959 resultados para Financial incentives
Resumo:
This work analyzes the use of linear discriminant models, multi-layer perceptron neural networks and wavelet networks for corporate financial distress prediction. Although simple and easy to interpret, linear models require statistical assumptions that may be unrealistic. Neural networks are able to discriminate patterns that are not linearly separable, but the large number of parameters involved in a neural model often causes generalization problems. Wavelet networks are classification models that implement nonlinear discriminant surfaces as the superposition of dilated and translated versions of a single "mother wavelet" function. In this paper, an algorithm is proposed to select dilation and translation parameters that yield a wavelet network classifier with good parsimony characteristics. The models are compared in a case study involving failed and continuing British firms in the period 1997-2000. Problems associated with over-parameterized neural networks are illustrated and the Optimal Brain Damage pruning technique is employed to obtain a parsimonious neural model. The results, supported by a re-sampling study, show that both neural and wavelet networks may be a valid alternative to classical linear discriminant models.
Resumo:
During the financial crisis, companies and lenders found themselves in distressed situations. Competition authorities across the globe had to deal with controversial issues such as the application of the failing firm defence in merger transactions as well as assessment of emergency aid granted by states. This article considers competition policy in periods of crisis, in particular the failing firm defence in merger control and its state aid policy.
Resumo:
The aim of this chapter is to examine what the construction sector brings to our understanding of the procurement of complex performance. The chapter is divided into the following parts: fi rst, an overview of the various matters that contribute to the complexity of construction procurement is provided. Second, the most important contractual incentive schemes found in construction contracts are discussed, and this is followed by, third, an examination of the changes associated with the shift towards procuring complex performance (PCP) (service provision). Fourth, the main findings of the authors’ recent research on PCP contracts are summarised, followed by the conclusion. It should be noted that the procurement of services is referred to as ‘PCP’ in this chapter.