969 resultados para electoral incentives
Resumo:
The emphasis on integrated care implies new incentives that promote coordinationbetween levels of care. Considering a population as a whole, the resource allocation systemhas to adapt to this environment. This research is aimed to design a model that allows formorbidity related prospective and concurrent capitation payment. The model can be applied inpublicly funded health systems and managed competition settings.Methods: We analyze the application of hybrid risk adjustment versus either prospective orconcurrent risk adjustment formulae in the context of funding total health expenditures for thepopulation of an integrated healthcare delivery organization in Catalonia during years 2004 and2005.Results: The hybrid model reimburses integrated care organizations avoiding excessive risktransfer and maximizing incentives for efficiency in the provision. At the same time, it eliminatesincentives for risk selection for a specific set of high risk individuals through the use ofconcurrent reimbursement in order to assure a proper classification of patients.Conclusion: Prospective Risk Adjustment is used to transfer the financial risk to the healthprovider and therefore provide incentives for efficiency. Within the context of a National HealthSystem, such transfer of financial risk is illusory, and the government has to cover the deficits.Hybrid risk adjustment is useful to provide the right combination of incentive for efficiency andappropriate level of risk transfer for integrated care organizations.
Resumo:
Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufficient penalties.Foreign creditors can only be repaid if the government enforces foreign debts. And this will onlyhappen if foreign creditors can effectively use the threat of imposing penalties to the country.Guided by this assessment of the problem, policy prescriptions to reduce sovereign risk havefocused on providing incentives for governments to enforce foreign debts. For instance, countriesmight want to favor increased trade ties and other forms of foreign dependence that make themvulnerable to foreign retaliation thereby increasing the costs of default penalties.
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We study the standard economic model of unilateral accidents, in its simplest form, assumingthat the injurers have limited assets.We identify a second-best optimal rule that selects as duecare the minimum of first-best care, and a level of care that takes into account the wealth ofthe injurer. We show that such a rule in fact maximizes the precautionary effort by a potentialinjurer. The idea is counterintuitive: Being softer on an injurer, in terms of the required level ofcare, actually improves the incentives to take care when he is potentially insolvent. We extendthe basic result to an entire population of potentially insolvent injurers, and find that the optimalgeneral standards of care do depend on wealth, and distribution of income. We also show theconditions for the result that higher income levels in a given society call for higher levels of carefor accidents.
Resumo:
The process of changes that have been taking place in contemporary world reaches undoubtedly to the public sector. The quest for a new public management, that seeks to provide quality and effective services to the citizens, has been the target of contemporary State. Within this framework, the study of people inside publics organizations becomes strategic. Knowledge is generated, processed, and communicated at great speed, taking society to adopt new approaches. In order to meet the challenges of the new millennium, organizations must thing more of people and, above all, they must be more concerned with creating incentives that can motivate their collaborators to achieve not only the objectives of the organization but also personal objectives of each individual, since there is no point in gaining profit and having productivity if the organization do not develop policies and practices that focus on the human being. Motivation implies accomplishment feelings and professional recognition, expressed by means of executing tasks and activities that are sufficiently challenging and meaningful to the job. The truth is that the adoption of a public management focused on quality requires changes in organization culture, requiring mainly motivation, which leads to efforts, dedication, persistence, and commitment. This work is intended to research motivation as a tool to achieve productivity and excellence in the performance of activities in Cape Verdean Public Administration. To achieve the aim of this work, a bibliographical research on Human Resources Administration as well as different theories related to work motivation in organizations was conducted. The inquisitive method was used based upon a written questionnaire aimed at obtaining data referring to motivation of Public Administration workers.
Resumo:
Les inégalités économiques se traduisent-elles dans des inégalités politiques à travers le processus de représentation électorale? Telle est la question centrale de cette thèse qui s'attache, par ailleurs, à investiguer les mécanismes qui tendent à produire une représentation biaisée des préférences politiques des citoyens en fonction de leur statut économique. Focalisé sur le cas de la Suisse et faisant usage des données de l'enquête postélectorale Selects de 2007, ce travail démontre que sur les rares sujets qui divisent les citoyens selon des clivages économiques - la redistribution des richesses et la sécurité sociale en particulier - les élus à l'Assemblée fédérale ont des préférences qui reflètent mieux les opinions des citoyens les plus riches. Cette sous-représentation des opinions des citoyens modestes et de ceux faisant partie du centre de la distribution des revenus peut en partie être attribuée à des différences dans les taux de participation et de connaissance politiques entre ces groupes de citoyens. La thèse met également en évidence le rôle joué par la représentation descriptive - autrement dit, la similitude en termes de statut économique entre les représentants et les représentés - dans la représentation des opinions et intérêts des citoyens. Par ailleurs, la structure du système partisan en Suisse ne reflétant pas la multidimensionnalité des préférences politiques des citoyens, les électeurs ne parviennent pas à traduire la complexité de leurs préférences politiques dans un choix de vote, ce qui, dans la configuration actuelle des forces politiques, tend à favoriser l'élection de représentants aux opinions proches de la droite sur les questions économiques. Enfin, une analyse de la représentation politique au niveau cantonal tend à soutenir la thèse selon laquelle le manque de régulation en matière de financement des partis en Suisse pourrait partiellement expliquer les inégalités dans la représentation des opinions politiques des citoyens aux revenus distincts. - Do economic inequalities translate into political inequalities through electoral representation? This is the central research question of this thesis, which also investigates the mechanisms that lead to potential economically based inequalities in the representation of citizens' policy preferences. Focusing on the case of Switzerland and making use of data provided by the post- electoral survey Selects 2007, this research demonstrates that regarding the rare policy domains in which the preferences of citizens are clearly linked to economic cleavages - redistribution and social security in particular - members of the Federal Assembly have policy preferences that best reflect the policy preferences of richer citizens. The under-representation of the opinions of relatively poor citizens and of those being the in the middle of the income distribution can be to some extent be explained by differences in political participation and political information across income groups. The thesis also puts forward the role played by descriptive representation - the similarity between representatives and represented in terms of their socioeconomic status - for the representation of citizens' preferences and interests. In addition, the structure of the party system in Switzerland does not reflect the multidimensionality of policy preferences among citizens who, as a result, have a hard time translating their complex preferences into a vote choice. Given the configuration of political actors, this tends to favour the election of representatives from the right who do not represent the preferences of their voters on economic issues. Finally, an analysis of representation at the cantonal level tends to confirm that the lack of party finance regulations in Switzerland may partially explain inequalities in the representation of citizens with different levels of income.
Resumo:
O processo de mudanças que vem acontecendo no mundo contemporâneo alcança, inevitavelmente, o sector público. A busca de uma nova gestão pública, que procure prestar serviços ao cidadão com qualidade e eficiência tem sido o alvo a ser alcançado pelo Estado contemporâneo. Dentro desse prisma o estudo das pessoas dentro das organizações públicas apresenta-se como estratégico. O conhecimento é gerado, processado e comunicado a grande velocidade, o que leva a sociedade a assumir novas posturas. Para enfrentar os desafios do novo milénio, as organizações terão que pensar mais nas pessoas e sobretudo, preocupar-se mais em criar estímulos que motivem os colaboradores para alcançarem tanto os objectivos da organização quanto os objectivos pessoais de cada um porque não adianta obter lucro e produtividade se a organização não desenvolver políticas e práticas que privilegiam o ser humano. Motivação envolve sentimentos de realização e de reconhecimento profissional, manifestado por meio de exercícios das tarefas e actividades que oferecem suficiente desafio e significado para o trabalho. A verdade é que a adopção de uma gestão pública focada na qualidade requer mudanças na cultura organizacional, exigindo principalmente motivação, que conduz ao esforço, dedicação, persistência e comprometimento. Com o presente trabalho pretende-se investigar a motivação como uma ferramenta para alcançar a produtividade e a excelência no desempenho das actividades na Administração Pública Cabo-verdiana. Para alcançar o objectivo deste trabalho, fez-se uma pesquisa bibliográfica sobre a Administração dos Recursos Humanos e sobre as diversas teorias relacionadas com a motivação para o trabalho nas organizações. Utilizou-se o método inquisitivo baseado num interrogatório escrito para se obter dados referentes a motivação dos funcionários da Administração Pública.
Resumo:
The process of changes that have been taking place in contemporary world reaches undoubtedly to the public sector. The quest for a new public management, that seeks to provide quality and effective services to the citizens, has been the target of contemporary State. Within this framework, the study of people inside publics organizations becomes strategic. Knowledge is generated, processed, and communicated at great speed, taking society to adopt new approaches. In order to meet the challenges of the new millennium, organizations must thing more of people and, above all, they must be more concerned with creating incentives that can motivate their collaborators to achieve not only the objectives of the organization but also personal objectives of each individual, since there is no point in gaining profit and having productivity if the organization do not develop policies and practices that focus on the human being. Motivation implies accomplishment feelings and professional recognition, expressed by means of executing tasks and activities that are sufficiently challenging and meaningful to the job. The truth is that the adoption of a public management focused on quality requires changes in organization culture, requiring mainly motivation, which leads to efforts, dedication, persistence, and commitment. This work is intended to research motivation as a tool to achieve productivity and excellence in the performance of activities in Cape Verdean Public Administration. To achieve the aim of this work, a bibliographical research on Human Resources Administration as well as different theories related to work motivation in organizations was conducted. The inquisitive method was used based upon a written questionnaire aimed at obtaining data referring to motivation of Public Administration workers.
Resumo:
The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in theprivate sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In thispaper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role ofthe institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector andthe private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model theinstitution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). Weshow that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the sciencesector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate thebrain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through themarket might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and therebyworsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetaryand non-monetary incentives in science.
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We consider an economy where the production technology has constantreturns to scale but where in the descentralized equilibrium thereare aggregate increasing returns to scale. The result follows froma positive contracting externality among firms. If a firms issurrounded by more firms, employees have more opportunitiesoutside their own firm. This improves employees' incentives toinvest in the presence of ex post renegotiation at the firm level,at not cost. Our leading result is that if a region is sparselypopulated or if the degree of development in the region is lowenough, there are multiple equilibria in the level of sectorialemployment. From the theoretical model we derive a non-linearfirst-order censored difference equation for sectoral employment.Our results are strongly consistent with the multiple equilibriahypothesis and the existence of a sectoral critical scale (belowwich the sector follows a delocation process). The scale of theregions' population and the degree of development reduce thecritical scale of the sector.
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In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.
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We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.
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The principal aim of this paper is to estimate a stochastic frontier costfunction and an inefficiency effects model in the analysis of the primaryhealth care services purchased by the public authority and supplied by 180providers in 1996 in Catalonia. The evidence from our sample does not supportthe premise that contracting out has helped improve purchasing costefficiency in primary care. Inefficient purchasing cost was observed in thecomponent of this purchasing cost explicitly included in the contract betweenpurchaser and provider. There are no observable incentives for thecontracted-out primary health care teams to minimise prescription costs, whichare not explicitly included in the present contracting system.
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This essay deals with the reasons explaining children s work in 19th century textile factories and their removal during the first part of the 20th century. The inadequacy of the structure of incomes and expenditures of the household and the very low economic incentives to educate children can explain why children were in the factories and not in the school. Moreover, the marginal economic contribution to the economy of the household of a child was the same as that of his mother. This normally implied that women and children were perfect substitutes. When the family had a child at working age this allowed to replace the paid work input of the mother. With the beginnings of the 20th century a set of changes leading to the increase of women s productivity and hourly real wages, switched the situation and involved the new incorporation of women into paid work and the investment in children s human capital.
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This paper examines properties of optimal poverty assistance programs under different informational environments using an income maintenanceframework. To that end, we make both the income generating ability andthe disutility of labor of individuals unobservable, and compare theresulting benefit schedules with those of programs found in the UnitedStates since Welfare Reform (1996). We find that optimal programs closelyresemble a Negative Income Tax with a Benefit Reduction rate that dependson the distribution of population characteristics. A policy of workfare(unpaid public sector work) is inefficient when disutility of labor isunobservable, but minimum work requirements (for paid work) may be usedin that same environment. The distortions to work incentives and thepresence of minimum work requirements depend on the observability andrelative importance of the population's characteristics.
Resumo:
Individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of reform beingenacted and sustained. Reform may be more likely to be enacted because amajority of agents might end up losing little from reform and a minoritygaining a lot. Under certainty, reform would therefore be rejected, butit may be enacted with uncertainty because those who end up losing believethat they might be among the winners. Reform may be more likely to besustained because, in a realistic setting, reform will increase theincentives of agents to move into those economic activities that benefit.Agents who respond to these incentives will vote to sustain reform infuture elections, even if they would have rejected reform under certainty.These points are made using the trade-model of Fernandez and Rodrik (AER,1991).