The postoccidental deconstruction and resignification of "Modernity'': a critical analysis

The thesis which follows, entitled ''The Postoccidental Deconstruction and Resignification of 'Modemity': A Critical Analysis", is an exposition and criticism of the critique of occidental modemity found in a group of writings which identify their critique with a "postoccidental" point of view with respect to postcolonial studies. The general problem ofthe investigation concems the significance and reach ofthis critique of modemity in relation to the ongoing debate, in Latín American studies, about the historical relationship between Latín America, as a mu1ticultural/ structurally heterogeneous region, and the industrial societies of Euro pe and North America. A brief Preface explains the genealogy of the author's ideas on this subject Following this preface, the thesis proceeds to analyze the writings in this corpus through an intertextual, schematic approach which singles out two rnajor elements of the postoccidental critique: "coloniality" and "eurocentrism". These two main elements are investigated in the Introduction and Chapters One and Two, in terms of how they distinguish postoccidental analysis from other theoretical tendencias with which it has affinities but whose key concepts it reformu1ates in ways that are key to the unique approach which postoccidental analysis takes to modemity, the nature of the capitalist world system, colonialism, subaltemization, center/periphery and development . Chapter Three attempts a critical analysis of the foregoing postoccidentalist deconstruction according to the following question: to what extent does it succeed in deconstructing "modernity" as a term which refers to a historically articulated set of discourses whose underlying purpose has been to justify European and North American hegemony and structural asymmetries vis-a-vis the peripheries of the capitalist world system, based on an ethnocentric, racialist logic of exploitation and subalternization of non-European peoples? A Conclusion follows Chapter Three.

La irracionalidad de lo racionalizado. Una mirada crítica desde América Latina

La tesis desarrolla una reflexión crítica sobre la Racionalidad Instrumental, hegemónica, monocultural, euro-céntrica, para mostrar por qué ésta cuando se totaliza, se convierte en Irracional. Se trata por tanto, de desarrollar una crítica epistemológica a los conocimientos hegemónicos en cuanto expresión de la Irracionalidad de lo racionalizado, y promover la “recuperación”, reconocimiento y producción de opciones alternativas de saberes, ethos y luchas, desde las “víctimas” del sistema mundo moderno. Busca desarrollar una crítica a las éticas “universales” eurócentricas que sirven de sustento al sistema mundo vigente. Dicha crítica la desarrollamos desde la materialidad de la vida como propuesta ética de las víctimas del sistema mundo. Reflexionamos sobre una ética-critica construida no para minorías, ni para épocas excepcionales de conflicto o revolución. Se trata de una ética cotidiana, desde y a favor de las grandes mayorías de la humanidad excluidas de la globalización neoliberal. A la vez, buscamos construir colectivamente desde los proyectos políticos contextuales, nuevas conciencias y prácticas centradas en la pluralidad, la interrelación, la decolonialidad y la interculturalidad entendidas como proyectos políticos, sociales, epistémicos y éticos entrelazados. Estas conciencias y prácticas, buscan distanciarse de la Irracionalidad de lo Racionalizado de este capitalismo neoliberal globalizado y multiculturalizado; y encaminarse hacia la construcción, cultivación, ejercitación y cimentación de condiciones de existencia y convivencia –de buen vivir-, que convocan todos los tiempos, claman por su propia historia y justicia, y resignifican su consistencia, desarrollo, liberación y humanidad.

La eurozona en crisis: diagnóstico, reformas, perspectivas (Coyuntura)

Desde el año 2008, los países de la zona euro conocen una crisis muy profunda que no tiene visos de concluir. Las recientes decepciones de varios países del sur de Europa (España, Grecia y Chipre) podrían sugerir que esta crisis es el resultado de decisiones políticas no adecuadas o de la crisis financiera mundial. La idea principal de este artículo es que los fundamentos de la crisis actual de la zona euro son mucho más complejos que aquellos expuestos de forma cotidiana por la prensa e incluso por analistas económicos. En el caso del euro, los problemas ocurridos son resultado principalmente de una arquitectura monetaria y financiera incoherente e incompleta. El euro nació como una moneda única con deficiencias estructurales e institucionales que no han sido corregidas desde su creación e implementación.

El diálogo intercultural de conocimientos en las leyes educativas de Ecuador y Bolivia

La presente investigación visibiliza en las leyes educativas del Ecuador y Bolivia, la relación intercultural entre conocimientos propios y conocimientos de otros lugares del mundo, entre ellos el conocimiento euro-norte-occidental. También se propone visibilizar el lugar de los conocimientos propios en un Estado intercultural y plurinacional. Para tal cometido se ha diseñado una serie de entradas temáticas que tocan al contexto histórico de la Plurinacionalidad, la pluriespiritualidad e interreligiosidad, las tensiones entre conocimientos, ciencias, tecnologías, sabidurías y diálogo de saberes, sociedad del conocimiento y las políticas lingüísticas. A partir de un diálogo interconceptual se exploran las dimensiones profundas y las dimensiones abyectas respecto a las transformaciones epistémicas y políticas que proponen las leyes educativas.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

Eurozone as home country of banks. CEPS Commentary, 2 July 2012

The euro area summit has managed to surprise the markets once again. By moving banking supervision of the eurozone to the European Central Bank, a huge step towards a more federal banking model has been taken, explains CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary. But will this move be enough to re-establish confidence, bolster the euro interbank market and further financial integration?

Path to eurobonds. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/10, July 2012

This paper discusses proposals for common euro area sovereign securities. Such instruments can potentially serve two functions: in the short-term, stabilize financialmarkets and banks and, in the medium-term, help improve the euro area economic governance framework through enhanced fiscal discipline and risk-sharing. Many questions remain onwhether financial instruments can ever accomplish such goals without bold institutional and political decisions, and,whether, in the absence of such decisions, they can create new distortions. The proposals discussed are also not necessarily competing substitutes; rather, they can be complements to be sequenced along alternative paths that possibly culminate in a fully-fledged Eurobond. The specific path chosen by policymakers should allow for learning and secure the necessary evolution of institutional infrastructures and political safeguards.

Productivity, labour cost and export adjustment: Detailed results for 24 EU countries. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/11, 12 July 2012

As a background document for Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/11 ‘Compositional effects on productivity, labour cost and export adjustment’, this working paper presents detailed results for 24 EU countries on: • The sectoral changes in the economy; • The unit labour costs (ULC) based real effective exchange rate (REER) and its main components; • Export performance. • The ULC-REERs are calculated: • For the total economy, the business sector (excluding agriculture, construction and real estate activities), and some main sectors; • Using both actual aggregates and fixed-weight aggregates, as the latter are free from the impacts of compositional changes; • Against 30 trading partners and against three subsets of trading partners: euro-area, non-euro area EU, non-EU.

Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB. CEPS Policy Brief No. 276, 11 July 2012,

Different economic and financial structures require different crisis responses. Different crises also require different tools and resources. The first ‘stage’ of the financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. Increasing financial disintegration within the region has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty for the entire cross-border banking market and to intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed countries. The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB), however, have not always represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, consistency and transparency. This is especially true for the Securities Markets Programme (SMP): by de facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably killed its future effectiveness.

Unholy compromise in the eurozone and how to right it. CEPS Policy Brief No. 277, 16 July 2012

This paper reviews the causes of the ongoing crisis in the eurozone and the policies needed to restore stability in financial markets and reassure a bewildered public. Its main message is that the EU will not overcome the crisis until it has a comprehensive and convincing set of policies in place; able to address simultaneously budgetary discipline and the sovereign debt crisis, the banking crisis, adequate liquidity provision by the ECB and dismal growth. The text updates and expands on his Policy Brief contributed in the run-up to the emergency European Council meeting at the end of June.

Can Italy and Spain survive rates of 6-7%? CEPS Policy Brief No. 279, 27 July 2012

The sentiment that the euro is now in real danger is based in large part on the widespread conviction that interest rates of 6-7% are simply unsustainable for both Italy and Spain., After taking a closer look at the fundamentals, however, Daniel Gros concludes in this new Policy Brief that both countries should be able to live with this level of interest rates for quite some time, but only if they mobilize domestic savings, which remain strong in both countries. For Spain, some debt/equity swaps are also needed.

Adjusting to a credit cycle bust: The role of fiscal policy. CEPS Commentary, 27 July 2012

In response to the often-heard accusation that “austerity is killing growth in Europe”, Daniel Gros asks in this new Commentary: “What austerity?” Looking at the entire budget cycle, he finds that the picture of austerity killing growth simply does not hold up. Since the bursting of the bubble in 2007, Gros reports that the economic performance of the US has been very similar to that of the euro area: GDP per capita is today about 2% below the 2007 level on both sides of the Atlantic; and the unemployment rate has increased by about the same amount as well: it increased by 3% both in the US and the euro area. Thus, he concludes that over a five-year period, the US has not done any better than the euro area although it has used a much larger dose of fiscal expansion.

The simple macroeconomics of North and South in EMU. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/12, 30 July 2012

The euro area today consists of a competitive, moderately leveraged North and an uncompetitive, over-indebted South. Its main macroeconomic challenge is to carry out the adjustment required to restore the competitiveness of its southern part and eliminate its excessive public and private debt burden. This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal and competitiveness adjustment in a stylised model with two countries in a monetary union, North and South. To restore competitiveness, South implements a more restrictive fiscal policy than North. We consider two scenarios. In the first, monetary policy aims at keeping inflation constant in the North. The South therefore needs to deflate to regain competitiveness, which worsens the debt dynamics. In the second, monetary policy aims at keeping inflation constant in the monetary union as a whole. This results in more monetary stimulus, inflation in the North is higher, and this in turn helps the debt dynamics in the South. Our main findings are: •The differential fiscal stance between North and South is what determines real exchange rate changes. South therefore needs to tighten more. There is no escape from relative austerity. •If monetary policy aims at keeping inflation stable in the North and the initial debt is above a certain threshold, debt dynamics are perverse: fiscal retrenchment is self-defeating; •If monetary policy targets average inflation instead, which implies higher inflation in the North, the initial debt threshold above which the debt dynamics become perverse is higher. Accepting more inflation at home is therefore a way for the North to contribute to restoring debt sustainability in the South. •Structural reforms in the South improve the debt dynamics if the initial debt is not too high. Again, targeting average inflation rather than inflation in the North helps strengthen the favourable effects of structural reforms.

spotlight europe 20120/05, August 2012: Confronting the crisis

The euro crisis has not gone away on holiday. In fact, it continues to generate a never-ending string of horrific headlines. Where is it all going to end? In this article we describe the proposed remedies that are currently being discussed, and what blue and red eurobonds, euro bills, FIRE and the debt redemption fund can actually achieve.