994 resultados para labor supply incentives
Resumo:
Division of labor in social insects is determinant to their ecological success. Recent models emphasize that division of labor is an emergent property of the interactions among nestmates obeying to simple behavioral rules. However, the role of evolution in shaping these rules has been largely neglected. Here, we investigate a model that integrates the perspectives of self-organization and evolution. Our point of departure is the response threshold model, where we allow thresholds to evolve. We ask whether the thresholds will evolve to a state where division of labor emerges in a form that fits the needs of the colony. We find that division of labor can indeed evolve through the evolutionary branching of thresholds, leading to workers that differ in their tendency to take on a given task. However, the conditions under which division of labor evolves depend on the strength of selection on the two fitness components considered: amount of work performed and on worker distribution over tasks. When selection is strongest on the amount of work performed, division of labor evolves if switching tasks is costly. When selection is strongest on worker distribution, division of labor is less likely to evolve. Furthermore, we show that a biased distribution (like 3:1) of workers over tasks is not easily achievable by a threshold mechanism, even under strong selection. Contrary to expectation, multiple matings of colony foundresses impede the evolution of specialization. Overall, our model sheds light on the importance of considering the interaction between specific mechanisms and ecological requirements to better understand the evolutionary scenarios that lead to division of labor in complex systems. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s00265-012-1343-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Marrow radioiron uptake and marrow blood flow were measured in order to evaluate iron supply for erythropoiesis. Normal, phenylhydrazine-treated and bled animals were studied. The plasma iron turnover of seven normal rabbits was 1.49 +/- 0.22 mg/dl whole blood per d, of 11 rabbits treated 4 d before with phenylhydrazine was 5.16 +/- 1.81, and of four bled animals the plasma iron turnover was 3.75 +/- 1.61. The cardiac output and the percentage of blood flow to the marrow was increased in phenylhydrazine-treated and bled animals. Marrow iron flow in phenylhydrazine-treated animals was 38.3 +/- 32.6 micrograms/min per kg as compared with control values of 7.0 +/- 1.3 (P less than 0.01). This was due to an increase in marrow flow, an increase in plasma iron, and an increase in plasmatocrit. In bled animals, in spite of an increased marrow blood flow, marrow iron flow of 7.3 +/- 2.2 was similar to that of control animals due to a lower plasma iron concentration. The calculated marrow iron extraction of 3.7 +/- 2.4% in phenylhydrazine-treated animals was not different from that of control animals of 4.3 +/- 1.1, whereas extraction was increased in bled animals to 7.9 +/- 1.3 (P less than 0.01). In additional studies of transfused animals, acutely induced anemia was associated with an increased cardiac output, but also with a relative decrease in marrow flow, which left marrow iron supply unaffected. It would appear from these studies that an important mechanism for meeting the increased iron requirement of the hyperplastic erythroid marrow is an increase in marrow blood flow.
Resumo:
When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.
Resumo:
Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
