Securing EU growth from services. CEPS Special Report No. 67, October 2012

This report explores the untapped growth that could result from the better functioning of services markets in the EU and aims to bridge the gap between the policy debate and the latest empirical economic analysis in this field. The authors find ample scope for further economic growth in the EU, both from the reform of domestic services and from the deepening of the ‘single services market’. Domestic and EU-level services reforms are so intertwined economically that indeed we may speak of a ‘double dividend’ and, for the eurozone, a ‘triple dividend’.

On the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU economic policies. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/04, 9 November 2012

For markets, European economic governance faces a crisis of policy effectiveness, while for citizens the European Union faces a democratic legitimacy crisis. The introduction of the European Semester economic policy surveillance system has not resolved these problems. Policy guidance deriving from the Semester is not focused enough on areas of significant spillovers and on problem countries, and national compliance is often procedural rather than actual. This brings into question both the Semester’s effectiveness and the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s new intervention rights, which allow intrusion into national policy-making.

What distinguishes the euro crisis from a ‘normal’ financial crisis? CEPS Commentary, 6 November 2012

This Commentary attempts to discern the distinguishing features between the present euro crisis and the financial crisis brought on in the US by the subprime lending disaster and the ensuing collapse of banks and other financial institutions in 2007-08. It finds that whereas the US was able to bring its crisis to an end by socialising the dubious debt and stabilising its valuation so that it could migrate to other investors capable of bearing the risk, this pattern can be only partly repeated in the eurozone, where both debt socialisation and a return to normal risk assessment are more problematic.. It concludes, nevertheless, that the crisis should now abate somewhat given that most risk-averse institutions have by now sold their holdings of peripheral countries’ sovereign debt and especially in light of the ECB’s assurances that it will not allow the euro to disintegrate.

Europe’s New Post-Trade Infrastructure Rules. ECMI Policy Brief No. 20, 8 November 2012

After more than a decade of indecision, the EU is finally now set to implement a consistent regulatory architecture for clearing and settlement. Following the agreement on a European market infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), the European Commission has proposed harmonised rules for centralised settlement depositaries (CSDs), while the European Central Bank is moving forward with its plans for a central eurozone settlement engine. This paper analyses three components of the new post-trade infrastructure measures: 1) the regulatory framework for and supervision of central counterparties under the new EMIR legislation, 2) the authorisation requirements of trade repositories and 3) the draft CSD Regulation and the progress with the ECB’s Target 2 Securities project. It then discusses the impact of the new rules, and argues that, analogous to the unexpected impact of MiFID on trading infrastructures, a similar EMIR revolution may be on its way.

The Greek debt trap: an escape plan. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/19, 7 November 2012

Without corrective measures, Greek public debt will exceed 190 percent of GDP, instead of peaking at the anyway too-high target ratio of 167 percent of GDP of the March 2012 financial assistance programme. The rise is largely due to a negative feedback loop between high public debt and the collapse in GDP, and endangers Greek membership of the euro area. But a Greek exit would have devastating impacts both inside and outside Greece. A small reduction in the interest rate on bilateral loans, the exchange of European Central Bank holdings, buy-back of privately-held debt, and frontloading of some privatisation receipts are unlikely to be sufficient. A credible resolution should involve the reduction of the official lending rate to zero until 2020, an extension of the maturity of all official lending, and indexing the notional amount of all official loans to Greek GDP. Thereby, the debt ratio would fall below 100 percent of GDP by 2020, and if the economy deteriorates further, there will not be a need for new arrangements. But if growth is better than expected, official creditors will also benefit. In exchange for such help, the fiscal sovereignty of Greece should be curtailed further. An extended privatisation plan and future budget surpluses may be used to pay back the debt relief. The Greek fiscal tragedy highlights the need for a formal debt restructuring mechanism

The long-term EU budget: size or flexibility? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/20, November 2012

The EU is in the process of negotiating its 2014-20 financial framework. Failure to reach an agreement would imply a delay in the preparation of the strategic plans each member state puts together to explain how it will use Structural and Cohesion Funds. Even if solutions are found – for example annual renewals of the budget based on the previous year's figures – there will be political and institutional costs. EU leaders have too often and too forcefully advocated the use of the EU budget for growth to be able to drop the idea without consequences. • The overwhelming attention paid to the size of the budget is misplaced. EU leaders should instead aim to make the EU budget more flexible, safeguard it from future political power struggles, and reinforce assessment of the impact of EU funded growth policies. • To improve flexibility a commitment device should be created that places the EU budget above continuous political disagreement. We suggest the creation of a European Growth Fund, on the basis of which the European Commission should be allowed to borrow on capital markets to anticipate pre-allocated EU expenditure, such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. Markets would thus be a factor in EU budget policymaking, with a potentially disciplining effect. Attaching conditionality to this type of disbursement appears legitimate, as capital delivered in this way is a form of assistance.

The known unknowns and the unknown unknowns of the EMU. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/18, October 2012

Extensive prior research on the economics of European monetary union highlighted some potential risks (the known unknowns) but overlooked others (the unknown unknowns). Asymmetries among participating countries, the potentially destabilising character of a one-size-fits all monetary policy, the weakness of adjustment mechanisms, the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline, the possibility of sovereign solvency crises and their adverse consequences were all known and understood. But policymakers often relied on a complacent reading of the evidence. • The potential for financial disruption was vastly underestimated. Economists generally did not consider, or underestimated, the possibility of balance of payment crises such as those experienced by southern European countries, or the risk of a feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. • Remedying EMU’s systemic deficiencies is on the policy agenda. Banking union would go a long way towards addressing the fault lines. The urgent question for economists is if it is going to be enough and, if not, what else should complement the ‘bare-bones’ EMU of Maastricht.

How to deal with macroeconomic imbalances? CEPS Special Report No. 69, 23 November 2012

Lax financial conditions can foster credit booms. The global credit boom of the last decade led to large capital flows across the world, including large movements of resources from the northern countries of the euro area towards the southern part. Since the start of the crisis and more markedly after 2009, these flows have suddenly stopped, creating severe adjustment pressure. At this point the common monetary policy can only try to mitigate the unavoidable adjustment by maintaining overall financial stability. The challenge is to strike a delicate balance between providing liquidity for solvent institutions while keeping the overall pressure on for a rapid correction of the imbalances.

Household Debt in Europe’s Periphery: The dangers of a prolonged recession. ECRI Commentary No. 12, 22 November 2012

The second-dip recession in Europe’s periphery has created a poisonous mix, which risks threatening further the financial system and the economy. Against this background, this ECRI Commentary argues that time matters in the household deleveraging cycle and that a swift recovery is one of its most vital parts. The paper also assesses the extent to which self-feeding phenomena related to household debt have already materialised and evaluates the risks for countries that have so far been spared their full effects. It also offers a theoretical policy response towards a more sustainable household credit sector and overall economic recovery.

How to avoid a double-dip recession in the eurozone. CEPS Commentary, 15 November 2012

This CEPS Commentary argues that the way in which the burden of adjustment to the imbalances in the eurozone is borne almost exclusively by the deficit countries in the periphery produces a deflationary bias in the region as a whole. Against the threat of double-dip recession, Paul De Grauwe asserts that the adjustment could be done differently and calls for implementation of a more symmetric macroeconomic policy that reduces the deflationary bias.

Smart choices for growth. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/21, November 2012

Recovery in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain is held back in part by structural barriers. Overcoming these requires structural reform and public investment. Given the limited availability of political and financial capital, prioritising reform efforts and spending is important, but difficult. The different success factors for individual sectors are complementary. Using the example of the high-tech industry, we make the case that only investing in one success factor (eg broadband infrastructure) without having a sufficient endowment of others (eg education) is unlikely to make the sector successful. One consequence of the complementarity of the different success factors is that public investment and reform efforts should be fine-tuned in order to match the endowment of other factors. This might imply an increase in efforts to tackle several structural barriers at the same time, but it might also imply reducing investment in less promising fields. This in turn requires strategic thinking about whether it is worthwhile pursuing development strategies that require investment in many success factors but that do not promise much success. Such a strategic approach to public investment and reform efforts might make the allocation of scarce public financial and political capital more efficient.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.

The false promise of a eurozone budget. CEPS Commentary, 7 December 2012

n this new CEPS commentary, CEPS Director Daniel Gros takes a closer look at the US experience to point out that the federal budget provides much less insurance against state specific shocks than widely assumed, while the US Banking Union act as a very powerful shock absorber. Accordingly, he argues that the euro’s long-term stability depends far more on completing plans for a European banking union than on the introduction of a fiscal capacity for the eurozone.

Private long-term investment in uncertain times. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/23, December 2012

The economic and financial crisis in Europe is affecting the financing of long-term infrastructure investment. There are multiple clearly identifiable channels: reduced demand for long-term investment, a tightening prudential framework for lending, upward adjustment of risk perception, complex transition of the financial system, and increasing macroeconomic, sovereign and regulatory risk. Some of the identified channels are potentially dangerous spillovers from the crisis that entail the risk of a downward spiral (eg increasing regulatory risk), while others are efficient market responses (eg reduced investment demand, correction of pricing of risk). Consequently, public policy instruments should not address the accessibility of long-term finance per se, but should explicitly target the critical channels.

Why is the Greek economy collapsing? A simple tale of high multipliers and low exports. CEPS Commentary, 21 December 2012

In an attempt to understand why the Greek economy is collapsing, this Commentary points out two key aspects that are often overlooked – the country’s large multiplier and a bad export performance. When combined with the need for a large fiscal adjustment, these factors help explain how fiscal consolidation in Greece has been associated with such a large drop in GDP.