The development of the private equity industry since the 2008 financial crisis

The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.

Financial governance: the Brazilian experience on prudential regulation and its impacts on the effects of the 2008 financial crisis

The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system 1, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was implemented in Brazil in the aftermath of the Real Plan seems to play a decisive role in the resilience of the system nowadays.

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.

Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2008

Includes bibliography

Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2010

Includes bibliography

Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2011

Incluye Bibliografía

Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2010-2011: Internacional integration and macroeconomic policy challenges amid global economic turmoil

Includes bibliography

Summit of the Americas 1994-2009: selected indicators

Includes bibliography

International trade in Latina America and the Caribbean 2009: crisis and recovery

Includes bibliography

Equilibrium real exchange rates, misalignment and competitiveness in the Southern Cone

Includes bibliography

Istmo Centroamericano y República Dominicana: evolución económica durante 2007 y perspectivas para 2008

Incluye Bibliografía

Honduras: evolución económica durante 2008 y perspectivas para 2009

Incluye Bibliografía

Cartera vencida y estrés macrofinanciero: un estudio econométrico para Centroamérica y la República Dominicana en 2008-2009

Incluye Bibliografía

Capital flows to Latin America: recent developments

The external environment has deteriorated sharply as a result of the spiraling financial turmoil, and has led to a weakening in commodity prices and fears of a worldwide recession. Latin America and the Caribbean's fastest expansion in 40 years may be threatened as the global credit crunch makes financing scarce and squeezes demand for the region's commodities. This time around the region is better positioned to weather the crisis than in the past, given improvements in macroeconomic and financial policies as well as a reduced net dependency on external capital inflows. However, Latin American markets are feeling the effects of the crisis through a slowdown in capital inflows, large declines in stock price indexes, significant currency adjustments and an increase in debt spreads. Volatility has soared, with the closely watched Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index moving to an all-time high of 70.33 on October 17, indicating that fear (rather than greed) has been ruling the markets.After reaching record lows in May 2007, emerging markets bond spreads are now above pre-Asian crisis levels. The JPMorgan EMBI+ Latin American composite widened by 146 basis points in the third quarter, with spreads reaching 448 basis points at the end of September. Spreads have widened sharply in recent weeks as foreign investors cut back regional exposure for the safety of U.S. Treasuries. The ongoing lack of liquidity and subsequent liquidation of assets is leading to a collapse in asset prices and a sharp widening in spreads. Daily spreads in October have risen to levels not seen since December 2002, making it much more difficult for governments that need financing to get it. Risk premiums for Latin corporates and sovereigns have risen substantially, but have remained well below U.S. junk (high-yield) bonds. Latin corporates are facing a steep rise in foreign exchange borrowing costs (although less than firms in other emerging markets), which raises concerns that refinancing risks will climb.So far, emerging markets vulnerabilities have been more focused on corporates, as sovereigns have improved public debt dynamics and countries' financing needs are under control. Market performance has been driven by the rapid deterioration of emerging markets bank and corporate market, as well as ongoing losses in emerging markets equities. From January to September 2008, the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Latin American Index lost almost 28%, while the Emerging Markets Index lost 37% and the G-7 Index lost 24%. While in 2007 the Latin America component gained 47%, almost nine times as much as the MSCI-G7 index for developed markets, since mid-September 2008 stocks in Latin America have been doing worse than stocks in developed countries, as concerns about access to credit and the adverse impact of sharp falls in commodity prices and in local currencies contribute to increased risk aversion and to outflows of capital. Many governments in the region have used revenue from the commodity boom to pay down debt and build reserves. Now, facing a global financial crisis and the threat of recession in developed countries, the biggest question for Latin America is how long and deep this cyclical downturn will be, and how much it is going to reduce commodity prices. Prices for commodities such as soy, gold, copper and oil, which helped fund the region's boom, have fallen 28% since their July 2 high, according to the RJ/CRB Commodity Price Index. According to Morgan Stanley (in a September 29 report), should prices return to their 10-year average, Latin America's balanced budgets would quickly revert to a deficit of 4.1% of GDP. As risk aversion increases, investors are rapidly pulling out massive amounts of money, creating problems for local markets and banks. There is an ongoing shortage of dollars (as investors liquidate assets in Latin American markets), and as currencies depreciate, inflation concerns increase despite the global slowdown. In Brazil and Mexico, central banks deployed billions of dollars of reserves to stem steep currency declines, as companies in these countries, believing their local currencies would continue to strengthen against the U.S. dollar, took debts in dollars. Some companies also made bets using currency derivatives that have led to losses in the billions of dollars. Dramatic currency swings have caused heavy losses for many companies, from Mexico's cement giant Cemex SAB to the Brazilian conglomerate Grupo Votorantim. Mexico's third-largest retailer, Controladora Comercial Mexicana, declared bankruptcy recently after reporting huge losses related to exchange rate bets. As concerns about corporate exposure to dollar-denominated derivatives increases, yields on bonds issued by many of Brazil's and Mexico's leading companies have started to rise, sharply raising the cost of issuing new debt. Latin American external debt issuance came to a halt in the third quarter of 2008, totaling only US$ 690 million. The cost of obtaining loans for capital expenditures, M&A and debt refinancing is also rising substantially for Latin American corporates amid contagion from the U.S. financial crisis. According to bankers, a protracted trend of shortening tenors and widening spreads has intensified in the past few weeks, indicating that bank lending is quickly following the way of bonds and equity. Finally, money transfers from Latin American migrants are expected to decline for the first time this decade, as a result of economic downturns in the U.S. and Spain, inflation and a weaker dollar. The Mexican Central Bank announced that money transfers from Mexicans living in the U.S. dropped a record 12.2% in August. In 2008, migrants from the region will send some 1.7% less in remittances year-on-year when adjusted for inflation, according to the IADB, compounding the adverse effects of the deepening financial turmoil.

Relação de longo prazo entre o investimento direto externo e variáveis macroeconômicas entre janeiro de 1999 à dezembro de 2007

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)