Public-public partnerships (PUPs) in water

Water operators need to be efficient, accountable, honest public institutions providing a universal service. Many water services however lack the institutional strength, the human resources, the technical expertise and equipment, or the financial or managerial capacity to provide these services. They need support to develop these capacities. The vast majority of water operators in the world are in the public sector – 90% of all major cities are served by such bodies. This means that the largest pool of experience and expertise, and the great majority of examples of good practice and sound institutions, are to be found in existing public sector water operators. Because they are public sector, however, they do not have any natural commercial incentive to provide international support. Their incentive stems from solidarity, not profit. Since 1990, however, the policies of donors and development banks have focussed on the private companies and their incentives. The vast resources of the public sector have been overlooked, even blocked by pro-private policies. Out of sight of these global policy-makers, however, a growing number of public sector water companies have been engaged, in a great variety of ways, in helping others develop the capacity to be effective and accountable public services. These supportive arrangements are now called 'public-public partnerships' (PUPs). A public-public partnership (PUP) is simply a collaboration between two or more public authorities or organisations, based on solidarity, to improve the capacity and effectiveness of one partner in providing public water or sanitation services. They have been described as: “a peer relationship forged around common values and objectives, which exclude profit-seeking”.1 Neither partner expects a commercial profit, directly or indirectly. This makes PUPs very different from the public–private partnerships (PPPs) which have been promoted by the international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank. The problems of PPPs have been examined in a number of reports. A great advantage of PUPs is that they avoid the risks of such partnerships: transaction costs, contract failure, renegotiation, the complexities of regulation, commercial opportunism, monopoly pricing, commercial secrecy, currency risk, and lack of public legitimacy.2 PUPs are not merely an abstract concept. The list in the annexe to this paper includes over 130 PUPs in around 70 countries. This means that far more countries have hosted PUPs than host PPPs in water – according to a report from PPIAF in December 2008, there are only 44 countries with private participation in water. These PUPs cover a period of over 20 years, and been used in all regions of the world. The earliest date to the 1980s, when the Yokohama Waterworks Bureau first started partnerships to help train staff in other Asian countries. Many of the PUP projects have been initiated in the last few years, a result of the growing recognition of PUPs as a tool for achieving improvements in public water management. This paper attempts to provide an overview of the typical objectives of PUPs; the different forms of PUPs and partners involved; a series of case studies of actual PUPs; and an examination of the recent WOPs initiative. It then offers recommendations for future development of PUPs.

Thinking inside the box: the World Bank position on the private and public sector

An analysis of how the World Bank has maintained a position supportive of mutlinational strategies for privatisation of water. (Brief version).

Can evidence-based healthy housing interventions be put into practice in the UK's private housing sector?

The UK’s public health agenda has encouraged enhanced housing and health interventions. The private housing sector (privately rented and owner occupied) is the favoured and majority UK tenure, but is it seen as a primarily health promoting environment, or a commercial asset? There has been a growing interest in integrating health and housing policy in recent years. However, housing and public health fall under separate government departments and funding regimes. Partnership working has sought to overcome silo working and encourage evidence-based practice, yet is particularly challenging for interventions in the private housing sector, with an increased emphasis on ‘personal responsibility’ for conditions. Strategic public health frameworks are in place, but barriers remain and there is pressure for organisations to revert to core activities. An accessible, continually updated evidence base specific to private sector housing is recommended, to help estimate health gain arising from interventions to prioritise activities and address inequalities.

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) summary paper

The summary of three reports on PPPs in Europe, including a critical overview, a study of alternatives, and a study on the protection of working conditions, in the context of EU law on procurement and other subjects.

Private equity and employment - the Davos/WEF/Harvard study

The World Economic Forum at Davos has published a major study showing that workplaces of firms taken over by private equity have 10% less employees 5 years after the takeover, than other similar workplaces. The rate of plant closures, opening, acquisitions and disposals is twice as high as in other firms, and the net effect is still a job loss of 3.6%-4.5% after only 2 years, compared with other firms. Firms taken over by private equity are also more likely to go bankrupt than publicly quoted firms.

Private equity: financial investors, public services, and employment

The report surveys the activity of private equity and other financial investors in the water, waste and healthcare sectors in Europe. It includes the appraisal of a WEF study on employment effects.

More public rescues for more private finance failures - a critique of the EC Communication on PPPs

A critique of the EC Communication on PPPs, challenging the scale of state aid offered to PPPs, the role of PPPs in the economic recovery strategy for the EU, and drawing attention to the damage done to public authorities by 'innovative' financing mechanisms.

Public sector pay in the UK: has the historic pattern of public/private sector pay movements been broken?

The historic pattern of public sector pay movements in the UK has been counter-cyclical with private sector pay growth. Periods of relative decline in public sector pay against private sector movements have been followed by periods of ‘catch-up’ as Government controls are eased to remedy skill shortages or deal with industrial unrest among public servants. Public sector ‘catch up’ increases have therefore come at awkward times for Government, often coinciding with economic downturn in the private sector (Trinder 1994, White 1996, Bach 2002). Several such epochs of public sector pay policy can be identified since the 1970s. The question is whether the current limits on public sector pay being imposed by the UK Government fit this historic pattern or whether the pattern has been broken and, if so, how and why? This paper takes a historical approach in considering the context to public sector pay determination in the UK. In particular the paper seeks to review the period since Labour came into office (White and Hatchett 2003) and the various pay ‘modernisation’ exercises that have been in process over the last decade (White 2004). The paper draws on national statistics on public sector employment and pay levels to chart changes in public sector pay policy and draws on secondary literature to consider both Government policy intentions and the impact of these policies for public servants.

Replacing failed private water contracts

Failed private water concessions have been terminated and replaced with public sector operations in many countries. The paper reviews the negotiating processes involved in these terminations.

Self-regulated learning and social media – a ‘natural’ alliance? Evidence on students’ self-regulation of learning, social media use and student-teacher relationship

Article is available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17439884.2015.1064953.