Are property agents to blame for upward only rent reviews?

In negotiating commercial leases, many landlords and tenants employ property agents (brokers) to act on their behalf; typically these people are chartered surveyors. The aim of this paper is to explore the role that these brokers play in the shaping of commercial leases in the context of the current debate in the UK on upward only rent reviews. This role can be described using agency theory and the theories of professionalism. These provide expectations of behaviour which show inherent tensions between the role of agent and professional, particularly regarding the use of knowledge, autonomy and the obligation to the public interest. The parties to eleven recent lease transactions were interviewed to see if the brokers conformed to the expectations of agency theory or professionalism. Brokers that acted for industrial and office tenants behaved as professionals in using their expertise to determine lease structures. However, those acting for landlords and retail tenants simply followed instructions and behaved as conduits for their clients, a role more usually associated with that of an agent within the principal-agent relationship. None of the landlords’ brokers saw themselves as having responsibilities beyond their clients and so they were not promoting the discussion of alternatives to the UORR. The evidence from these case studies suggests that agents are not professionals; to behave entirely as an agent is to contradict the essential characteristics of a professional. While brokers cannot be held entirely responsible for the lack of movement on the UORR, by adopting predominantly agent roles then they must take some of the blame. However, behind this may be a much larger issue that needs to be explored; the institutional pressures that lead to professionals behaving in this way.

Expert judgement in the processes of commercial property market forecasting

In this paper, we investigate the role of judgement in the formation of forecasts in commercial property markets. The investigation is based on interview surveys with the majority of UK forecast producers, who are using a range of inputs and data sets to form models to predict an array of variables for a range of locations. The findings suggest that forecasts need to be acceptable to their users (and purchasers) and consequently forecasters generally have incentives to avoid presenting contentious or conspicuous forecasts. Where extreme forecasts are generated by a model, forecasters often engage in ‘self‐censorship’ or are ‘censored’ following in‐house consultation. It is concluded that the forecasting process is significantly more complex than merely carrying out econometric modelling, forecasts are mediated and contested within organisations and that impacts can vary considerably across different organizational contexts.

Private property vehicles: the valuation of interests in limited partnerships

This paper examines the extent to which the valuation of partial interests in private property vehicles should be closely aligned to the valuation of the underlying assets. A sample of vehicle managers and investors replied to a questionnaire on the qualities of private property vehicles relative to direct property investment. Applying the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique the relative importance of the various advantages and disadvantages of investment in private property vehicles relative to acquisition of the underlying assets are assessed. The results suggest that the main drivers of the growth of the this sector have been the ability for certain categories of investor to acquire interests in assets that are normally inaccessible due to the amount of specific risk. Additionally, investors have been attracted by the ability to ‘outsource’ asset management in a manner that minimises perceived agency problems. It is concluded that deviations from NAV should be expected given that investment in private property vehicles differs from investment in the underlying assets in terms of liquidity, management structures, lot size, financial structure inter alia. However, reliably appraising the pricing implications of these variations is likely to be extremely difficult due to the lack of secondary market trading and vehicle heterogeneity.

Explaining deviations from NAV in UK property companies: rationality and sentimentality

One of the most vexing issues for analysts and managers of property companies across Europe has been the existence and persistence of deviations of Net Asset Values of property companies from their market capitalisation. The issue has clear links to similar discounts and premiums in closed-end funds. The closed end fund puzzle is regarded as an important unsolved problem in financial economics undermining theories of market efficiency and the Law of One Price. Consequently, it has generated a huge body of research. Although it can be tempting to focus on the particular inefficiencies of real estate markets in attempting to explain deviations from NAV, the closed end fund discount puzzle indicates that divergences between underlying asset values and market capitalisation are not a ‘pure’ real estate phenomenon. When examining potential explanations, two recurring factors stand out in the closed end fund literature as often undermining the economic rationale for a discount – the existence of premiums and cross-sectional and periodic fluctuations in the level of discount/premium. These need to be borne in mind when considering potential explanations for real estate markets. There are two approaches to investigating the discount to net asset value in closed-end funds: the ‘rational’ approach and the ‘noise trader’ or ‘sentiment’ approach. The ‘rational’ approach hypothesizes the discount to net asset value as being the result of company specific factors relating to such factors as management quality, tax liability and the type of stocks held by the fund. Despite the intuitive appeal of the ‘rational’ approach to closed-end fund discounts the studies have not successfully explained the variance in closed-end fund discounts or why the discount to net asset value in closed-end funds varies so much over time. The variation over time in the average sector discount is not only a feature of closed-end funds but also property companies. This paper analyses changes in the deviations from NAV for UK property companies between 2000 and 2003. The paper present a new way to study the phenomenon ‘cleaning’ the gearing effect by introducing a new way of calculating the discount itself. We call it “ungeared discount”. It is calculated by assuming that a firm issues new equity to repurchase outstanding debt without any variation on asset side. In this way discount does not depend on an accounting effect and the analysis should better explain the effect of other independent variables.

Another look at the relative importance of sectors and regions in determining property returns

This paper re-examines the relative importance of sector and regional effects in determining property returns. Using the largest property database currently available in the world, we decompose the returns on individual properties into a national effect, common to all properties, and a number of sector and regional factors. However, unlike previous studies, we categorise the individual property data into an ever-increasing number of property-types and regions, from a simple 3-by-3 classification, up to a 10 by 63 sector/region classification. In this way we can test the impact that a finer classification has on the sector and regional effects. We confirm the earlier findings of previous studies that sector-specific effects have a greater influence on property returns than regional effects. We also find that the impact of the sector effect is robust across different classifications of sectors and regions. Nonetheless, the more refined sector and regional partitions uncover some interesting sector and regional differences, which were obscured in previous studies. All of which has important implications for property portfolio construction and analysis.