Concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights: Some implications for developing countries

This paper explores concentration levels in the ownership of intellectual property rights over plant varieties worldwide. An analysis of data for 30 UPOV member-countries shows a high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights for six major crops at the national level in the developed world. Much of this concentration has arisen owing to the rapid consolidation of the seed industry through mergers and acquisitions, especially in the 1990s. A high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights, in combination with recent efforts to strengthen plant variety protection regimes, is likely to have significant effects on the prospects for future innovation in plant breeding and the distribution of market power between companies. For developing countries, concentration in intellectual property right ownership may have important implications for the structure of domestic seed industries and access to protected varieties and associated plant breeding technologies. These implications for developing countries are likely to become apparent in the context of the rapid spread of plant variety protection and access legislation, emerging changes in the international exchange regime for plant material and liberalised investment policies permitting foreign investment in the seeds sector.

Exploring the feasibility of farmers' rights

In many developing countries, there is concern that a conventional system of plant breeders' rights provides no rewards to farmers for their role in the conservation and enhancement of agro-biodiversity. To redress this imbalance, developing countries are incorporating farmers' rights provisions in their plant variety protection legislation. This article examines the feasibility of farmers' rights provisions based on intellectual property rights. It argues that the farmers' rights provisions crafted by some developing countries will involve enormous operational difficulties, while IPR-based farmers' rights are unlikely to provide significant economic returns to farmers or farming communities. At the same time, farmers' rights provisions, as currently conceived, are likely significantly to dilute the incentives for innovation provided to institutional plant breeders.

Concentration in ownership of plant variety rights: some implications for developing countries

This paper explores concentration levels in the ownership of intellectual property rights over plant varieties worldwide. An analysis of data for 30 UPOV member-countries shows a high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights for six major crops at the national level in the developed world. Much of this concentration has arisen owing to the rapid consolidation of the seed industry through mergers and acquisitions, especially in the 1990s. A high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights, in combination with recent efforts to strengthen plant variety protection regimes, is likely to have significant effects on the prospects for future innovation in plant breeding and the distribution of market power between companies. For developing countries, concentration in intellectual property right ownership may have important implications for the structure of domestic seed industries and access to protected varieties and associated plant breeding technologies. These implications for developing countries are likely to become apparent in the context of the rapid spread of plant variety protection and access legislation, emerging changes in the international exchange regime for plant material and liberalised investment policies permitting foreign investment in the seeds sector. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Ownership rights in performance-based contracting: A case study of English law

Clients and contractors need to be aware of the project’s legal environment because the viability of a procurement strategy can be vitiated by legal rules. This is particularly true regarding Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) whose viability may be threatened by rules of property law: while the PBC concept does not require that the contractor transfers the ownership in the building materials used to the client, the rules of property law often lead to an automatic transfer of ownership. But does the legal environment really render PBC unfeasible? In particular, is PBC unfeasible because contractors lose their materials as assets? These questions need to be answered with respect to the applicable property law. As a case study, English property law has been chosen. Under English law, the rule which governs the automatic transfer of ownership is called quicquid plantatur solo, solo credit (whatever is fixed to the soil belongs to the soil). An analysis of this rule reveals that not all materials which are affixed to land become part of the land. This fate only occurs in relation to materials which have been affixed with the intention of permanently improving the land. Five fictitious PBC cases have been considered in terms of the legal status of the materials involved, and several subsequent legal questions have been addressed. The results suggest that English law does actually threaten the feasibility of PBC in some cases. However, it is also shown that the law provides means to circumvent the unwanted results which flow from the rules of property law. In particular, contractors who are interested in keeping their materials as assets can insist on agreeing a property right in the client’s land, i.e. a contractor’s lien. Therefore, the outcome is that English property law does not render the implementation of the PBC concept unfeasible. At a broader level, the results contribute to the theoretical framework of PBC as an increasingly used procurement strategy.