Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

Tractable theories for the synthesis of neural networks

The Radius of Direct attraction of a discrete neural network is a measure of stability of the network. it is known that Hopfield networks designed using Hebb's Rule have a radius of direct attraction of Omega(n/p) where n is the size of the input patterns and p is the number of them. This lower bound is tight if p is no larger than 4. We construct a family of such networks with radius of direct attraction Omega(n/root plog p), for any p greater than or equal to 5. The techniques used to prove the result led us to the first polynomial-time algorithm for designing a neural network with maximum radius of direct attraction around arbitrary input patterns. The optimal synaptic matrix is computed using the ellipsoid method of linear programming in conjunction with an efficient separation oracle. Restrictions of symmetry and non-negative diagonal entries in the synaptic matrix can be accommodated within this scheme.

DMT of Multihop Networks: End Points and Computational Tools

In this paper, the diversity-multiplexing gain tradeoff (DMT) of single-source, single-sink (ss-ss), multihop relay networks having slow-fading links is studied. In particular, the two end-points of the DMT of ss-ss full-duplex networks are determined, by showing that the maximum achievable diversity gain is equal to the min-cut and that the maximum multiplexing gain is equal to the min-cut rank, the latter by using an operational connection to a deterministic network. Also included in the paper, are several results that aid in the computation of the DMT of networks operating under amplify-and-forward (AF) protocols. In particular, it is shown that the colored noise encountered in amplify-and-forward protocols can be treated as white for the purpose of DMT computation, lower bounds on the DMT of lower-triangular channel matrices are derived and the DMT of parallel MIMO channels is computed. All protocols appearing in the paper are explicit and rely only upon AF relaying. Half-duplex networks and explicit coding schemes are studied in a companion paper.