Effects of an asymmetric friction on the nonlinear equilibration of a baroclinic system

Following some recent linear and nonlinear studies the authors examine, using numerical simulations of a classical two-layer model, the effect of an asymmetric friction on the nonlinear equilibrium of moderately unstable baroclinic systems, The results show that the presence of an asymmetric friction leads to a significant wave scale selection: ''long'' waves (in terms of their zonal wavelengths) emerge with a traditional asymmetric friction (with the upper layer less viscous than the lower layer), while only ''short'' waves dominate with a nontraditional asymmetric friction (with the lower layer less viscous than the upper layer). The role of the nonlinear interactions and. more precisely, the effects of an asymmetric friction on the wave-mean flow and wave-wave interactions; and their consequences on the wave scale selection are examined.

Pricing derivatives with stochastic volatility

This Ph.D. thesis contains 4 essays in mathematical finance with a focus on pricing Asian option (Chapter 4), pricing futures and futures option (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) and time dependent volatility in futures option (Chapter 7). In Chapter 4, the applicability of the Albrecher et al.(2005)'s comonotonicity approach was investigated in the context of various benchmark models for equities and com- modities. Instead of classical Levy models as in Albrecher et al.(2005), the focus is the Heston stochastic volatility model, the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model and the Schwartz (1997) two-factor model. It is shown that the method delivers rather tight upper bounds for the prices of Asian Options in these models and as a by-product delivers super-hedging strategies which can be easily implemented. In Chapter 5, two types of three-factor models were studied to give the value of com- modities futures contracts, which allow volatility to be stochastic. Both these two models have closed-form solutions for futures contracts price. However, it is shown that Model 2 is better than Model 1 theoretically and also performs very well empiri- cally. Moreover, Model 2 can easily be implemented in practice. In comparison to the Schwartz (1997) two-factor model, it is shown that Model 2 has its unique advantages; hence, it is also a good choice to price the value of commodity futures contracts. Fur- thermore, if these two models are used at the same time, a more accurate price for commodity futures contracts can be obtained in most situations. In Chapter 6, the applicability of the asymptotic approach developed in Fouque et al.(2000b) was investigated for pricing commodity futures options in a Schwartz (1997) multi-factor model, featuring both stochastic convenience yield and stochastic volatility. It is shown that the zero-order term in the expansion coincides with the Schwartz (1997) two-factor term, with averaged volatility, and an explicit expression for the first-order correction term is provided. With empirical data from the natural gas futures market, it is also demonstrated that a significantly better calibration can be achieved by using the correction term as compared to the standard Schwartz (1997) two-factor expression, at virtually no extra effort. In Chapter 7, a new pricing formula is derived for futures options in the Schwartz (1997) two-factor model with time dependent spot volatility. The pricing formula can also be used to find the result of the time dependent spot volatility with futures options prices in the market. Furthermore, the limitations of the method that is used to find the time dependent spot volatility will be explained, and it is also shown how to make sure of its accuracy.

Invertibility characterization of Wiener-Hopf plus Hankel operators on variable exponent Lebesgue spaces via even asymmetric factorization

We obtain invertibility and Fredholm criteria for the Wiener-Hopf plus Hankel operators acting between variable exponent Lebesgue spaces on the real line. Such characterizations are obtained via the so-called even asymmetric factorization which is applied to the Fourier symbols of the operators under study.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).