-President in charge of Energy Union Mr. Maros Sefcovic said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal at the World Economic Forum in Davos on the 22nd of January. He was commenting on the recent announcement by President Vladimir Putin and Gazprom’s Alexei Miller. Indeed, the Russian gas giant’s CEO announced that South Stream would be replaced by a new project, Turkish Stream, linking Russia to the European part of Turkey and this in addition to the existing 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) Blue stream. This policy brief looks at the various implications this new reality could have for Europe’s energy security.

The altar and the throne alliance. The Russian Orthodox Church vs. the government in Russia. OSW STUDIES 54, 2016-01-04

The Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC), the largest religious community in Russia, plays an essential role in the process of the cultural and national self-identification of the Russian people. Being a socio-political institution with a centuries-long history, it possesses great symbolic capital and enjoys public respect, which has been used for political purposes. Since Vladimir Putin regained the presidency in 2012, in order to strengthen the political regime in Russia the Kremlin has begun to extensively draw upon conservative ideology and promote the traditional moral and social values which the Church is viewed as the guardian of. This has resulted in establishing closer relations between the secular government and the ROC, as well as in a greater engagement of ROC hierarchs and organisations in domestic and foreign policy issues. This situation exposes the ROC to criticism for being excessively involved in politics, and in the longer term, to the risks linked to potential destabilisation of the governmental system in Russia.

Nord Stream II - yes or no? - Political decision of a political Commission. EPC Commentary, 14 June 2016

When the new European Commission started work in autumn 2014, the president of the Commission took great pride in calling it a ‘political Commission’, which will be big on big things and small on small. Whilst the EU is currently dealing with many crises, reality is that things do not come much bigger than Nord Stream II. Will this be a political Commission that stands by its principles, including respect for liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights? Will this Commission have the backbone to politically assess a project that threatens EU unity and its core values, undermines the Union’s commonly agreed commitment to building an Energy Union and facilitates Russia’s aggression against Ukraine? President Juncker’s controversial visit to Russia and meeting with President Putin on 16-17 June is a test-case: will this Commission be ready to defend its commitments and principles when discussing ‘economic issues’?

Virtual car accidents of epilepsy patients, interictal epileptic activity, and medication.

OBJECTIVE To investigate effects of interictal epileptic activity (IEA) and antiepileptic drugs (AEDs) on reactivity and aspects of the fitness to drive for epilepsy patients. METHODS Forty-six adult patients with demonstration of focal or generalized bursts of IEA in electroencephalography (EEG) readings within 1 year prior to inclusion irrespective of medication performed a car driving computer test or a single light flash test (39 patients performed both). Reaction times (RTs), virtual crashes, or lapses (RT ≥ 1 s in the car or flash test) were measured in an IEA burst-triggered fashion during IEA and compared with RT-measurements during unremarkable EEG findings in the same session. RESULTS IEA prolonged RTs both in the flash and car test (p < 0.001) in individual patients up to 200 ms. Generalized IEA with spike/waves (s/w) had the largest effect on RT prolongation (p < 0.001, both tests), whereas mean RT during normal EEG, age, gender, and number of AEDs had no effect. The car test was better than the flash test in detecting RT prolongations (p = 0.030). IEA increased crashes/lapses >26% in sessions with generalized IEA with s/w. The frequency of IEA-associated RT >1 s exceeded predictions (p < 0.001) based on simple RT shift, suggesting functional impairment beyond progressive RT prolongation by IEA. The number of AEDs correlated with prolonged RTs during normal EEG (p < 0.021) but not with IEA-associated RT prolongation or crashes/lapses. SIGNIFICANCE IEA prolonged RTs to varying extents, dependent on IEA type. IEA-associated RTs >1 s were more frequent than predicted, suggesting beginning cerebral decompensation of visual stimulus processing. AEDs somewhat reduced psychomotor speed, but it was mainly the IEA that contributed to an excess of virtual accidents.

Sharpening the edge of market driven intangibles and innovations

A review of the extant literature concludes that market-driven intangibles and innovations are increasingly considered to be the most critical firm-specific resources, but also finds a lack of elaboration of which types of these resources are most important. In this paper, we incorporate these observations into a conceptual model and link it to highly developed institutional settings for the model evaluation. From the point of view of firm revenue management, we can anticipate that performance advantages created through deployment of intellectual and relational capital in marketing and innovation are more likely to be superior. In essence, they constitute the integration of organisational intangibles both in cognitive and behavioural level to create an idiosyncratic combination for each firm. Our research findings show feasible paths for sharpening the edge of market-driven intangibles and innovations. We discuss the key results for research and practice.

Institutional shifts in inter-municipal service delivery:an analysis of developments in eight Western European countries

Comparative research on inter-municipal cooperation in eight European countries shows that there is a great variety of institutional arrangements for cooperation across the different countries. Also, these arrangements tend to change over time in terms of the scope of cooperation among partners, their composition and the degree of organizational integration. This article describes and analyzes the variety of and shifts in institutional arrangements for a specific class of inter-municipal cooperation arrangements: those that are set up to provide for the joint delivery of public services. It is argued that specific arrangements are typically the outcomes of interaction between national institutional contexts,?environmental factors and local preferences.

[Review of] Ivo Mijnssen, The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia I. Back to Our Future! History, Modernity and Patriotism According to Nashi, 2005–2012. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2012, 202pp., e 34.90 p/b

THE YOUTH MOVEMENT NASHI (OURS) WAS FOUNDED IN THE SPRING of 2005 against the backdrop of Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’. Its aim was to stabilise Russia’s political system and take back the streets from opposition demonstrators. Personally loyal to Putin and taking its ideological orientation from Surkov’s concept of ‘sovereign democracy’, Nashi has sought to turn the tide on ‘defeatism’ and develop Russian youth into a patriotic new elite that ‘believes in the future of Russia’ (p. 15). Combining a wealth of empirical detail and the application of insights from discourse theory, Ivo Mijnssen analyses the organisation’s development between 2005 and 2012. His analysis focuses on three key moments—the organisation’s foundation, the apogee of its mobilisation around the Bronze Soldier dispute with Estonia, and the 2010 Seliger youth camp—to help understand Nashi’s organisation, purpose and ideational outlook as well as the limitations and challenges it faces. As such,the book is insightful both for those with an interest in post-Soviet Russian youth culture, and for scholars seeking a rounded understanding of the Kremlin’s initiatives to return a sense of identity and purpose to Russian national life.The first chapter, ‘Background and Context’, outlines the conceptual toolkit provided by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to help make sense of developments on the terrain of identity politics. In their terms, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced acute dislocation of its identity. With the tangible loss of great power status, Russian realities have become unfixed from a discourse enabling national life to be constructed, albeit inherently contingently, as meaningful. The lack of a Gramscian hegemonic discourse to provide a unifying national idea was securitised as an existential threat demanding special measures. Accordingly, the identification of those who are ‘notUs’ has been a recurrent theme of Nashi’s discourse and activity. With the victory in World War II held up as a foundational moment, a constitutive other is found in the notion of ‘unusual fascists’. This notion includes not just neo-Nazis, but reflects a chain of equivalence that expands to include a range of perceived enemies of Putin’s consolidation project such as oligarchs and pro-Western liberals.The empirical background is provided by the second chapter, ‘Russia’s Youth, the Orange Revolution, and Nashi’, which traces the emergence of Nashi amid the climate of political instability of 2004 and 2005. A particularly note-worthy aspect of Mijnssen’s work is the inclusion of citations from his interviews with Nashicommissars; the youth movement’s cadres. Although relatively few in number, such insider conversations provide insight into the ethos of Nashi’s organisation and the outlook of those who have pledged their involvement. Besides the discussion of Nashi’s manifesto, the reader thus gains insight into the motivations of some participants and behind-the-scenes details of Nashi’s activities in response to the perceived threat of anti-government protests. The third chapter, ‘Nashi’s Bronze Soldier’, charts Nashi’s role in elevating the removal of a World War II monument from downtown Tallinn into an international dispute over the interpretation of history. The events subsequent to this securitisation of memory are charted in detail, concluding that Nashi’s activities were ultimately unsuccessful as their demands received little official support.The fourth chapter, ‘Seliger: The Foundry of Modernisation’, presents a distinctive feature of Mijnssen’s study, namely his ethnographic account as a participant observer in the Youth International Forum at Seliger. In the early years of the camp (2005–2007), Russian participants received extensive training, including master classes in ‘methods of forestalling mass unrest’ (p. 131), and the camp served to foster a sense of group identity and purpose among activists. After 2009 the event was no longer officially run as a Nashi camp, and its role became that of a forum for the exchange of ideas about innovation, although camp spirit remained a central feature. In 2010 the camp welcomed international attendees for the first time. As one of about 700 international participants in that year the author provides a fascinating account based on fieldwork diaries.Despite the polemical nature of the topic, Mijnssen’s analysis remains even-handed, exemplified in his balanced assessment of the Seliger experience. While he details the frustrations and disappointments of the international participants with regard to the unaccustomed strict camp discipline, organisational and communication failures, and the controlled format of many discussions,he does not neglect to note the camp’s successes in generating a gratifying collective dynamic between the participants, even among the international attendees who spent only a week there.In addition to the useful bibliography, the book is back-ended by two appendices, which provide the reader with important Russian-language primary source materials. The first is Nashi’s ‘Unusual Fascism’ (Neobyknovennyi fashizm) brochure, and the second is the booklet entitled ‘Some Uncomfortable Questions to the Russian Authorities’ (Neskol’ko neudobnykh voprosov rossiiskoivlasti) which was provided to the Seliger 2010 instructors to guide them in responding to probing questions from foreign participants. Given that these are not readily publicly available even now, they constitute a useful resource from the historical perspective.