Input Aggregation in Models of Data Envelopment Analysis: A Statistical Test with an Application to Indian Manufacturing

A problem frequently encountered in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is that the total number of inputs and outputs included tend to be too many relative to the sample size. One way to counter this problem is to combine several inputs (or outputs) into (meaningful) aggregate variables reducing thereby the dimension of the input (or output) vector. A direct effect of input aggregation is to reduce the number of constraints. This, in its turn, alters the optimal value of the objective function. In this paper, we show how a statistical test proposed by Banker (1993) may be applied to test the validity of a specific way of aggregating several inputs. An empirical application using data from Indian manufacturing for the year 2002-03 is included as an example of the proposed test.

Financial Liberalization and Inflationary Dynamics in the Context of a Small Open Economy

The paper develops a short-run model of a small open financially repressed economy characterized by unorganized money markets, capital good imports, capital mobility, wage indexation, and flexible exchange rates. The analysis shows that financial liberalization, in the form of an increased rate of interest on deposits and tight monetary policy, unambiguously and unconditionally causes deflation. Moreover, the results do not depend on the degree of capital mobility and structure of wage setting. The paper recommends that a small open developing economy should deregulate interest rates and tighten monetary policy if reducing inflation is a priority. The pre-requisite for such a policy, however, requires the establishment of a flexible exchange rate regime.

Economies of Scale and Cost Efficiencies: A Panel-Data Stochastic-Frontier Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT) operating efficiencies. We estimate a stochastic-frontier panel-data model specifying a translog cost function, covering 1995 to 2003. The results disagree with previous research in that we find little evidence of scale economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also generally find smaller inefficiencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary to previous research, the results also show that self-management of a REIT associates with more inefficiency when we measure output with assets. When we use revenue to measure output, selfmanagement associates with less inefficiency. Also contrary with previous research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency. The results further suggest that inefficiency increases over time in three of our four specifications.

An Economic Analysis of Drawing Lines in the Sea

It is shown that low dispute costs relative to expected resource rents from oceanic resources favor drawn out disputes over maritime boundaries; asymmetric dispute costs favor agreement on boundaries wanted by the low dispute cost state party; and high symmetric dispute costs favor formation of joint development zones. The fact that most maritime boundaries have not yet been drawn suggests that state parties think that resource rents that can be drawn from the oceans are high relative to dispute costs. Moreover, the recent mini-trend towards JDZs in East Asia suggests that state parties in the area have recently reassessed dispute costs as being higher than previously believed.

Are Indian Firms too Small? A Nonparametric Analysis of Cost Efficiency and Industry Structure of Indian Manufacturing

In this paper we use the 2004-05 Annual Survey of Industries data to estimate the levels of cost efficiency of Indian manufacturing firms in the various states and also get state level measures of industrial organization (IO) efficiency. The empirical results show the presence of considerable cost inefficiency in a majority of the states. Further, we also find that, on average, Indian firms are too small. Consolidating them to attain the optimal scale would further enhance efficiency and lower average cost.

Technical Efficiency in the Indian Textiles Industry: A Nonparametric Analysis of Firm-Level Data

The Indian textiles industry is now at the crossroads with the phasing out of quota regime that prevailed under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) until the end of 2004. In the face of a full integration of the textiles sector in the WTO, maintaining and enhancing productive efficiency is a precondition for competitiveness of the Indian firms in the new liberalized world market. In this paper we use data obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries for a number of years to measure the levels of technical efficiency in the Indian textiles industry at the firm level. We use both a grand frontier applicable to all firms and a group frontier specific to firms from any individual state, ownership, or organization type in order to evaluate their efficiencies. This permits us to separately identify how locational, proprietary, and organizational characteristics of a firm affect its performance.

The Real Exchange Rate in Small Open Developed Economies: Evidence from Cointegration Analysis

We examine the effects of the terms of trade and the expected real interest rate differential on the real exchange rate in a sample of small open developed economies. We employ cointegration analysis to search for possible long-term linkages. We find that while both the terms of trade and the expected real interest rate differentials affect the real exchange rate in the long run, the role of the terms of trade generally proves more consistent across countries. The speed of adjustment for the expected real interest rate differential in the error-correction model, however, is quantitatively larger than it is for the terms of trade.

Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in criminal investigations. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to require that police obtain a warrant prior to search and that illegally seized evidence be excluded from trial. A consensus has developed in the law and economics literature that tort liability for police officers is a superior means of deterring unreasonable searches. We argue that this conclusion depends on the assumption of truth-seeking police, and develop a game-theoretic model to compare the two remedies when some police officers (the bad type) are willing to plant evidence in order to obtain convictions, even though other police (the good type) are not (where this type is private information). We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the asymmetric-information game between the police and a court that seeks to minimize error costs in deciding whether to convict or acquit suspects. In this framework, we show that the exclusionary rule with a warrant requirement leads to superior outcomes (relative to tort liability) in terms of truth-finding function of courts, because the warrant requirement can reduce the scope for bad types of police to plant evidence

Do Exposure Suits Produce a 'Race to File'? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk

Conventional tort law does not allow victims of exposure to a toxic substance to seek compensation until they develop actual symptoms of illness. This may effectively bar recovery because at the time the illness arises, injurers may be judgment proof. One possible response is to allow a tort for risk that allows victims to seek expected damages at the time of exposure. However, critics charge that this could create a 'race to file' wherein victims rush to file suit to ensure that they will get a share of the injurer's limited assets. We show that such a race may or may not occur in equilibrium, and that when it does occur, not all victims choose to file at exposure if bankruptcy is an inevitable result. If bankruptcy is not inevitable, it is possible that a tort for risk will trigger bankruptcy, although a no-bankruptcy equilibrium always exists and Paretodominates the bankruptcy equilibrium. We examine the consequences of the various tort-for-risk equilibria on the compensation of exposure victims, litigation costs, and injurer care.