Annotated bibliography on socio-economic and ecological impacts of marine protected areas in Pacific Island countries

The bibliography is to highlight impacts on fisheries and livelihoods attributed to coral reef marine protected areas in Pacific Island countries and territories. Included in this collection is literature that reports various forms of reef area management practiced in Pacific Island countries: reserves, sanctuaries, permanent or temporary closed areas, community and traditional managed areas. (Document contains 36 pages)

Reference Points Based on Dynamic Optimisation: A Versatil Algorithm for Mixed Fishery Management with Bio-economic Agestructured Models

Single-species management objectives may not be consistent within mixed fisheries. They may lead species to unsafe situations, promote discarding of over-quota and/or misreporting of catches. We provide an algorithm for characterising bio-economic reference points for a mixed fishery as the steady-state solution of a dynamic optimal management problem. The optimisation problem takes into account: i) that species are fishing simultaneously in unselective fishing operations and ii)intertemporal discounting and fleet costs to relate reference points to discounted economic profits along optimal trajectories. We illustrate how the algorithm can be implemented by applying it to the European Northern Stock of Hake (Merluccius merluccius), where fleets also capture Northern megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis) and Northern anglerfish (Lophius piscatorius and Lophius budegassa). We find that optimal mixed management leads to a target reference point that is quite similar to the 2/3 of the Fmsy single-species (hake) target. Mixed management is superior to singlespecies management because it leads the fishery to higher discounted profits with higher long-term SSB for all species. We calculate that the losses due to the use of the Fmsy single-species (hake) target in this mixed fishery account for 11.4% of total discounted profits.

Consumer Expertise or Credit Risk? An empirical analysis of mortgage pricing

Loan mortgage interest rates are usually the result of a bank-customer negotiation process. Credit risk, consumer cross-buying potential, bundling, financial market competition and other features affecting the bargaining power of the parties could affect price. We argue that, since mortgage loan is a complex product, consumer expertise could be a relevant factor for mortgage pricing. Using data on mortgage loan prices for a sample of 1055 households for the year 2005 (Bank of Spain Survey of Household Finances, EFF-2005), and including credit risk, costs, potential capacity of the consumer to generate future business and bank competition variables, the regression results indicate that consumer expertise-related metrics are highly significant as predictors of mortgage loan prices. Other factors such as credit risk and consumer cross-buying potential do not have such a significant impact on mortgage prices. Our empirical results are affected by the credit conditions prior to the financial crisis and could shed some light on this issue.

Data Revisions in the Estimation of DSGE Models

Revisions of US macroeconomic data are not white-noise. They are persistent, correlated with real-time data, and with high variability (around 80% of volatility observed in US real-time data). Their business cycle effects are examined in an estimated DSGE model extended with both real-time and final data. After implementing a Bayesian estimation approach, the role of both habit formation and price indexation fall significantly in the extended model. The results show how revision shocks of both output and inflation are expansionary because they occur when real-time published data are too low and the Fed reacts by cutting interest rates. Consumption revisions, by contrast, are countercyclical as consumption habits mirror the observed reduction in real-time consumption. In turn, revisions of the three variables explain 9.3% of changes of output in its long-run variance decomposition.

Economic Impacts of Aquatic Vegetation to Angling in Two South Carolina Reservoirs

Angler creel surveys and economic impact models were used to evaluate potential expansion of aquatic vegetation in Lakes Murray and Moultrie, South Carolina. (PDF contains 4 pages.)

Catch-22: conservation, communities and the privatization of B.C. fisheries. An economic, social and ecological impact study

pdf contains 47 pages

Selectivity, pulse fishing and endogenous lifespan in Beverton-Holt models

Optimal management in a multi-cohort Beverton-Holt model with any number of age classes and imperfect selectivity is equivalent to finding the optimal fish lifespan by chosen fallow cycles. Optimal policy differs in two main ways from the optimal lifespan rule with perfect selectivity. First, weight gain is valued in terms of the whole population structure. Second, the cost of waiting is the interest rate adjusted for the increase in the pulse length. This point is especially relevant for assessing the role of selectivity. Imperfect selectivity reduces the optimal lifespan and the optimal pulse length. We illustrate our theoretical findings with a numerical example. Results obtained using global numerical methods select the optimal pulse length predicted by the optimal lifespan rule.

Basoa Euskal Herriko historian zehar

[EUS]Antzinako errejimenean basoa bizitzaren bizigunea zen.Garai honetan jarduera gehienak basoaren inguruan kokatzen ziren: gizakumeen elikadura, abereen janaria, ehiza,etxeko sua, ikatzaren industria,eraikinak, nekazaritza, etxeko eta teknika tresnak, ontzigintza, e.a. Horregati, basoak izan zuen bilakaera jarduera hauekin oso lotuta zegoen. Gipuzkoa eta Bizkaia jarduera hauen arteko eta basoaren inguruko aurkakotasuna bortitza baino bortitzagoa izan zuen. Egun, gauzak aldatu dira, basoak ez du ekonomiarekiko hainbeste garrantzirik. Momentu honetan basoarekiko interesa izadiaren kontserbatzioan eta suntsiketan datza

Submarine landslides : selected studies in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone

Submarine Landslides: An Introduction 1 By RIo Lee, W.C. Schwab, and J.S. Booth U.S. Atlantic Continental Slope Landslides: Their Distribution, General Anributes, and Implications 14 By J.S. Booth, D.W. O'Leary, Peter Popenoe, and W.W. Danforth Submarine Mass Movement, a Formative Process of Passive Continental Margins: The Munson-Nygren Landslide Complex and the Southeast New England Landslide Complex 23 By D.W. O'Leary The Cape Fear Landslide: Slope Failure Associated with Salt Diapirism and Gas Hydrate Decomposition 40 By Peter Popenoe, E.A. Schmuck, and W.P. Dillon Ancient Crustal Fractures Control the Location and Size of Collapsed Blocks at the Blake Escarpment, East of Florida 54 By W.P. Dillon, J.S. Risch, K.M. Scanlon, P.C. Valentine, and Q.J. Huggett Tectonic and Stratigraphic Control on a Giant Submarine Slope Failure: Puerto Rico Insular Slope 60 By W.C. Schwab, W.W. Danforth, and K.M. Scanlon Slope Failure of Carbonate Sediment on the West Florida Slope 69 By D.C. Twichell, P.C. Valentine, and L.M. Parson Slope Failures in an Area of High Sedimentation Rate: Offshore Mississippi River Delta 79 By J.M. Coleman, D.B. Prior, L.E. Garrison, and H.J. Lee Salt Tectonics and Slope Failure in an Area of Salt Domes in the Northwestern Gulf of Mexico 92 By B.A. McGregor, R.G. Rothwell, N.H. Kenyon, and D.C. Twichell Slope Stability in Regions 01 Sea-Floor Gas Hydrate: Beaufort Sea Continental Slope 97 By R.E. Kayen and H.J. Lee Mass Movement Related to Large Submarine Canyons Along the Beringian Margin, Alaska 104 By P.R. Carlson, H.A. Karl, B.D. Edwards, J.V. Gardner, and R. Hall Comparison of Tectonic and Stratigraphic Control of Submarine Landslides on the Kodiak Upper Continental Slope, Alaska 117 By M.A. Hampton Submarine Landslides That Had a Significant Impact on Man and His Activities: Seward and Valdez, Alaska 123 By M.A. Hampton, R.W. Lemke, and H.W. Coulter Processes Controlling the Style of Mass Movement in Glaciomarine Sediment: Northeastern Gulf of Alaska 135 By W.C. Schwab and H.J. Lee Contents V VI Contents Liquefaction of Continental Shelf Sediment: The Northern California Earthquake of 1980 143 By M.E. Field A Submarine Landslide Associated with Shallow Sea-Floor Gas and Gas Hydrates off Northern California 151 By M.E. Field and J.H. Barber, Jr. Sur Submarine Landslide, a Deep-Water Sediment Slope Failure 158 By C.E. Gutmacher and W.R. Normark Seismically Induced Mudflow in Santa Barbara Basin, California 167 By B.D. Edwards, H.J. Lee, and M.E. Field Submarine Landslides in a Basin and Ridge Setting, Southern California 176 By M.E. Field and B.D. Edwards Giant Volcano-Related Landslides and the Development of the Hawaiian Islands 184 By W.R. Normark, J.G. Moore, and M.E. Torresan Submarine Slope Failures Initiated by Hurricane Iwa, Kahe Point, Oahu, Hawaii 197 By W.R. Normark, Pat Wilde, J.F. Campbell, T.E. Chase, and Bruce Tsutsui (PDF contains 210 pages)

Institutional designs to face the dark side of total allowable catches

Setting total allowable catches (TACs) is an endogenous process in which different agents and institutions, often with conflicting interests and opportunistic behaviour, try to influence policy-makers. Such policy-makers, far from being the benevolent social planners many would wish them to be, may also pursue self-interest when making final decisions. Although restricted knowledge of stock abundance and population dynamics, and weakness in enforcement, have effects, these other factors may explain the reason why TAC management has failed to guarantee sustainable exploitation of fish resources. Rejecting the exogeneity of the TAC and taking advantage of fruitful debate on economic policy (i.e. the rules vs. discretion debate, and that surrounding the independence of central banks), two institutional developments are analysed as potential mechanisms to face up to misconceptions about TACs: long-term harvest control rules, and a central bank of fish.

The Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders: Report on the Design, Implementation, and Descriptive Results for 2006

This technical memorandum documents the design, implementation, data preparation, and descriptive results for the 2006 Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders. The data collection was designed by the NOAA Fisheries Southeast Fisheries Science Center Social Science Research Group to track the financial and economic status and performance by vessels holding a federal moratorium permit for harvesting shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico. A two page, self-administered mail survey collected total annual costs broken out into seven categories and auxiliary economic data. In May 2007, 580 vessels were randomly selected, stratified by state, from a preliminary population of 1,709 vessels with federal permits to shrimp in offshore waters of the Gulf of Mexico. The survey was implemented during the rest of 2007. After many reminder and verification phone calls, 509 surveys were deemed complete, for an ineligibility-adjusted response rate of 90.7%. The linking of each individual vessel’s cost data to its revenue data from a different data collection was imperfect, and hence the final number of observations used in the analyses is 484. Based on various measures and tests of validity throughout the technical memorandum, the quality of the data is high. The results are presented in a standardized table format, linking vessel characteristics and operations to simple balance sheet, cash flow, and income statements. In the text, results are discussed for the total fleet, the Gulf shrimp fleet, the active Gulf shrimp fleet, and the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet. Additional results for shrimp vessels grouped by state, by vessel characteristics, by landings volume, and by ownership structure are available in the appendices. The general conclusion of this report is that the financial and economic situation is bleak for the average vessels in most of the categories that were evaluated. With few exceptions, cash flow for the average vessel is positive while the net revenue from operations and the “profit” are negative. With negative net revenue from operations, the economic return for average shrimp vessels is less than zero. Only with the help of government payments does the average owner just about break even. In the short-term, this will discourage any new investments in the industry. The financial situation in 2006, especially if it endures over multiple years, also is economically unsustainable for the average established business. Vessels in the active and inactive Gulf shrimp fleet are, on average, 69 feet long, weigh 105 gross tons, are powered by 505 hp motor(s), and are 23 years old. Three-quarters of the vessels have steel hulls and 59% use a freezer for refrigeration. The average market value of these vessels was $175,149 in 2006, about a hundred-thousand dollars less than the average original purchase price. The outstanding loans averaged $91,955, leading to an average owner equity of $83,194. Based on the sample, 85% of the federally permitted Gulf shrimp fleet was actively shrimping in 2006. Of these 386 active Gulf shrimp vessels, just under half (46%) were owner-operated. On average, these vessels burned 52,931 gallons of fuel, landed 101,268 pounds of shrimp, and received $2.47 per pound of shrimp. Non-shrimp landings added less than 1% to cash flow, indicating that the federal Gulf shrimp fishery is very specialized. The average total cash outflow was $243,415 of which $108,775 was due to fuel expenses alone. The expenses for hired crew and captains were on average $54,866 which indicates the importance of the industry as a source of wage income. The resulting average net cash flow is $16,225 but has a large standard deviation. For the population of active Gulf shrimp vessels we can state with 95% certainty that the average net cash flow was between $9,500 and $23,000 in 2006. The median net cash flow was $11,843. Based on the income statement for active Gulf shrimp vessels, the average fixed costs accounted for just under a quarter of operating expenses (23.1%), labor costs for just over a quarter (25.3%), and the non-labor variable costs for just over half (51.6%). The fuel costs alone accounted for 42.9% of total operating expenses in 2006. It should be noted that the labor cost category in the income statement includes both the actual cash payments to hired labor and an estimate of the opportunity cost of owner-operators’ time spent as captain. The average labor contribution (as captain) of an owner-operator is estimated at about $19,800. The average net revenue from operations is negative $7,429, and is statistically different and less than zero in spite of a large standard deviation. The economic return to Gulf shrimping is negative 4%. Including non-operating activities, foremost an average government payment of $13,662, leads to an average loss before taxes of $907 for the vessel owners. The confidence interval of this value straddles zero, so we cannot reject, with 95% certainty, that the population average is zero. The average inactive Gulf shrimp vessel is generally of a smaller scale than the average active vessel. Inactive vessels are physically smaller, are valued much lower, and are less dependent on loans. Fixed costs account for nearly three quarters of the total operating expenses of $11,926, and only 6% of these vessels have hull insurance. With an average net cash flow of negative $7,537, the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet has a major liquidity problem. On average, net revenue from operations is negative $11,396, which amounts to a negative 15% economic return, and owners lose $9,381 on their vessels before taxes. To sustain such losses and especially to survive the negative cash flow, many of the owners must be subsidizing their shrimp vessels with the help of other income or wealth sources or are drawing down their equity. Active Gulf shrimp vessels in all states but Texas exhibited negative returns. The Alabama and Mississippi fleets have the highest assets (vessel values), on average, yet they generate zero cash flow and negative $32,224 net revenue from operations. Due to their high (loan) leverage ratio the negative 11% economic return is amplified into a negative 21% return on equity. In contrast, for Texas vessels, which actually have the highest leverage ratio among the states, a 1% economic return is amplified into a 13% return on equity. From a financial perspective, the average Florida and Louisiana vessels conform roughly to the overall average of the active Gulf shrimp fleet. It should be noted that these results are averages and hence hide the variation that clearly exists within all fleets and all categories. Although the financial situation for the average vessel is bleak, some vessels are profitable. (PDF contains 101 pages)