An investigation of twentieth century observant Jewish fine artists

People of the Jewish faith base their belief on the written word of the Torah. Presented in this paper are fine artists that produce work within these laws. The Torah sets guidelines for life and morality. The belief system within this domain is that visual images have an impact on the viewers, and artists are accountable for what they produce. This is in opposition with art education, where freedom of expression takes precedence over morality. The results of this study will form the basis for a curriculum for the community college. The researcher's area of inquiry is directed to painting and sculpture made by artists of the Jewish faith who follow the Torah, meaning those who are observant of their faith and practices. Their skills and perceptions will be presented to educate the viewer about their visions. The research questions were posed to rabbinical authorities and artists in order to establish a clear and defined statement of what the Jewish law is regarding the fine arts. The evidence presented was obtained by questionnaires, personal interviews, articles, and opinions from Jewish scholars. Four rabbis were selected based on their erudition on Torah law, and their strong leadership positions in Jewish educational institutions. The ten artists were selected based on recommendations from art historians, and art and gallery directors. The artists and the rabbis were mailed questionnaires, which was followed by an interview. The conclusion from this study is that fine artists are encouraged to use their talents, this is supported by the Torah text, and rabbinic explanation. The restriction for the Jewish artist is in making a replication of a realistic full-scale figure, making a visual rendition of G-d, a nude, or violent image. Art is made by the observant Jew with the intention of enhancing the world with visions inspired by their belief in the Torah. A crucial belief in Judaism is that there is but one G-d, and all man-made images should reflect the majesty of G-d's creations.

Acting on impulse: using the neuroscience of impulse control to improve the law

This thesis investigates the potential legal utility of neurotechnologies which measure correlates of impulsive behaviors. Chapter 1 explains my philosophical position and how this position compares to others in the field. Chapter 2 explores some of the technical concepts which must be understood for the discussion of neurotechnologies and their applications to be fruitful. These chapters will be important for both explaining the capabilities of a neuroscientific approach to neural abnormalities as well as how they relate to the kind of regulation in which the law is engaged. The purpose of Chapter 3 will be a descriptive account of Canadian law where I will begin to explore how to apply ideas and experiments from neuroscience to specific areas of law. Chapter 3 will look at actual examples of Canadian criminal law and will span topics from the creation of law to the construction of appropriate sentences. Chapter 4 will debate if and how we should apply the neuroscientific perspective to the law given the ethical concerns surrounding the applications described in Chapter 3. The thrust of the chapter is that the development of the law does not occur in a vacuum and any alteration either to the laws themselves, how they are interpreted, or the technologies used to provide evidence, must have an ethical justification, that is, a way in which the proposed change will better meet the needs of society and the ethical objectives of the law. Sometimes these justifications can be drawn directly from constitutional documents, such as the Charter, or from the Criminal Code, while at other times these justifications depend upon arguments about furthering meaningful responsibility and therapeutic outcomes.

Police is Dead: On the Birth of Economism

Police is Dead is an historiographic analysis whose objective is to change the terms by which contemporary humanist scholarship assesses the phenomenon currently termed neoliberalism. It proceeds by building an archeology of legal thought in the United States that spans the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. My approach assumes that the decline of certain paradigms of political consciousness set historical conditions that enable the emergence of what is to follow. The particular historical form of political consciousness I seek to reintroduce to the present is what I call “police:” a counter-liberal way of understanding social relations that I claim has particular visibility within a legal archive, but that has been largely ignored by humanist theory on account of two tendencies: first, an over-valuation of liberalism as Western history’s master signifier; and second, inconsistent and selective attention to law as a cultural artifact. The first part of my dissertation reconstructs an anatomy of police through close studies of court opinions, legal treatises, and legal scholarship. I focus in particular on juridical descriptions of intimate relationality—which police configured as a public phenomenon—and slave society apologetics, which projected the notion of community as an affective and embodied structure. The second part of this dissertation demonstrates that the dissolution of police was critical to emergence of a paradigm I call economism: an originally progressive economic framework for understanding social relations that I argue developed at the nexus of law and economics at the turn of the twentieth century. Economism is a way of understanding sociality that collapses ontological distinctions between formally distinct political subjects—i.e., the state, the individual, the collective—by reducing them to the perspective of economic force. Insofar as it was taken up and reoriented by neoliberal theory, this paradigm has become a hegemonic form of political consciousness. This project concludes by encouraging a disarticulation of economism—insofar as it is a form of knowledge—from neoliberalism as its contemporary doctrinal manifestation. I suggest that this is one way progressive scholarship can think about moving forward in the development of economic knowledge, rather than desiring to move backwards to a time before the rise of neoliberalism. Disciplinarily, I aim to show that understanding the legal historiography informing our present moment is crucial to this task.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

To what extent has research conducted by the GaWC Research Network aided our understanding of large EU law firm geography?

This thesis explores whether a specific group of large EU law firms exhibited multiple common behaviours regarding their EU geographies between 1998 and 2009. These potentially common behaviours included their preferences for trading in certain EU locations, their usage of law firm alliances, and the specific reasons why they opened or closed EU branch offices. If my hypothesis is confirmed, this may indicate that certain aspects of large law firm geography are predictable – a finding potentially of interest to various stakeholders globally, including legal regulators, academics and law firms. In testing my hypothesis, I have drawn on research conducted by the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network to assist me. Between 1999 and 2010, the GaWC published seven research papers exploring the geographies of large US and UK law firms. Several of the GaWC’s observations arising from these studies were evidence-based; others were speculative – including a novel approach for explaining legal practice branch office change, not adopted in research conducted previously or subsequently. By distilling the GaWC’s key observations these papers into a series of “sub-hypotheses”, I been able to test whether the geographical behaviours of my novel cohort of large EU law firms reflect those suggested by the GaWC. The more the GaWC’s suggested behaviours are observed among my cohort, the more my hypothesis will be supported. In conducting this exercise, I will additionally evaluate the extent to which the GaWC’s research has aided our understanding of large EU law firm geography. Ultimately, my findings broadly support most of the GaWC’s observations, notwithstanding our cohort differences and the speculative nature of several of the GaWC’s propositions. My investigation has also allowed me to refine several of the GaWC’s observations regarding commonly-observable large law firm geographical behaviours, while also addressing a key omission from the group’s research output.