951 resultados para Assignment of credit


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Agency Performance Report

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Agency Performance Report

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Agency Performance Report

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Agency Performance Report

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Agency Performance Report

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Agency Performance Report

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Agency Performance Report

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Agency Performance Report

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Agency Performance Report

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Agency Performance Plan, Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division

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Agency Performance Report

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Report on the Historic Preservation and Cultural and Entertainment District Tax Credit program administered by the State Historic Preservation Office within the State Historical Society of Iowa, a division of the Department of Cultural Affairs, for the period July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2013

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Agency Strategic Performance Report

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Agency Performance Plan, Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division

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On the domain of general assignment games (with possible reservation prices) the core is axiomatized as the unique solution satisfying two consistency principles: projection consistency and derived consistency. Also, an axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus is given as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency and equal maximum complaint between groups. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus. Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, showing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain bargaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his / her optimally matched partner equals the maximum amount that he / she can receive from this partner, also remaining inside the core. We now prove that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs but also for optimally matched coalitions. Key words: cooperative games, assignment game, core, nucleolus