The Behavior Rating Inventory Of Executive Function - Self-Report Version (Brief-Sr) And The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function Sys

The assessment of executive functions is an area of study that has seen considerable development in recent years. Despite much research examining the validity of various measures of executive functions from both a direct and indirect format, little evidence exists in the extant literature evaluating the correspondence between these types of measures. The current study examined the extent of correspondence, comprising concurrent validity, between the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) and the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function ¿ Self-Report Version (BRIEF-SR). Participants included 30 undergraduate and high school students 18 years of age. Results indicated mixed evidence of concurrent validity between the two measures of executive functions. The findings obtained suggest both expected significant, negative correlation as well as lack of expected correlation between the measures. Suggestions for future research in the assessment of executive functions are discussed.

Cognitive and behavioral aspects of executive functions in children born very preterm

This study investigated whether children aged between 8 and 12 years born very preterm (VPT) and/or at very low birth weight (VLBW) performed lower than same-aged term-born controls in cognitive and behavioral aspects of three executive functions: inhibition, working memory, and shifting. Special attention was given to sex differences. Fifty-two VPT/VLBW children (26 girls, 50%) born in the cohort of 1998-2003 and 36 same-aged term-born children (18 girls, 50%) were recruited. As cognitive measures, children completed tasks of inhibition (Color-Word Interference Test, D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001 ), working memory (digit span backwards, HAWIK-IV; Petermann & Petermann, 2008 ), and shifting (Trail Making Test, number-letter-switching, D-KEFS; Delis et al., 2001 ). As behavioral measures, mothers completed the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000 ). Scales of interest were inhibit, working memory, and shift. Analyses of the cognitive aspects of executive functions revealed that VPT/VLBW children performed significantly lower than controls in the shifting task but not in the working memory and inhibition tasks. Analyses of behavioral aspects of executive functions revealed that VPT/VLBW children displayed more problems than the controls in working memory in everyday life but not in inhibition and shifting. No sex differences could be detected either in cognitive or behavioral aspects of executive functions. To conclude, cognitive and behavioral measures of executive functions were not congruent in VPT/VLBW children. In clinical practice, the combination of cognitive and behavioral instruments is required to disclose children's executive difficulties.

Executive functions of children born very preterm--deficit or delay?

This cross-sectional study examined the performance of children born very preterm and/or at very low birth weight (VPT/VLBW) and same-aged term-born controls in three core executive functions: inhibition, working memory, and shifting. Children were divided into two age groups according to the median (young, 8.00-9.86 years; old, 9.87-12.99 years). The aims of the study were to investigate whether (a) VPT/VLBW children of both age groups performed poorer than controls (deficit hypothesis) or caught up with increasing age (delay hypothesis) and (b) whether VPT/VLBW children displayed a similar pattern of performance increase in executive functions with advancing age compared with the controls. Fifty-six VPT/VLBW children born in the cohort of 1998-2003 and 41 healthy-term-born controls were recruited. All children completed tests of inhibition (Color-Word Interference Task, Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS)), working memory (Digit Span Backwards, HAWIK-IV), and shifting (Trail Making Test, Number-Letter Sequencing, D-KEFS). Results revealed that young VPT/VLBW children performed significantly poorer than the young controls in inhibition, working memory, and shifting, whereas old VPT/VLBW children performed similar to the old controls across all three executive functions. Furthermore, the frequencies of impairment in inhibition, working memory and shifting were higher in the young VPT/VLBW group compared with the young control group, whereas frequencies of impairment were equal in the old groups. In both VPT/VLBW children and controls, the highest increase in executive performance across the ages of 8 to 12 years was observed in shifting, followed by working memory, and inhibition.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Firing Up the Crucible with Senator Lee Metcalf & Governor Forrest Anderson -- Judge Gordon Bennett in “The Crucible of Change”

During the lead-up to Montana second progressive era, Lee Metcalf and Forrest Anderson, along with others, kept the progressive flame lit in Montana. Metcalf’s political history is replete with close electoral wins because of his commitment to progressive ideals when the times were not always politically favorable for that. As State Legislator, MT Supreme Court Justice, Congressman and eventually as US Senator, Lee won races by as little as 55 votes because he stuck to his guns as a progressive. In Forrest Anderson’s career as a County Attorney, State Legislator, MT Supreme Court Justice and 12 years as MT Attorney General he was respected as a pragmatic practitioner of politics. But during that entire career leading up to his election as Governor, Forrest Anderson was also a stalwart supporter of the progressive agenda exemplified by FDR and the New Deal, which brought folks out of the Great Depression that was brought on by the bad policies of the GOP and big business. As MT’s second progressive period began in 1965, the first important election was Senator Metcalf’s successful re-election battle in 1966 with the sitting MT Governor, Tim Babcock. And the progressive express was really ignited by the election of Forrest Anderson as Governor in 1968 after 16 years of Republican Governors in MT. Gordon Bennett played a rather unique role, being a confidant of Metcalf and Anderson, both who respected his wide and varied experience, his intellect, and his roots in progressivism beginning with his formative years in the Red Corner of NE Montana. Working with Senator Metcalf and his team, including Brit Englund, Vic Reinemer, Peggy McLaughlin, Betty Davis and Jack Condon among others, Bennett helped shape the progressive message both in Washington DC and MT. Progressive labor and farm organizations, part of the progressive coalition, benefitted from Bennett’s advice and counsel and aided the Senator in his career including the huge challenge of having a sitting popular governor run against him for the Senate in 1966. Metcalf’s noted intern program produced a cadre of progressive leaders in Montana over the years. Most notably, Ron Richards transitioned from Metcalf Intern to Executive Secretary of the Montana Democratic Party (MDP) and assisted, along with Bennett, in the 1966 Metcalf-Babcock race in a big way. As Executive Secretary Richards was critical to the success of the MDP as a platform for Forrest Anderson’s general election run and win in 1968. After Forrest’s gubernatorial election, Richards became Executive Assistant (now called Chief of Staff) for Governor Anderson and also for Governor Thomas Judge. The Metcalf progressive strain, exemplified by many including Richards and Bennett, permeated Democratic politics during the second progressive era. So, too, did the coalition that supported Metcalf and his policies. The progressivism of the period of “In the Crucible of Change” was fired up by Lee Metcalf, Forrest Anderson and their supporters and coalitions, and Gordon Bennett was in the center of all of that, helping fire up the crucible, setting the stage for many policy advancements in both Washington DC and Montana. Gordon Bennett’s important role in the 1966 re-election of Senator Lee Metcalf and the 1968 election of Governor Forrest Anderson, as well as his wide experience in government and politics of that time allows him to provide us with an insider’s personal perspective of those races and other events at the beginning of the period of progressive change being documented “In the Crucible of Change,” as well as his personal insights into the larger political/policy picture of Montana. Gordon Bennett, a major and formative player “In the Crucible of Change,” was born in the far northeast town of Scobey, MT in 1922. He attended school in Scobey through the eighth grade and graduated from Helena High School. After attending Carroll College for two years, he received his BA in economics from Carleton College in Northfield, MN. During a brief stint on the east coast, his daily reading of the New York Times (“best newspaper in the world at that time … and now”) inspired him to pursue a career in journalism. He received his MA in Journalism from the University of Missouri and entered the field. As a reporter for the Great Falls Tribune under the ownership and management of the Warden Family, he observed and competed with the rigid control of Montana’s press by the Anaconda Company (the Great Falls Tribune was the only large newspaper in Montana NOT owned by ACM). Following his intellectual curiosity and his philosophical bend, he attended a number of Farm-Labor Institutes which he credits with motivating him to pursue solutions to economic and social woes through the law. In 1956, at the age of 34, he received his Juris Doctorate degree from the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC. Bennett’s varied career included eighteen years as a farmer, four years in the US Army during WWII (1942-46), two years as Assistant MT Attorney General (1957-59) with Forrest Anderson, three years in private practice in Glasgow (1959-61), two years as Associate Solicitor in the Department of Interior in Washington, DC (1961-62), and private law practice in Helena from 1962 to 1969. While in Helena he was an unsuccessful candidate for the Montana Supreme Court (1962) and cemented his previous relationships with Attorney General Forrest Anderson and US Senator Lee Metcalf. Bennett modestly refuses to accept the title of Campaign Manager for either Lee Metcalf (1966 re-election over the challenger, MT Republican Governor Tim Babcock) or Forrest Anderson (his 1968 election as Governor), saying that “they ran their campaigns … we were only there to help.” But he has been generally recognized as having filled that critical role in both of those critical elections. After Governor Anderson’s election in 1968, Bennett was appointed Director of the MT Unemployment Compensation Commission, a position from where he could be a close advisor and confidant of the new Governor. In 1971, Governor Anderson appointed him Judge in the most important jurisdiction in Montana, the 1st Judicial District in Helena, a position he held for seventeen years (1971-88). Upon stepping down from his judgeship, for twenty years (1988-2008) he was a law instructor, mediator and arbitrator. He currently resides in Helena with his wife, Norma Tirrell, former newspaper reporter and researcher/writer. Bennett has two adult children and four grandchildren.