958 resultados para Inversor boost
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The sector business services contributes directly and indirectly to aggregate economic growth in Europe. The direct contribution comes from the sector’s own dynamism. Though the business-services industry appears to be characterised by strong cyclical volatility, there was also a strong structural growth. Business services actually generated more than half of total net employment growth in the European Union since the second half of the 1990s. Apart from this direct growth contribution, the sector also contributed in an indirect way to economic growth by generating knowledge and productivity spill-overs for other industries. The knowledge role of business services is reflected in its employment characteristics. The business-services industry created spill-overs in three ways: original innovations, knowledge diffusion, and the reduction of human capital indivisibilities at firm level. The share of knowledge-intensive business services in the intermediate inputs of the total economy has risen sharply in the last decade. Firm-level scale diseconomies with regard to knowledge and skill inputs are reduced by external deliveries of such inputs, thereby exploiting positive external scale economies. The process goes along with an increasingly complex social division of labour between economic sectors. The European business-services industry itself is characterised by a relatively weak productivity growth. Does this contribute to growth stagnation tendencies à la the socalled “Baumol disease”? The paper argues that there is no reason to expect this as long as the productivity and growth spill-overs from business services to other sectors are large enough. Finally, the paper concludes by suggesting several policy elements that could boost the role of business services in European economic growth. This might to achieve some of the ambitious Lisbon goals with respect to employment, productivity and innovation.
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Summary. Expanding EU-China institutional cooperation in the energy sector has been matched by a parallel process of stronger economic ties between European and Chinese companies in the renewable energy (RE) sector (particularly wind and photovoltaics). While the foundation of early EU-China institutional relations was based primarily on trade cooperation, international efforts to mitigate climate change and the common challenge of decreasing energy dependence in a sustainable manner brought a new dimension to their partnership in the energy sector in the mid 90s. Although the role of EU-China energy cooperation has grown tremendously in the context of EU external trade policy and EU strategy to boost its energy independence and international climate policy, the potential of civil society collaboration in this partnership has remained rather unexploited. Based on major civil society initiatives in the RE field that have been developed in recent years, this policy brief argues that civil society dialogue between China and EU could be an important driving force in deepening EU-China cooperation on RE and a bridge towards a more sustainable future.
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Introduction. The Chinese leader Xi Jinping presented the concept of the New Silk Road – a collection of land and maritime routes – in autumn 2013. Initially, it envisaged the creation of a network of infrastructural connections, mainly transport corridors, between China and its most important economic partner – Europe. The concept grew in importance throughout 2014 to become the key instrument of China’s foreign policy, especially in the areas of public diplomacy and soft power. Towards the end of 2014, the Chinese government announced it would establish a Silk Road Fund worth US$40 billion. The New Silk Road idea is a flexible formula used by China in its dialogue with many other countries. Its inclusive nature helps contribute to diluting the negative impression caused by China’s rapid economic expansion and assertiveness in foreign policy, especially with regard to its neighbours. The process of implementing the New Silk Road concept will allow China to expand its influence within its neighbourhood: in Central and South-Eastern Asia. The New Silk Road will be an alternative point of reference to the US dominance and Russian integration projects in these regions. The concept will legitimise and facilitate the growth of China’s influence in the transit countries on the route to Western Europe, i.e. in the Middle East (Arab countries, Israel and Turkey, the Horn of Africa and Central Europe (the Balkans and the Visegrad Group countries). This concept is also essential for China’s domestic policy. It has become one of Xi Jinping’s main political projects. It will boost the development of China’s central and western provinces. The fact that the concept is open and not fully defined means that it will be a success regardless of the extent to which it will be implemented in practice. Its flexible nature allows China to continue investments already initiated bilaterally and to present them as components of the New Silk Road concept.
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The single market is often perceived as the panacea for Europe’s economic troubles. It is believed that completing the single market would boost welfare, stimulate growth and increase European competitiveness. • However, identifying and quantifying the channels through which market integration is expected to engender growth is methodologically complex. Although the overwhelming prediction from the literature is for single market integration to generate positive and significant aggregate effects, we conclude that the impact so far has fallen short of initial expectations, because: (1) Barriers continue to prevail in the EU, preventing the exploitation of the potential benefits of full market integration (2) ‘Complementary policies’ to support the single market were not, or were insufficiently, put in place (3) The single market project has not sufficiently been framed as a key part of the process of creative destruction that Europe needs to embrace to successfully modernise its economy. • That single market integration generates positive and significant aggregate effects does not imply that its effects are positive and significant for every sector. There is therefore an important role for European Union and national distributional policies to ensure that losers are sufficiently compensated by the winners, and to overcome political resistance to completing the single market.
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Introduction. Shale gas is an unconventional form of gas1 because its extraction is more difficult or less economical than that of conventional natural gas. It has become an important item of energy policy during the last years since new processes have allowed its extraction. In the medium term, shale gas should foster a reinforcement of the gas part in the world’s energy mix. In 2011, the IEA released an influential report entitled “Are we entering a golden age of gas?” This report suggests that shale gas could help substantially boost global gas use.2 It also warns at the same time that this success could bring into question the international goal of limiting the long-term increase in the global temperature to 2° C above pre-industrial levels. In the world economy, the impact of shale gas is increasing rapidly (especially in the USA, albeit apparently not as significantly as expected3). In the EU, its perspectives remain uncertain, for many reasons. Estimates are not reliable. Shale gas exploitation remains a controversial issue due to geology, lack of infrastructure and also fears for the environment and public health. The EU institutions seem to have a favorable attitude towards shale gas development while the Member States’ attitude seems to vary from enthusiasm to hesitation or opposition. Public opinion on the issue appears quite divided everywhere. This brief paper will examine various estimations of potential resources in the EU (§ 1), the potential costs and benefits (§ 2), the initiatives taken by the EU institutions (§ 3) and the national authorities (§ 4), and finally the emerging EU framework (§ 5). The conclusion is, rather surprisingly, that whatever happens on this front, this will not modify the present structural challenges of the EU in the domains of climate and energy.4
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FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service
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One thing is clear: the Greek people have emphatically voted ‘No’, providing a boost to Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and plunging Greece and the Eurozone even more into uncertainty. But it might, at the end of the day, prove to be a hollow victory for the Greek Prime Minister: the vote cannot compel the rest of the Eurozone to open their coffers and provide the funds Greece so desperately needs. It is certainly not a victory for democracy: it is highly questionable whether the Greek people could form an informed opinion, given the short time frame, the unclear question relying on a proposal no longer on the table, and the high level of misinformation on the potential consequences of the vote. This is no victory, neither for Greece nor the EU and its members: in the end, it increases the danger of Greece leaving the Eurozone – and potentially even an eventual exit from the EU –, which the people of Greece clearly do not want, as 75-80 per cent of citizens firmly want the country to stay in the euro.
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Against the background of the rapidly growing number of asylum-seekers, Daniel Gros argues in this CEPS Commentary that the EU needs to take action on two fronts. First, member countries must urgently boost their capacity to deal with asylum applications, so that they can quickly identify those who truly deserve protection. Second, the EU needs to improve burden-sharing in providing shelter for those who gain asylum. In his view, international law – and basic morality – demands nothing less.
China's ETS: A vote of confidence in carbon markets ahead of Paris. CEPS Commentary, 12 October 2015
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In this CEPS commentary, Andrei Marcu welcomes the recent announcement by President Xi Jinping that China will start a national emissions trading scheme in 2017. Calling it a "genuine game changer" in the global climate talks, Marcu describes the decision as giving a much-needed boost to carbon markets and cap-and-trade as the preferred way forward for those economies that have the capacity, the depth and the breadth for a liquid carbon market.
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When in 2012 China approached the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula, it declared it was willing to meet the needs of CEE countries. Beijing had been aware of the political importance of the problem of trade deficit (which has been ongoing for years) and launched cooperation with the governments of 16 CEE countries to boost imports from these states. The years 2011–2014 brought an improvement in the balance of trade between China and: Hungary, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. The remaining ten CEE countries recorded an increase in their trade deficits. Changes in CEE countries’ balance of trade with China resulted only slightly from political actions. Instead, they were due to the macroeconomic situation and to a deterioration of the debt crisis in the EU which, for example, caused a decline in the import of Chinese goods in some of these countries. Multilateral trade cooperation was successfully developed in the entire region only in the agricultural and food production sector – the area of greatest interest to China. The pace of bilateral cooperation with specific countries varied, with the fastest being Poland, Latvia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Actions by governments of CEE countries resulted in Chinese market opening up to hundreds of local companies which, in turn, translated into an increase in the volume of foodstuffs sold by ‘the 16’ to China from US$ 137 million in 2011 to US$ 400 million in 2014. The success achieved in the agricultural and food production sector has demonstrated the effectiveness of trade cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. It is, however, insufficient to generate a significant improvement of the trade balance. At present, the sector’s share in the total volume of goods sold to China by CEE states is a mere 3.7%, and any reduction of the trade deficit would require long-term and more comprehensive solutions still to be implemented by the governments of individual CEE states.
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After Japan’s snap Lower House elections called on December 14 by old – and now new – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, it will hopefully be the former, but probably the latter. This is the very opposite of what Abe promised would happen after his two-year tenure, which included many missed opportunities to adopt badly needed economic reforms capable of leading the country back onto a path of sustainable economic growth. While the jury is still out on whether Abe will focus this time around on economic reforms as opposed to attempts to boost the country’s defense profile and get rid of Japan’s constitutionally prescribed pacifism, his (very) nationalist and at times revisionist political track record suggests that it could be the latter yet again.
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Portugal provides a large number of factors that boost the development of the national equestrian tourism. It represents an opportunity for the qualification and differentiation of the national tourism, to stimulate rural economies, to combat seasonality and asymmetries.This study want to understand the importance, for the equestrian tourist, of the critical success factors such as the Lusitano horse, the national equestrian culture, the landscape diversity, among others. Also, how they can contribute to the differentiation of the national equestrian tourism for international destinations that are already deployed in the market.For this study is crucial to know the perspective of those involved in the various equestrian tourism activities. In this sense, a group of companies were selected and exploratory interviews were conducted that contributed to important outputs in the construction of the questionnaire.The research was attended by 110 individuals, with different profiles, motivations and types of involvement. From the analysis, it is concluded that the critical success factors are significant in motivating equestrian tourists, namely the quality of equestrian infrastructures, the Lusitano horse, the hospitality, among others. It is also possible to analyze that the equestrian tourist demonstrates a strong commitment: they are knowledgeable, read a lot about riding and belong to equestrian clubs.Finally, the factor analysis highlight the agreement between participants and a significant number of statements made in the questionnaire related to motivation and involvement. It is possible to conclude that equestrian tourists look for relaxing moments and opportunities to expand their equestrian knowledge.
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The adenylate cyclase toxoid (ACT) of Bordetella pertussis is capable of delivering its N-terminal catalytic domain into the cytosol of CD11b-expressing professional antigen-presenting cells such as myeloid dendritic cells. This allows delivery of CD8+ T-cell epitopes to the major histocompatibility complex (MHC) class I presentation pathway. Recombinant detoxified ACT containing an epitope of the Plasmodium berghei circumsporozoite protein (CSP), indeed, induced a specific CD8+ T-cell response in immunized mice after a single application, as detected by MHC multimer staining and gamma interferon (IFN-gamma) ELISPOT assay. This CSP-specific response could be significantly enhanced by prime-boost immunization with recombinant ACT in combination with anti-CTLA-4 during the boost immunization. This increased response was accompanied by complete protection in a number of mice after a challenge with P. berghei sporozoites. Transient blockade of CTLA-4 may overcome negative regulation and hence provide a strategy to enhance the efficacy of a vaccine by amplifying the number of responding T cells.
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Esta tese apresenta uma configuração em que, numa rede social regida pelo princípio da ligação preferencial, nós periféricos buscam inflacionar artificialmente seus índices de centralidade, medida pelo grau de entrada, por meio do privilégio temporário da reciprocidade de ligações com outros nós periféricos. Para construir este cenário, criou-se uma rede com as características de uma rede acadêmica de citações entre artigos, em que os nós são artigos publicados por um conjunto de periódicos, e as ligações entre eles são as citações que cada artigo faz a outros artigos existentes. Esta rede foi condensada em outra, na qual os nós são os periódicos aos quais cada artigo da primeira rede está associado, e as ligações são o total de citações que os artigos de um periódico faz aos artigos de cada outro periódico. Implementou-se um método de simulação computacional, no qual, durante alguns ciclos, foram manipulados parâmetros relacionados à quantidade total de ligações (citações) entre periódicos periféricos, de forma a induzir os efeitos desejados de reciprocidade periférica, alterando a lógica de direcionamento de citações pela atribuição de maior probabilidade para que artigos de outros periódicos periféricos recebessem ligações, afastando-se da lógica da ligação preferencial, porém sem alterar qualquer outra característica intrínseca que representasse a capacidade de um artigo ou periódico atrair novas ligações. Chamou-se esta alteração da lógica de alocação de ligações entre periódicos periféricos de Comportamento Estratégico. Observou-se que o Comportamento Estratégico é capaz de trazer benefícios de centralidade medida por grau para aqueles periódicos em que ele foi induzido, e prejuízos para os demais periódicos periféricos, porém não é suficiente para que eles saiam do quartil periférico de centralidade a que pertenciam antes da manipulação dos efeitos. Além disso, observou-se que, na ausência de elementos que alterem a capacidade intrínseca de atração de ligações de um periódico, a interrupção do Comportamento Estratégico levou aos níveis anteriores de centralidade. Também se observou que o Comportamento Estratégico acarretou em alterações de centralidade medida por autovetor estatisticamente significativas, porém não esperadas, mas que, após sua interrupção, esta retornou aos patamares anteriores à indução dos efeitos.