Ukraine's cooperation with the IMF - unfulfilled hopes for deeper reforms. OSW Commentary No. 52, 2011-06-15

The Party of Regions took power in early 2010, after Ukraine had been plunged deep in economic crisis. Over the next year, with the external markets recovering, the country’s economic situation started to improve gradually. Ukraine’s economic stabilisation was also strengthened by its resumed cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, which provided for a loan worth $15.1 billion. The issuing of successive tranches of the loan was made dependent on the implementation of a comprehensive reform programme. The cooperation went quite smoothly at first; however, as the economic situation in Ukraine improved, the reformist zeal of the Ukrainian government started to fade, and obstacles began piling up. As a result, Ukraine was refused the third tranche, scheduled for this March, and for the moment the credit line remains frozen. Even though the IMF has numerous reservations about the Ukrainian government’s economic policy, the fundamental condition for resuming cooperation is reform of the pension system, which the parliament should adopt. The difficulties with fulfilling the obligations made to the IMF reflect the wider problem with implementing reforms in Ukraine, as the Party of Regions promised after taking power. Changes which do not affect the interests of influential lobbies are quite easy to carry out. Often, however, these changes are not conducive to the economy’s liberalisation; moreover, the influential lobbies are successful in blocking reforms that could harm their businesses. Another impediment to the changes is that some reforms are likely to bring about painful social consequences, and that can affect public support for the ruling group. Even though theoretically possible, it does not seem likely that Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF will be terminated. But even if this cooperation is continued, deeper reforms in Ukraine are likely to be postponed until after the parliamentary elections in autumn 2012.

The fiscal compact - Europe's "hard core" based on German economic conditions. OSW Commentary No. 71, 2012-03-07

On 2 March, the leaders of 25 EU member states signed the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union. It will introduce new fiscal constraints and officially vest new competences in the eurozone countries. Thus, their right to coordinate economic policy among them will be sanctioned. So far, the Lisbon Treaty has only provided for organisation of informal Eurogroup meetings, to be attended by representatives of the European Commission. The principles introduced by the compact, if the eurozone countries are really determined to observe its provisions, will create a new way of managing the single currency. Within the next few years, the most indebted countries will have to carry out radical reforms to boost their competitiveness and adjust it to German standards. During this period the Federal Republic of Germany will most probably decide to offer higher loan guarantees to relieve these countries’ budgets. The compact’s political consequences are also of great significance, especially considering how the treaty was finalised. The eurozone states have in fact accepted that the direction for changes will be devised by France and Germany, and the role of European institutions such as the Commission or the Parliament may weaken. From the perspective of eurozone candidate countries, the introduction of the fiscal compact means expanding the scope of conditions they must meet to become members of the single currency area. In the future, a country, in order to adopt the single currency, will have to meet the structural deficit criterion, and also most probably carry out economic reforms such as unifying its fiscal system. These goals will be achieved across the eurozone gradually, in the subsequent stages of the economic governance reform.

Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

Farm-level Capital: Capital positions, structures, the dynamics of farm-level investments, capital accumulation and leverage positions. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 7, October 2011

This Factor Markets Working Paper describes and highlights the key issues of farm capital structures, the dynamics of investments and accumulation of farm capital, and the financial leverage and borrowing rates on farms in selected European countries. Data collected from the Farm Account Data Network (FADN) suggest that the European farming sector uses quite different farm business strategies, capabilities to generate capital revenues, and segmented agricultural loan market regimes. Such diverse business strategies have substantial, and perhaps more substantial than expected, implications for the financial leverage and performance of farms. Different countries adopt different approaches to evaluating agricultural assets, or the agricultural asset markets simply differ substantially depending on the country in question. This has implications for most of the financial indicators. In those countries that have seen rapidly increasing asset prices at the margin, which were revised accordingly in the accounting systems for the whole stock of assets, firm values increased significantly, even though the firms had been disinvesting. If there is an asset price bubble and it bursts, there may be serious knock-on effects for some countries.

Agricultural Credit Market Institutions: A Comparison of Selected European Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 33, January 2013

This paper describes and compares the institutional framework of the agricultural credit markets in selected European countries. The institutions can be both formal (rules, regulations, authorities and actors) and informal (norms, values and relations). They also interact and in situations where the formal institutions are weak, the informal ones increase in importance. The study is based on a questionnaire sent to agricultural financial experts in selected countries. The case studies show that credit regulations are typically general, with no specific regulations for the agricultural credit market. On the other hand, several countries support agricultural credit in various forms, implying that the governments do not perceive the general credit market to function in the case of agricultural firms. In a risk assessment, the most frequent reasons for rejecting a loan application are all linked to economic performance and the situation of the farmer. Personal characteristics, such as educational level or lack of experience, were generally perceived as less influential. Another interesting point when it comes to risk assessment is that in some countries the importance of asset-based lending compared with cash flow-based lending seems to differ when concerning a first-time applicant and when there is an application to extend a loan. To get an idea of the availability of credit, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was calculated, and it showed remarkably low values for Poland and Slovakia. For all the countries, the calculated value was lower than what the financial experts would have expected. This might imply credit rationing in agriculture in some of the countries studied. The financial experts all judged the possibility of an agricultural firm obtaining a loan as higher than that for other small rural firms, implying that the latter are also credit-rationed.

Performance Indicators in Agricultural Financial Markets. Factor Markets Working Document No. 43, May 2013

This study attempts to develop performance indicators for the financial markets based on the findings in an earlier Factor Markets Working Paper (No. 33, “Agricultural credit market institutions: A comparison of selected European countries”) and on FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network) data. Two indicators were developed. One measured the long-term economic sustainability of agricultural firms since the financial characteristics of the firms were perceived as important factors when rejecting a loan applicant. If the indicator works, it should show that a low value in this indicator is related to the performance in the financial markets. The second indicator was the loan-to-value (LTV), or debt-to-asset ratio, the reasoning behind this indicator is that low values can point to credit constraints, and in WP 33 we saw that the interviewed experts expected LTVs to be much higher than what is actually the case. We find that the first indicator can’t be used to measure the performance of the financial institutions, since we can’t show any relationship between the indicator and activities in the financial markets. However, the indicator is valuable for its measurement of the long-term financial sustainability of the agricultural sector, or of the firms. The loan-to-value indicator does imply that most countries would have room to increase the credit.

A ship run aground Deepening problems in the Ukrainian economy. OSW Commentary Number 173, 16 June 2015

The drop in Ukraine’s GDP by nearly 18% in the first three months of 2015 (versus the corresponding period in 2014) has confirmed the decline of the country’s economy. Over the last 14 months, the Ukrainian currency was subject to an almost threefold devaluation against the US dollar, and in April 2015 the inflation rate was 61% (year-on-year), which exacerbated the impoverishment of the general public and weakened domestic demand. The main reason behind the crisis has been the destruction of heavy industry and infrastructure in the war-torn Donbas region, over which Kyiv no longer has control, as well as a sharp decline in foreign trade (by 24% in 2014 and by 34% in the first quarter of 2015), recorded primarily in trading volume with Ukraine’s major trade partner, i.e. Russia (a drop of 43%). The conflict has also had a negative impact on the production figures for the two key sectors of the Ukrainian economy: agriculture and metallurgy, which account for approximately 50% of Ukrainian exports. The government’s response to the crisis has primarily been a reduction in the costs of financing the Donbas and an increase in the financial burden placed on the citizens and companies of Ukraine. No radical reforms which would encompass the entire system, including anti-corruption reforms, have been carried out to stop the embezzlement of state funds and to facilitate business activity. The reasons for not initiating reforms have included the lack of will to launch them, Ukraine’s traditionally slow pace of bureaucratic action and growing dissonance among the parties making up the parliamentary coalition. The few positive changes, including marketisation of energy prices and sustaining budgetary discipline (in the first quarter of 2015, budgetary revenues grew by 25%, though partly as a result of currency devaluation), are being carried out under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which is making the payment of further loan instalments to the tune of US$ 17.5 billion conditional upon reforms. Despite assistance granted by Western institutional donors and by individual states, the risk of Ukraine going bankrupt remains real. The issue of restructuring foreign debt worth US$ 15 billion has not been resolved, as foreign creditors who hold Ukrainian bonds have not consented to any partial cancellation of the debt. Whether Ukraine’s public finances can be stabilised will depend mainly on the situation in the east of the country and on the possible renewal of military action. It seems that the only way to rescue Ukraine’s public finances from deteriorating further is to continue to ‘freeze’ the conflict, to gradually implement wide-ranging reforms and to reach a consensus in negotiations with lenders.

The ECB’s Latest Gimmick. Cash for loans, CEPS Policy Brief No. 341, March 2016

Among several important monetary policy initiatives decided by the European Central Bank on 10 March 2016 was the launch of a new set of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II), expanding on the previous TLTRO. In assessing this scheme, which might cost up to €24 billion, this Policy Brief finds that while it could become important, it is questionable whether it will achieve its goal of encouraging the extension of credit for new investment, as banks can easily window dress their loan book.

Projeto Aplicado “Acácias Perfume”

O presente trabalho, visa implementar uma perfumaria na província de Benguela-Angola, e tem como objetivo identificar a relevância da mesma e aferir a viabilidade económica e financeira do negócio. O setor da perfumaria e cosméticos ainda são dos menos competitivos em Benguela, contudo o segmento desta junção apresenta uma enorme margem de progressão, pois a oferta ainda é escassa, e existe uma tendência de se procurar cada vez mais estes produtos. A ideia surgiu devido a presença de uma realidade precária na oferta e procura desses produtos naquela província em geral, para além disso, alia-se o facto de não existir nenhuma perfumaria na zona onde se pretende instalar a perfumaria. Como tal, entendeu-se estar perante uma boa oportunidade de negócio. Os meios financeiros necessários foram de, 70% de capitais próprios e 30% através de empréstimo bancário, a uma taxa de juro anual de 14%. O montante total do financiamento foi de 15 306 060,00 AOA. Com base em estudos científicos, pesquisas de campo, livros, entrevistas a pessoas singulares e coletivas, e um plano financeiro aplicado bem elaborado, obtivemos resultados satisfatórios principalmente se analisarmos os três critérios de avaliação mais preponderantes de um projeto aplicado tais como o valor atual líquido de 617 051 187,75 AOA, taxa interna de rentabilidade de 56,40%, e é expectável que o período de recuperação do investimento seja aproximadamente de 3 anos. Consequentemente, foram utilizadas técnicas estratégicas académicas focadas nas características do mercado que apresentaram boas perspetivas futuras através de uma relação entre a visão do investimento o custo de oportunidade do negócio. Portanto, conclui-se que é um investimento viável, devido a características do mercado e os recursos tangíveis e intangíveis que nele ostentam, bem como as perspetivas futuras de sustentabilidade que a mesma apresenta.

Reflections on the Nature of Preferentialism in Services Trade

The Graduate Institute organized an academic workshop and roundtable on the occasion of EFTA's 50th Anniversary in Geneva under the chairmanship of H.E. Doris Leuthard, President of the Swiss Confederation. Pierre Sauve, Deputy Managing Director and Director of Studies, WTI and Co-leader, NCCR-Trade work programme on preferentialism and Anirudh Shingal, Senior Research Fellow, WTI and Co-leader, NCCR-Trade work programme on impact assessment of trade, co-authored a paper on the nature of preferentialism in services trade, which Anirudh presented at the workshop. The event was extremely well-attended by high profile dignitaries and academics including President Leuthard; Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy; trade ministers of Brazil and Finland; Jan Kubis, Executive Secretary of the UNECE and several current and former ambassadors. The academic workshop, moderated by Theresa Carpenter (Graduate Institute, Geneva), began in the morning with Prof. Victor Norman's (Norwegian School of Economics & Business Administration) presentation on the future of EFTA. Other presentations included those by Prof. Peter Egger (ETH Zurich) on the structural estimation of gravity models with market entry dynamics and by Prof. Richard Baldwin (Graduate Institute, Geneva) on 21st century regionalism. The high-profile Panel in the afternoon, moderated by Prof. Richard Baldwin, was led by President Leuthard who spoke on free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system in 2020. The keynote address at the Panel was delivered by Prof. Jagdish Bhagwati (Coulmbia University), who spoke on strengthening defences against protectionism and liberalizing trade.

Colombia, small farmer market access.

"AID project 514-0194."

Accessing federal data bases for contaminated site clean-up technologies /

"May 1991"

Annual report - Superintendent of Banks, State of New York.

Some vols. issued with: Detailed statement.

New measures of the Great pyramid,

"Extended and corrected from the review in the ʻBanner of Israel, ̓for November and December, 1883."

Exploring the future of Indian Health information systems /

"February 1998."