937 resultados para Government Agencies
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The purpose of this newsletter is to inform and update State agencies on relevant labor relations issues and employment law on a monthly basis, and to focus on topics or questions agencies would like more information about.
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The purpose of this newsletter is to inform and update State agencies on relevant labor relations issues and employment law on a monthly basis, and to focus on topics or questions agencies would like more information about.
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Archive of meeting agendas and minutes for 2003 for the DAS-General Services Enterprise Customer Council.
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Archive of meeting agendas and minutes for 2004 for the DAS-General Services Enterprise Customer Council.
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Archive of meeting agendas and minutes for 2005 for the DAS-General Services Enterprise Customer Council.
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Archive of meeting agendas and minutes for 2004 for the DAS-Human Resources Enterprise Customer Council.
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Archive of meeting agendas and minutes for 2005 for the DAS-Human Resources Enterprise Customer Council.
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Archive of meeting agendas and minutes for 2004 for the DAS-I/3 Customer Council.
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Archive of meeting agendas and minutes for 2005 for the DAS-I/3 Customer Council.
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Orders that State Agencies achieve and maintain a diverse workforce in state government.
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Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.
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The aim of this essay is to deal with economic voting in contexts ofmultilevel governance and to be a contribution to the debate on attribution of responsibilities in popularity functions literature. We use aggregate and individual data from Catalonia in order to analyse the relation between the state of the economy and the support for a sub-state government. The empirical analysis shows that the responsibility hypothesis works in regional governments without explicit macroeconomic competencies. We have also considered the evaluations of government performance on certain specific policies in order to clarify and determine the factors that drive Catalan government support. The article considers the implications of the findings for future attempts to model party support in a context of the European Union.
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House file 2782 (2007 Infrastructure Appropriations Act) requires state agencies that receive appropriations from specific funds to report that information. The Iowa Department of Transportation received funds from the Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Fund, the State Recreational Trails Fund, the Health Restricted Capitals, and the Rail Revolving Loan and Grant Program in FY 2007. These are the status reports for those funds and the status of the FY2006 funds received from the State Recreational Trails Fund, the Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Fund and the Tobacco Settlement Trust Fund.
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This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.