Authors', Institutions' and Countries' rankings in regional and urban science : an analysis for nine top international journals from 1991 to 2000

This paper examines the most productive authors, institutions and countries in regional and urban science from 1991 to 2000 using information on published articles (and pages) from a sample of widely recognized journals in this field: ARS, JUE, JRS, IJURR, IRSR, PRS, RSUE, RS and US. We also consider the relation between the country of the institution named in articles and the country in which the journal is published, in order to know if there are a home publication bias in regional and urban science. Analysis was made for the whole decade and by subperiods, this allowed us to make a more dynamic interpretation of the results

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

Authors', Institutions' and Countries' rankings in regional and urban science : an analysis for nine top international journals from 1991 to 2000

This paper examines the most productive authors, institutions and countries in regional and urban science from 1991 to 2000 using information on published articles (and pages) from a sample of widely recognized journals in this field: ARS, JUE, JRS, IJURR, IRSR, PRS, RSUE, RS and US. We also consider the relation between the country of the institution named in articles and the country in which the journal is published, in order to know if there are a home publication bias in regional and urban science. Analysis was made for the whole decade and by subperiods, this allowed us to make a more dynamic interpretation of the results

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

Sibling competition and the risk of falling out of the nest

In birds, sibling competition encompasses several activities, one of which is jostling for position, that is, competing for the location in the nest where parents predictably deliver food items. We hypothesized that nestlings that compete by jostling for position may fall out of the nest either accidentally or because siblings push each other to reduce brood size. This hypothesis predicts that in a competitive environment needy nestlings trade-off the benefit of being fed against the cost of falling out of the nest. As a first attempt to evaluate this hypothesis, we experimentally manipulated the number of young per brood in the colonial Alpine swift, Apus melba. Nestlings fell out of their colony more frequently when reared in enlarged than in reduced broods. Because brood size manipulation affects not only the number of young per nest but also their body condition, we analysed an extended data set to disentangle these two factors. This analysis showed that, independently of brood size, nestlings in poor condition and those reared in broods where sibling differed markedly in weight were more likely to disappear from the colony. Nestling disappearance also occurred predominantly in nests close to the colony entrances. Although nestling swifts can wander in the colony and become adopted in neighbouring nests, we found no evidence that wandering per se increased the risk of falling out of the colony. Our study therefore highlights a novel cost of scramble competition.

Reading films through political classics : genres of politics in popular cultures

Abstract: Readin films through political classics

Combined report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Corrections for the year ending June 30, 2010

Combined report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Corrections for the year ending June 30, 2010