930 resultados para New York (State). Court of Special Sessions (New York)
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1903
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An order to the sheriff of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, for twelve men to serve on a jury in the trial of John Borrowes, for an unspecified crime. Signed: Jeremiah Langhorne (justice of the peace); dated 14 June 1731. With seal. With this document (originally attached) is the list of jurors chosen to serve at the trial.
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A copy of the reports by Edward Barradall of decisions of the general court of Virginia made by Gustavus A. Myers for William Green from a copy lent him by Conway Robinson.
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Contains summaries of cases before the Chancery Court of Grenada arranged chronologically and preceded by an index.
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Bond signed by William Buckley, justice of the peace for Bucks County, Pennsylvania.
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Williams was accused of assault and battery against John Black. Bond signed by Joseph Hartz, (justice of the peace for Bucks County, Pennsylvania); dated 30 October 1764.
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Attestation regarding the trial of Quelch and other defendants, who were convicted of piracy. Signed: John Valentine, registrar.
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Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.