Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

Insurance with frequent trading: A dynamic analysis of efficient insurance markets

This paper extends existing insurance results on the type of insurance contracts needed for insurance market efficiency toa dynamic setting. It introduces continuosly open markets that allow for more efficient asset allocation. It alsoeliminates the role of preferences and endowments in the classification of risks, which is done primarily in terms of the actuarial properties of the underlying riskprocess. The paper further extends insurability to include correlated and catstrophic events. Under these very general conditions the paper defines a condition that determines whether a small number of standard insurance contracts (together with aggregate assets) suffice to complete markets or one needs to introduce such assets as mutual insurance.

Irreversible investment in stochastically cyclical markets

This paper presents a new framework for studying irreversible (dis)investment whena market follows a random number of random-length cycles (such as a high-tech productmarket). It is assumed that a firm facing such market evolution is always unsure aboutwhether the current cycle is the last one, although it can update its beliefs about theprobability of facing a permanent decline by observing that no further growth phasearrives. We show that the existence of regime shifts in fluctuating markets suffices for anoption value of waiting to (dis)invest to arise, and we provide a marginal interpretationof the optimal (dis)investment policies, absent in the real options literature. Thepaper also shows that, despite the stochastic process of the underlying variable has acontinuous sample path, the discreteness in the regime changes implies that the samplepath of the firm s value experiences jumps whenever the regime switches all of a sudden,irrespective of whether the firm is active or not.

PENELOPE-2008: A Code System for Monte Carlo Simulation of Electron and Photon Transport

The computer code system PENELOPE (version 2008) performs Monte Carlo simulation of coupledelectron-photon transport in arbitrary materials for a wide energy range, from a few hundred eV toabout 1 GeV. Photon transport is simulated by means of the standard, detailed simulation scheme.Electron and positron histories are generated on the basis of a mixed procedure, which combinesdetailed simulation of hard events with condensed simulation of soft interactions. A geometry packagecalled PENGEOM permits the generation of random electron-photon showers in material systemsconsisting of homogeneous bodies limited by quadric surfaces, i.e., planes, spheres, cylinders, etc. Thisreport is intended not only to serve as a manual of the PENELOPE code system, but also to provide theuser with the necessary information to understand the details of the Monte Carlo algorithm.

Direct simulation of interface dynamics: linking capillary pressure, interfacial area and surface energy

We perform direct numerical simulations of drainage by solving Navier- Stokes equations in the pore space and employing the Volume Of Fluid (VOF) method to track the evolution of the fluid-fluid interface. After demonstrating that the method is able to deal with large viscosity contrasts and to model the transition from stable flow to viscous fingering, we focus on the definition of macroscopic capillary pressure. When the fluids are at rest, the difference between inlet and outlet pressures and the difference between the intrinsic phase average pressure coincide with the capillary pressure. However, when the fluids are in motion these quantities are dominated by viscous forces. In this case, only a definition based on the variation of the interfacial energy provides an accurate measure of the macroscopic capillary pressure and allows separating the viscous from the capillary pressure components.

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

A game theoretic simulation model for quality oriented timber supply to sawmills

Summary

Numerical simulation of ambient seismic wavefield modification caused by pore-fluid effects in an oil reservoir

We have modeled numerically the seismic response of a poroelastic inclusion with properties applicable to an oil reservoir that interacts with an ambient wavefield. The model includes wave-induced fluid flow caused by pressure differences between mesoscopic-scale (i.e., in the order of centimeters to meters) heterogeneities. We used a viscoelastic approximation on the macroscopic scale to implement the attenuation and dispersion resulting from this mesoscopic-scale theory in numerical simulations of wave propagation on the kilometer scale. This upscaling method includes finite-element modeling of wave-induced fluid flow to determine effective seismic properties of the poroelastic media, such as attenuation of P- and S-waves. The fitted, equivalent, viscoelastic behavior is implemented in finite-difference wave propagation simulations. With this two-stage process, we model numerically the quasi-poroelastic wave-propagation on the kilometer scale and study the impact of fluid properties and fluid saturation on the modeled seismic amplitudes. In particular, we addressed the question of whether poroelastic effects within an oil reservoir may be a plausible explanation for low-frequency ambient wavefield modifications observed at oil fields in recent years. Our results indicate that ambient wavefield modification is expected to occur for oil reservoirs exhibiting high attenuation. Whether or not such modifications can be detected in surface recordings, however, will depend on acquisition design and noise mitigation processing as well as site-specific conditions, such as the geologic complexity of the subsurface, the nature of the ambient wavefield, and the amount of surface noise.

Comparison of thinning methods in a Scots pine stand on drained peatland : a simulation study

Tiivistelmä: Harvennusmenetelmien vertailu ojitetun turvemaan männikössä. Simulointitutkimus

Strategic behaviours in healthcare : evidence from primary care and pharmaceutical markets

We analyse the strategic behaviours of agents in a market through the appropriate¬ness of their skills to the market. If agents' skills are well adapted to market and they can reach their target, they will not need to adopt strategic behaviours. The agents will behave as selfish individuals. However, if their skills are not well adapted and they cannot attain their target alone, they will adopt strategic behaviours to reach their objectives. These behaviours will have a different impact on the utilities of other agents, depending on the skills and the objectives of the agent. If these agents need other agents to reach their objectives, they will behave as altruistic individuals who internalise the utilities of other agents in reaching their objectives and will adopt cooperative behaviours. However, if these agents fear that other agents could prevent them from reaching their target because they can foresee that the skills of other agents are better adapted than their own skills, the agents will then behave as predator individuals and will adopt destructive behaviours to attain their objective. It is in the interests of these agents to manipulate information to increase disorder and dissimulate their lack of skills. They will reproduce the strategies of animals that modify their appearance to escape predators or simulate being bait to attract their prey. These agents will seek to induce chaos into the behaviours of other agents to amplify the impact of their strategies. The appropriateness of skills to the market allows an understanding of the emer-gence of networks and associated strategies. The members of a networks are inputs who are excluded when their costs are higher than their benefits. A network simul-taneously allows cooperation and selfish, predatory behaviours among its members. A network may adopt informational strategies when seeking to become the leader in a market or when it cannot survive. The creation of networks and the manipulation of information are two overlapping evolutionary strategies, with the first strategy favouring the second. In our model, an agent does not behave like a firm that aims only to maximise the profits of the firm but rather as a member of a network who adopts strategic behaviours as a function of the interests of this network. If his skills are well adapted to the market and he can innovate, he will not invest in erroneous input; in contrast, if his skills are not adapted, the agent will invest in the erroneous input of information into the market in order to survive. Therefore, when any informational asymmetries between the agents and their principals characterise the market, the price cannot be the main element that allows equilibrium to be reached in the market; instead, the appropriateness of skills to the market enables equilibrium. We will now apply these hypotheses to explain the strategic behaviours of physicians and pharmaceutical companies.

Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and Rrommate markets

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172-186, 2011) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, solvable roommate markets),we characterize the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.