Angel Investing in Finland: An Analysis Based on Agency Theory and the Incomplete Contracting Theory

Wealthy individuals - business angels who invest a share of their net worth in entrepreneurial ventures - form an essential part of an informal venture capital market that can secure funding for entrepreneurial ventures. In Finland, business angels represent an untapped pool of capital that can contribute to fostering entrepreneurial development. In addition, business angels can bridge knowledge gaps in new business ventures by means of making their human capital available. This study has two objectives. The first is to gain an understanding of the characteristics and investment behaviour of Finnish business angels. The strongest focus here is on the due diligence procedures and their involvement post investment. The second objective is to assess whether agency theory and the incomplete contacting theory are useful theoretical lenses in the arena of business angels. To achieve the second objective, this study investigates i) how risk is mitigated in the investment process, ii) how uncertainty influences the comprehensiveness of due diligence as well as iii) how control is allocated post investment. Research hypotheses are derived from assumptions underlying agency theory and the incomplete contacting theory. The data for this study comprise interviews with 53 business angels. In terms of sample size this is the largest on Finnish business angels. The research hypotheses in this study are tested using regression analysis. This study suggests that the Finnish informal venture capital market appears to be comprised of a limited number of business angels whose style of investing much resembles their formal counterparts’. Much focus is placed on managing risks prior to making the investment by strong selectiveness and by a relatively comprehensive due diligence. The involvement is rarely on a day-to-day basis and many business angels seem to see board membership as a more suitable alternative than involvement in the operations of an entrepreneurial venture. The uncertainty involved does not seem to drive an increase in due diligence. On the contrary, it would appear that due diligence is more rigorous in safer later stage investments and when the business angels have considerable previous experience as investors. Finnish business angels’ involvement post investment is best explained by their degree of ownership in the entrepreneurial venture. It seems that when investors feel they are sufficiently rewarded, in terms of an adequate equity stake, they are willing to involve themselves actively in their investments. The lack of support for a relationship between increased uncertainty and the comprehensiveness of due diligence may partly be explained by an increasing trend towards portfolio diversification. This is triggered by a taxation system that favours investments through investment companies rather than direct investments. Many business angels appear to have substituted a specialization strategy that builds on reducing uncertainty for a diversification strategy that builds on reducing firm specific (idiosyncratic) risk by holding shares in ventures whose returns are not expected to exhibit a strong positive correlation.

Stock Option Compensation in Finland: An Analysis of Economic Determinants, Contracting Frequency, and Design

This paper addresses several questions in the compensation literature by examining stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms. First, the results indicate that principal-agent theory succeeds quite well in predicting the use of stock options. Proxies for monitoring costs, growth opportunities, ownership structure, and risk are found to determine the use of incentives consistent with theory. Furthermore, the paper examines whether determinants of stock options targeted to top management differ from determinants of broad-based stock option plans. Some evidence is found that factors driving these two types of incentives differ. Second, the results reveal that systematic risk significantly increases the likelihood that firms adopt stock option plans, whereas total firm risk and unsystematic risk do not seem to affect this decision. Third, the results show that growth opportunities are related to time-dimensional contracting frequency, consistent with the argument that incentive levels deviate more rapidly from optimum in firms with high growth opportunities. Finally, the results suggest that vesting schedules are decreasing in financial leverage, and that contract maturity is decreasing in firm focus. In addition, both vesting schedules and contract maturity tend to be longer in firms involving state ownership.

Lojalitet i licensavtal

Loyalty in Licensing Agreements The purpose of the dissertation is to analyse the impact of the principle of loyalty on licensing agreements from the viewpoint of Finnish law using the traditional legal method (Rechtsdogmatik) combined with empirical data in the form of licensing agreements. The need for good licensing agreements is crucial. One should avoid mechanical and stereotyped agreements in favour of more conscious and goal-oriented ones. When the parties' will and goals have been made clear, the drafting technique should be chosen accordingly. The importance of the principle of loyalty in the interpretation of licensing agreements varies according to their degree of relationality. This is a concept originating in the relational contract theory, more precisely Ian Macneil's spectrum of contracts, where contracts can be placed on an axis according to their degree of relationality. In the dissertation different factors are used to conclude whether the licensing agreement at hand is to be placed on the axis closer to the transactional pole or closer to the relational pole. A conclusion of the dissertation is that few licensing agreements can be placed so close to the transactional pole, that the principle of loyalty lacks importance altogether. The impact of the principle of loyalty the main focus of which is on fostering the contracting parties to behave in accordance with best practices, not for example on altering contract terms is analysed in different situations where the parties' interests typically collide. These situations are discussed from the point of view of three patent and knowhow licensing agreements that differ as to their degree of relationality. A balance needs to be struck between freedom of contract and relational needs. Especially when interpreting more modern licensing agreements, one should not focus on the written document alone, as is often recommended in the literature on Nordic intellectual property law. Neither is the principle of caveat emptor a proper starting point. Moreover, where the parties are of equal bargaining power, one should not assume that the grants in licensing agreements are to be interpreted narrowly. Focus in the interpretation should instead be on the entirety of the circumstances.

Microfoundations of HRM effects: Individual and Collective Attitudes and Performance

Previous research on Human Resource Management (HRM) has focused extensively on the potential relationships between the use of HRM practices and organizational performance. Extant research in HRM has been based on the underlying assumption that HRM practices can enhance organizational performance through their impact on positive employee attitudes and performance, that is, employee reactions to HRM. At the current state of research however, it remains unclear how employees come to perceive and react to HRM practices and to what extent employees in organizations, units and teams react to such practices in similar or widely different ways. In fact, recent HRM studies indicate that employee reactions to HRM may be far less homogeneous than assumed. This raises the question of whether or not the linkage between HRM and organizational outcomes can be explained by employee reactions in terms of attitudes and performance, if these reactions are largely idiosyncratic. Accordingly, this thesis aims to shed light on the processes that shape individuals’ reactions to HRM practices and how these processes may influence the variance or sharedness in such reactions among employees in organizations, units and teams. By theoretically developing and empirically examining the effects of employee perceptions of HRM practices from the perspective of ‘HRM as signaling’ and psychological contract theory, the main contributions of this thesis focus on the following research questions: i) How employee perceptions of the HRM practices relate to individual and collective employee attitudes and performance. ii) How employee perceptions of HRM practices relates to variance in employee attitudes and performance. iii) How collective employee performance mediates the relationship between employee perceptions of HRM practices and organizational performance. Regarding the first research questions the findings indicate that individuals do respond positively to HRM practices by adjusting their felt obligations towards the employer. This finding is in line with the idea of HRM as a signaling device where each HRM practice, implicitly or explicitly, sends signals to employees about promised rewards (inducements) and behaviors (obligations) expected in return. The relationship was also confirmed at the group level of analysis. What is more, variance was found to play an important role in that employee groups with more similar perceptions about the HRM system displayed a stronger relationship between HRM and employee obligations. Concerning the second question the findings were somewhat contradictory in that a strong HRM system was found negatively related to variance in employee performance but not employee obligations. Regarding the third question, the findings confirmed linkages between the HRM system and organizational performance at the group level and the HRM system and employee performance at the individual level. Also, the entire chain of links from the HRM system through variance in employee performance, and further through the level of employee performance to organizational performance was significant.