Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]

Prompt Payments by Government Departments pursuant to Government Decision No. S29296 of May 2009

Prompt Payments by Government Departments pursuant to Government Decision No. S29296 of May 2009 Click here to download PDF 22kb

Paleopharmacology and pollen: theory, method, and application

Parasitism was a universal human condition. Because of this, people developed herbal medicines to treat parasites as part of their pharmacopoeias. We propose that it is possible to recover evidence of medicinal plants from archaeological sites and link their use to specific health conditions. This is a multidisciplinary approach that must involve at least paleoethnobotanists, archaeoparasitologists, paleopathologists, and pharmacologists.

Playing Second Fiddle: Expert Advice and Decision-Making in Switzerland

This thesis concerns the role of scientific expertise in the decision-making process at the Swiss federal level of government. It aims to understand how institutional and issue-specific factors influence three things: the distribution of access to scientific expertise, its valuation by participants in policy for- mulation, and the consequence(s) its mobilization has on policy politics and design. The theoretical framework developed builds on the assumption that scientific expertise is a strategic resource. In order to effectively mobilize this resource, actors require financial and organizational resources, as well as the conviction that it can advance their instrumental interests within a particular action situation. Institutions of the political system allocate these financial and organizational resources, influence the supply of scientific expertise, and help shape the venue of its deployment. Issue structures, in turn, condition both interaction configurations and the way in which these are anticipated by actors. This affects the perceived utility of expertise mobilization, mediating its consequences. The findings of this study show that the ability to access and control scientific expertise is strongly concentrated in the hands of the federal administration. Civil society actors have weak capacities to mobilize it, and the autonomy of institutionalized advisory bodies is limited. Moreover, the production of scientific expertise is undergoing a process of professionalization which strengthens the position of the federal administration as the (main) mandating agent. Despite increased political polarization and less inclu- sive decision-making, scientific expertise remains anchored in the policy subsystem, rather than being used to legitimate policy through appeals to the wider population. Finally, the structure of a policy problem matters both for expertise mobilization and for the latter's impact on the policy process, be- cause it conditions conflict structures and their anticipation. Structured problems result in a greater overlap between the principal of expertise mobilization and its intended audience, thereby increasing the chance that expertise shapes policy design. Conversely, less structured problems, especially those that involve conflicts about values and goals, reduce the impact of expertise.

Instrumental leadership: Measurement and extension of transformational-transactional leadership theory.

Leaders must scan the internal and external environment, chart strategic and task objectives, and provide performance feedback. These instrumental leadership (IL) functions go beyond the motivational and quid-pro quo leader behaviors that comprise the full-range-transformational, transactional, and laissez faire-leadership model. In four studies we examined the construct validity of IL. We found evidence for a four-factor IL model that was highly prototypical of good leadership. IL predicted top-level leader emergence controlling for the full-range factors, initiating structure, and consideration. It also explained unique variance in outcomes beyond the full-range factors; the effects of transformational leadership were vastly overstated when IL was omitted from the model. We discuss the importance of a "fuller full-range" leadership theory for theory and practice. We also showcase our methodological contributions regarding corrections for common method variance (i.e., endogeneity) bias using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression and Monte Carlo split-sample designs.