The Sustainability Impact of the EU Emissions Trading System on the European Industry. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 17/2007

This BEEP explains the mechanism of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) for the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and explore into its likely sustainability impact on European industry. In doing so, it focuses on energy-intensive industries like cement, steel and aluminium production as well as on the emerging hydrogen economy. The BEEP concludes that at the moment it is still very inconsistently implemented and has a fairly narrow scope regarding greenhouse gases and involved sectors. It may also give an incentive to relocate for energy-intensive industries. In its current format, the EU ETS does not yet properly facilitate long term innovation dynamics such as the transition to a hydrogen economy. Nevertheless, the EU ETS is foremost a working system that – with some improvements – has the potential to become a pillar for effective and efficient climate change policy that also gives incentives for investment into climate friendly policies.

EU 2020 Renewable Energy Goals Insufficient. IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/01/January 2012

Summary. It is clear that any action to combat climate change must involve extensive efforts in reducing the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the energy sector. In the EU, nearly 80% of total GHG emissions come from the energy sector (European Commission, 2011, p. 21). Any credible action within the EU on combating climate change therefore requires deep shifts in the way we produce and use our energy. This paper highlights that renewable energy policies to 2020 are insufficient to meet the EU’s long-term climate policy objectives of reducing GHG emissions by between 80 and 95% by 2050, and thereby aiming to avoid an increase in global temperatures of more than 2°C. Such an ambition would likely require a very high share of renewable energy (in the range of 80 to 100%) in the overall energy mix of the EU, given current uncertainties about the feasibility of potential technological developments (e.g. carbon capture and storage technology).

The EU regime on biofuels in transport: Still in search of sustainability. Egmont Paper No. 68, July 2014

Like other regions of the world, the EU is developing biofuels in the transport sector to reduce oil consumption and mitigate climate change. To promote them, it has adopted favourable legislation since the 2000s. In 2009 it even decided to oblige each Member State to ensure that by 2020 the share of energy coming from renewable sources reached at least 10% of their final consumption of energy in the transport sector. Biofuels are considered the main instrument to reach that percentage since the development of other alternatives (such as hydrogen and electricity) will take much longer than expected. Meanwhile, these various legislative initiatives have driven the production and consumption of biofuels in the EU. Biofuels accounted for 4.7% of EU transport fuel consumption in 2011. They have also led to trade and investment in biofuels on a global scale. This large-scale expansion of biofuels has, however, revealed numerous negative impacts. These stem from the fact that first-generation biofuels (i.e., those produced from food crops), of which the most important types are biodiesel and bioethanol, are used almost exclusively to meet the EU’s renewable 10% target in transport. Their negative impacts are: socioeconomic (food price rises), legal (land-grabbing), environmental (for instance, water stress and water pollution; soil erosion; reduction of biodiversity), climatic (direct and indirect land-use effects resulting in more greenhouse gas emissions) and public finance issues (subsidies and tax relief). The extent of such negative impacts depends on how biofuel feedstocks are produced and processed, the scale of production, and in particular, how they influence direct land use change (DLUC) and indirect land use change (ILUC) and the international trade. These negative impacts have thus provoked mounting debates in recent years, with a particular focus on ILUC. They have forced the EU to re-examine how it deals with biofuels and submit amendments to update its legislation. So far, the EU legislation foresees that only sustainable biofuels (produced in the EU or imported) can be used to meet the 10% target and receive public support; and to that end, mandatory sustainability criteria have been defined. Yet they have a huge flaw. Their measurement of greenhouse gas savings from biofuels does not take into account greenhouse gas emissions resulting from ILUC, which represent a major problem. The Energy Council of June 2014 agreed to set a limit on the extent to which firstgeneration biofuels can count towards the 10% target. But this limit appears to be less stringent than the ones made previously by the European Commission and the European Parliament. It also agreed to introduce incentives for the use of advanced (second- and third-generation) biofuels which would be allowed to count double towards the 10% target. But this again appears extremely modest by comparison with what was previously proposed. Finally, the approach chosen to take into account the greenhouse gas emissions due to ILUC appears more than cautious. The Energy Council agreed that the European Commission will carry out a reporting of ILUC emissions by using provisional estimated factors. A review clause will permit the later adjustment of these ILUC factors. With such legislative orientations made by the Energy Council, one cannot consider yet that there is a major shift in the EU biofuels policy. Bolder changes would have probably meant risking the collapse of the high-emission conventional biodiesel industry which currently makes up the majority of Europe’s biofuel production. The interests of EU farmers would have also been affected. There is nevertheless a tension between these legislative orientations and the new Commission’s proposals beyond 2020. In any case, many uncertainties remain on this issue. As long as solutions have not been found to minimize the important collateral damages provoked by the first generation biofuels, more scientific studies and caution are needed. Meanwhile, it would be wise to improve alternative paths towards a sustainable transport sector, i.e., stringent emission and energy standards for all vehicles, better public transport systems, automobiles that run on renewable energy other than biofuels, or other alternatives beyond the present imagination.

Renewables: The great uncertainty of the EU energy strategy. Egmont Paper No. 71, November 2014

Summary. For more than two decades, the development of renewable energy sources (RES) has been an important aim of EU energy policy. It accelerated with the adoption of a 1997 White Paper and the setting a decade later of a 20% renewable energy target, to be reached by 2020. The EU counts on renewable energy for multiple purposes: to diversify its energy supply; to increase its security of supply; and to create new industries, jobs, economic growth and export opportunities, while at the same time reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many expectations rest on its development. Fossil fuels have been critical to the development of industrial nations, including EU Member States, which are now deeply reliant upon coal, oil and gas for nearly every aspect of their existence. Faced with some hard truths, however, the Member States have begun to shelve fossil fuel. These hard truths are as follows: firstly, fossil fuels are a finite resource, sometimes difficult to extract. This means that, at some point, fossil fuels are going to be more difficult to access in Europe or too expensive to use.1 The problem is that you cannot just stop using fossil fuels when they become too expensive; the existing infrastructure is profoundly reliant on fossil fuels. It is thus almost normal that a fierce resistance to change exists. Secondly, fossil fuels contribute to climate change. They emit GHG, which contribute greatly to climate change. As a consequence, their use needs to be drastically reduced. Thirdly, Member States are currently suffering a decline in their own fossil fuel production. This increases their dependence on increasingly costly fossil fuel imports from increasingly unstable countries. This problem is compounded by global developments: the growing share of emerging economies in global energy demand (in particular China and India but also the Middle East) and the development of unconventional oil and gas production in the United States. All these elements endanger the competitiveness of Member States’ economies and their security of supply. Therefore, new indigenous sources of energy and a diversification of energy suppliers and routes to convey energy need to be found. To solve all these challenges, in 2008 the EU put in place a strategy based on three objectives: sustainability (reduction of GHG), competitiveness and security of supply. The adoption of a renewable energy policy was considered essential for reaching these three strategic objectives. The adoption of the 20% renewable energy target has undeniably had a positive effect in the EU on the growth in renewables, with the result that renewable energy sources are steadily increasing their presence in the EU energy mix. They are now, it can be said, an integral part of the EU energy system. However, the necessity of reaching this 20% renewable energy target in 2020, combined with other circumstances, has also engendered in many Member States a certain number of difficulties, creating uncertainties for investors and postponing benefits for consumers. The electricity sector is the clearest example of this downside. Subsidies have become extremely abundant and vary from one Member State to another, compromising both fair competition and single market. Networks encountered many difficulties to develop and adapt. With technological progress these subsidies have also become quite excessive. The growing impact of renewable electricity fluctuations has made some traditional power plants unprofitable and created disincentives for new investments. The EU does clearly need to reassess its strategy. If it repeats the 2008 measures it will risk to provoke increased instability and costs.

Consensus, contradiction, and conciliation of interests: the geo-economics of the Energy Union. EPC Policy Brief, 8 July 2015

European Union energy policy calls for nothing less than a profound transformation of the EU's energy system: by 2050 decarbonised electricity generation with 80-95% fewer greenhouse gas emissions, increased use of renewables, more energy efficiency, a functioning energy market and increased security of supply are to be achieved. Different EU policies (e.g., EU climate and energy package for 2020) are intended to create the political and regulatory framework for this transformation. The sectorial dynamics resulting from these EU policies already affect the systems of electricity generation, transportation and storage in Europe, and the more effective the implementation of new measures the more the structure of Europe's power system will change in the years to come. Recent initiatives such as the 2030 climate/energy package and the Energy Union are supposed to keep this dynamic up. Setting new EU targets, however, is not necessarily the same as meeting them. The impact of EU energy policy is likely to have considerable geo-economic implications for individual member states: with increasing market integration come new competitors; coal and gas power plants face new renewable challengers domestically and abroad; and diversification towards new suppliers will result in new trade routes, entry points and infrastructure. Where these implications are at odds with powerful national interests, any member state may point to Article 194, 2 of the Lisbon Treaty and argue that the EU's energy policy agenda interferes with its given right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, the choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. The implementation of new policy initiatives therefore involves intense negotiations to conciliate contradicting interests, something that traditionally has been far from easy to achieve. In areas where this process runs into difficulties, the transfer of sovereignty to the European level is usually to be found amongst the suggested solutions. Pooling sovereignty on a new level, however, does not automatically result in a consensus, i.e., conciliate contradicting interests. Rather than focussing on the right level of decision making, European policy makers need to face the (inconvenient truth of) geo-economical frictions within the Union that make it difficult to come to an arrangement. The reminder of this text explains these latter, more structural and sector-related challenges for European energy policy in more detail, and develops some concrete steps towards a political and regulatory framework necessary to overcome them.

The uncertain future of the coal energy industry in Germany. OSW COMMENTARY #188, 2015-10-20

Germany’s current energy strategy, known as the “energy transition”, or Energiewende, involves an accelerated withdrawal from the use of nuclear power plants and the development of renewable energy sources (RES). According to the government’s plans, the share of RES in electricity production will gradually increase from its present rate of 26% to 80% in 2050. Greenhouse gas emissions are expected to fall by 80–95% by 2050 when compared to 1990 levels. However, coal power plants still predominate in Germany’s energy mix – they produced 44% of electricity in 2014 (26% from lignite and 18% from hard coal). This makes it difficult to meet the emission reduction objectives, lignite combustion causes the highest levels of greenhouse gas emissions. In order to reach the emission reduction goals, the government launched the process of accelerating the reduction of coal consumption. On 2 July, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy published a plan to reform the German energy market which will be implemented during the present term of government. Emission reduction from coal power plants is the most important issue. This problem has been extensively discussed over the past year and has transformed into a conflict between the government and the coal lobby. The dispute reached its peak when lignite miners took to the streets in Berlin. As the government admits, in order to reach the long-term emission reduction objectives, it is necessary to completely liquidate the coal energy industry in Germany. This is expected to take place within 25 to 30 years. However, since the decision to decommission nuclear power plants was passed, the German ecological movement and the Green Party have shifted their attention to coal power plants, demanding that these be decommissioned by 2030 at the latest.

Towards an Effective EU Framework for Road Transport and GHG Emissions. CEPS Special Report No. 141 / July 2016

The adoption of the Paris Agreement at the end of 2015 and the EU’s intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) have confirmed the EU’s commitment to achieve decarbonisation by 2050. Transport accounts for about a quarter of EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, representing the second-largest source of GHG emissions in Europe after the energy sector. The transport sector will play a significant role in the EU’s efforts to decarbonise its economy in line with its international commitments. The purpose of this report is to examine different EU policy options to address transport emissions, with a special emphasis on passenger cars. It ‘thinks through’ the options that are currently assessed in the EU and considers how they could be put together in a comprehensive framework. The report concludes with a number of measures to lead EU transport decarbonisation policy. A distinction is made between i) no-regret options and ii) measures for consideration.

Continuous CO2/CH4/CO measurements (2012–2014) at Beromünster tall tower station in Switzerland

The understanding of the continental carbon budget is essential to predict future climate change. In order to quantify CO₂ and CH₄ fluxes at the regional scale, a measurement system was installed at the former radio tower in Beromünster as part of the Swiss greenhouse gas monitoring network (CarboCount CH). We have been measuring the mixing ratios of CO₂, CH₄ and CO on this tower with sample inlets at 12.5, 44.6, 71.5, 131.6 and 212.5 m above ground level using a cavity ring down spectroscopy (CRDS) analyzer. The first 2-year (December 2012–December 2014) continuous atmospheric record was analyzed for seasonal and diurnal variations and interspecies correlations. In addition, storage fluxes were calculated from the hourly profiles along the tower. The atmospheric growth rates from 2013 to 2014 determined from this 2-year data set were 1.78 ppm yr⁻¹, 9.66 ppb yr⁻¹ and and -1.27 ppb yr⁻¹ for CO₂, CH₄ and CO, respectively. After detrending, clear seasonal cycles were detected for CO₂ and CO, whereas CH₄ showed a stable baseline suggesting a net balance between sources and sinks over the course of the year. CO and CO₂ were strongly correlated (r² > 0.75) in winter (DJF), but almost uncorrelated in summer. In winter, anthropogenic emissions dominate the biospheric CO₂ fluxes and the variations in mixing ratios are large due to reduced vertical mixing. The diurnal variations of all species showed distinct cycles in spring and summer, with the lowest sampling level showing the most pronounced diurnal amplitudes. The storage flux estimates exhibited reasonable diurnal shapes for CO₂, but underestimated the strength of the surface sinks during daytime. This seems plausible, keeping in mind that we were only able to calculate the storage fluxes along the profile of the tower but not the flux into or out of this profile, since no Eddy covariance flux measurements were taken at the top of the tower.

Validation of the Swiss methane emission inventory by atmospheric observations and inverse modelling

Atmospheric inverse modelling has the potential to provide observation-based estimates of greenhouse gas emissions at the country scale, thereby allowing for an independent validation of national emission inventories. Here, we present a regional-scale inverse modelling study to quantify the emissions of methane (CH₄) from Switzerland, making use of the newly established CarboCount-CH measurement network and a high-resolution Lagrangian transport model. In our reference inversion, prior emissions were taken from the "bottom-up" Swiss Greenhouse Gas Inventory (SGHGI) as published by the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment in 2014 for the year 2012. Overall we estimate national CH₄ emissions to be 196 ± 18 Gg yr⁻¹ for the year 2013 (1σ uncertainty). This result is in close agreement with the recently revised SGHGI estimate of 206 ± 33 Gg yr⁻¹ as reported in 2015 for the year 2012. Results from sensitivity inversions using alternative prior emissions, uncertainty covariance settings, large-scale background mole fractions, two different inverse algorithms (Bayesian and extended Kalman filter), and two different transport models confirm the robustness and independent character of our estimate. According to the latest SGHGI estimate the main CH₄ source categories in Switzerland are agriculture (78 %), waste handling (15 %) and natural gas distribution and combustion (6 %). The spatial distribution and seasonal variability of our posterior emissions suggest an overestimation of agricultural CH₄ emissions by 10 to 20 % in the most recent SGHGI, which is likely due to an overestimation of emissions from manure handling. Urban areas do not appear as emission hotspots in our posterior results, suggesting that leakages from natural gas distribution are only a minor source of CH₄ in Switzerland. This is consistent with rather low emissions of 8.4 Gg yr⁻¹ reported by the SGHGI but inconsistent with the much higher value of 32 Gg yr⁻¹ implied by the EDGARv4.2 inventory for this sector. Increased CH₄ emissions (up to 30 % compared to the prior) were deduced for the north-eastern parts of Switzerland. This feature was common to most sensitivity inversions, which is a strong indicator that it is a real feature and not an artefact of the transport model and the inversion system. However, it was not possible to assign an unambiguous source process to the region. The observations of the CarboCount-CH network provided invaluable and independent information for the validation of the national bottom-up inventory. Similar systems need to be sustained to provide independent monitoring of future climate agreements.

Stable carbon isotope ratios of alkane of IODP Hole 302-M0004A

The Palaeocene/Eocene thermal maximum represents a period of rapid, extreme global warming approx ~55 million years ago, superimposed on an already warm world (Zachos et al., 2003, doi:10.1126/science.1090110; Bowen et al., 2004, doi:10.1038/nature03115; Thomas et al., 2002, doi:10.1130/0091-7613(2002)030<1067:WTFFTF>2.0.CO;2). This warming is associated with a severe shoaling of the ocean calcite compensation depth **4 and a >2.5 per mil negative carbon isotope excursion in marine and soil carbonates (Zachos et al., 2003, doi:10.1126/science.1090110; Bowen et al., 2004, doi:10.1038/nature03115; Thomas et al., 2002, doi:10.1130/0091-7613(2002)030<1067:WTFFTF>2.0.CO;2; Zachos et al., doi:10.1126/science.1109004). Together these observations indicate a massive release of 13C-depleted carbon (Zachos et al., doi:10.1126/science.1109004) and greenhouse-gas-induced warming. Recently, sediments were recovered from the central Arctic Ocean (Backman et al., 2006, doi:10.2204/iodp.proc.302.2006), providing the first opportunity to evaluate the environmental response at the North Pole at this time. Here we present stable hydrogen and carbon isotope measurements of terrestrial-plant- and aquatic-derived n-alkanes that record changes in hydrology, including surface water salinity and precipitation, and the global carbon cycle. Hydrogen isotope records are interpreted as documenting decreased rainout during moisture transport from lower latitudes and increased moisture delivery to the Arctic at the onset of the Palaeocene/Eocene thermal maximum, consistent with predictions of poleward storm track migrations during global warming (Backman et al., 2006, doi:10.2204/iodp.proc.302.2006). The terrestrial-plant carbon isotope excursion (about ~4.5 to ~6 per mil) is substantially larger than those of marine carbonates. Previously, this offset was explained by the physiological response of plants to increases in surface humidity (Bowen et al., 2004, doi:10.1038/nature03115). But this mechanism is not an effective explanation in this wet Arctic setting, leading us to hypothesize that the true magnitude of the excursion - and associated carbon input - was greater than originally surmised. Greater carbon release and strong hydrological cycle feedbacks may help explain the maintenance of this unprecedented warmth.of this unprecedented warmth.

(Table 1) Gravity and pressure within the Sleipner area relative to ones at the reference station in 2002 and 2005

At Sleipner, CO2 is being separated from natural gas and injected into an underground saline aquifer for environmental purposes. Uncertainty in the aquifer temperature leads to uncertainty in the in situ density of CO2. In this study, gravity measurements were made over the injection site in 2002 and 2005 on top of 30 concrete benchmarks on the seafloor in order to constrain the in situ CO2 density. The gravity measurements have a repeatability of 4.3 µGal for 2003 and 3.5 µGal for 2005. The resulting time-lapse uncertainty is 5.3 µGal. Unexpected benchmark motions due to local sediment scouring contribute to the uncertainty. Forward gravity models are calculated based on both 3D seismic data and reservoir simulation models. The time-lapse gravity observations best fit a high temperature forward model based on the time-lapse 3D seismics, suggesting that the average in situ CO2 density is about to 530kg/m**3. Uncertainty in determining the average density is estimated to be ±65 kg/m**3 (95% confidence), however, this does not include uncertainties in the modeling. Additional seismic surveys and future gravity measurements will put better constraints on the CO2 density and continue to map out the CO2 flow.

(Table S1) Stable carbon and oxygen isotopes and Mg/Ca ratios of planktonic foraminifera from ODP Hole 198-1209B

The Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) has been attributed to a rapid rise in greenhouse gas levels. If so, warming should have occurred at all latitudes, although amplified toward the poles. Existing records reveal an increase in high-latitude sea surface temperatures (SSTs) (8° to 10°C) and in bottom water temperatures (4° to 5°C). To date, however, the character of the tropical SST response during this event remains unconstrained. Here we address this deficiency by using paired oxygen isotope and minor element (magnesium/calcium) ratios of planktonic foraminifera from a tropical Pacific core to estimate changes in SST. Using mixed-layer foraminifera, we found that the combined proxies imply a 4° to 5°C rise in Pacific SST during the PETM. These results would necessitate a rise in atmospheric pCO2 to levels three to four times as high as those estimated for the late Paleocene.

Do upwelled waters from the California Undercurrent contribute to high pCO2 within the fjord system of Nootka Sound, BC?

Senior thesis written for Oceanography 445

The Social and Economic Impacts of a Washington State Carbon Tax

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Development of Cookstove Emissions and Performance Testing Suite with Time-resolved Particulate Matter Analysis and Excess Air Estimation

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06