A validated assay for measuring doxorubicin in biological fluids and tissues in an isolated lung perfusion model: matrix effect and heparin interference strongly influence doxorubicin measurements.

Doxorubicin is an antineoplasic agent active against sarcoma pulmonary metastasis, but its clinical use is hampered by its myelotoxicity and its cumulative cardiotoxicity, when administered systemically. This limitation may be circumvented using the isolated lung perfusion (ILP) approach, wherein a therapeutic agent is infused locoregionally after vascular isolation of the lung. The influence of the mode of infusion (anterograde (AG): through the pulmonary artery (PA); retrograde (RG): through the pulmonary vein (PV)) on doxorubicin pharmacokinetics and lung distribution was unknown. Therefore, a simple, rapid and sensitive high-performance liquid chromatography method has been developed to quantify doxorubicin in four different biological matrices (infusion effluent, serum, tissues with low or high levels of doxorubicin). The related compound daunorubicin was used as internal standard (I.S.). Following a single-step protein precipitation of 500 microl samples with 250 microl acetone and 50 microl zinc sulfate 70% aqueous solution, the obtained supernatant was evaporated to dryness at 60 degrees C for exactly 45 min under a stream of nitrogen and the solid residue was solubilized in 200 microl of purified water. A 100 microl-volume was subjected to HPLC analysis onto a Nucleosil 100-5 microm C18 AB column equipped with a guard column (Nucleosil 100-5 microm C(6)H(5) (phenyl) end-capped) using a gradient elution of acetonitrile and 1-heptanesulfonic acid 0.2% pH 4: 15/85 at 0 min-->50/50 at 20 min-->100/0 at 22 min-->15/85 at 24 min-->15/85 at 26 min, delivered at 1 ml/min. The analytes were detected by fluorescence detection with excitation and emission wavelength set at 480 and 550 nm, respectively. The calibration curves were linear over the range of 2-1000 ng/ml for effluent and plasma matrices, and 0.1 microg/g-750 microg/g for tissues matrices. The method is precise with inter-day and intra-day relative standard deviation within 0.5 and 6.7% and accurate with inter-day and intra-day deviations between -5.4 and +7.7%. The in vitro stability in all matrices and in processed samples has been studied at -80 degrees C for 1 month, and at 4 degrees C for 48 h, respectively. During initial studies, heparin used as anticoagulant was found to profoundly influence the measurements of doxorubicin in effluents collected from animals under ILP. Moreover, the strong matrix effect observed with tissues samples indicate that it is mandatory to prepare doxorubicin calibration standard samples in biological matrices which would reflect at best the composition of samples to be analyzed. This method was successfully applied in animal studies for the analysis of effluent, serum and tissue samples collected from pigs and rats undergoing ILP.

Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.

Interference of Native Language in English Language Acquisition in Santa Cruz and Calheta Secondary schools

This study analyzes the interference of native language when students are learning a foreign language, in this case English. According to this study, interferences from the native language such as lexical-semantic and phonological are not infrequent. It is one of the main barriers that create difficulties when learning English. The outcome of this study is presented at the end of the Monografia: to provide English-language teachers and students the most significant linguistic interferences that occur during the learning process of English language. Furthermore, some teaching strategies are discussed to avoid the biases that appear due to the interferences of the native language. As a result of this study, I hope to contribute to the learning success among English-language students.

Competition, innovation and growth with limited commitment

We study how barriers to business start-up affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. Barriers to business start-up lower the competition for knowledge capital and, in absence of commitment, reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. As a result, countries with large barriers experience lower income and growth. Our results are consistent with cross-country evidence showing that the cost of business start-up is negatively correlated with the level and growth of income.

Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm: The effect of foreign competition

This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.

Managing competition in professional services and the burden of inertia

Professional services require certain organizational patterns in order to avoid information asymmetries and external effects. These same patterns are used within production structures involving various degrees of monopoly. However, competitive restraints are justified today only when substantial external effects are clearly present, whereas information asymmetries hardly justify such restraints because reputational investments have become widespread in the economy and are relatively efficient in overcoming such asymmetries. As a consequence, innovation in the production of externalities can make competitive constraints unnecessary.

Partisan competition, growth and the franchise

We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests use the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: When (1) there exist an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of 11 countries.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.