Abundance and Distribution of Ichthyoplankton along an Inshore-Offshore Transect in Onslow Bay, North Carolina

The distribution and abundance of ichthyoplankton was investigated from November 1979 to March 1980 along a transect from coastal to continental slope waters in Onslow Bay, North Carolina. Representatives of 66 families were collected; 24 of which were tropical families, a category that also includes families of typically oceanic and deep-sea fishes. Larvae of tropical species were collected in coastal and shelf waters, demonstrating the intrusion of Gulf Stream waters onto the continental shelf. From December through March, frontal waters that separated cold open-shelf surface waters from warm Gulf Stream surface waters were observed. Higher abundances of fish larvae were sometimes, but not consistently, associated with frontal waters. A great diversity of taxa was collected in offshore waters, and densities of larvae were low in coastal waters; low densities were attributed to gear selectivity rather than low larval abundance. Larvae of commercially and recreationally important estuarine-dependent species, especially Leiostomus xanthus and Micropogonias undulatus, were dominant components of the ichthyoplankton. Representatives of the families Bothidae, Clupeidae, Gadidae, Gonostomatidae, Myctophidae, Ophidiidae, and Sparidae were also important components of the ichthyoplankton. Larvae of species representing two strikingly different life history types-mesopelagic and estuarine-dependent frequently cooccurred.(PDF file contains 32 pages.)

Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction

In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might simply unexpectedly forget what they previously observed (but not chose). Following this idea, this paper drops the assumption that the information structure of extensive-form games is commonly known; that is, it introduces uncertainty into players' capacity to observe each others' past choices. Using this approach, our main result provides the following epistemic characterisation: if players (i) are rational,(ii) have strong belief in both opponents' rationality and opponents' capacity to observe others' choices, and (iii) have common belief in both opponents' future rationality and op-ponents' future capacity to observe others' choices, then the backward induction outcome obtains. Consequently, we do not require perfect information, and players observing each others' choices is often irrelevant from a strategic point of view. The analysis extends {from generic games with perfect information to games with not necessarily perfect information{the work by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Perea (2014), who provide different sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome.