Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/01, January 2013

Europe has responded to the crisis with strengthened budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, liquidity provisioning by resilient economies and the European Central Bank and a process towards a banking union. However, a monetary union requires some form of budget for fiscal stabilisation in case of shocks, and as a backstop to the banking union. This paper compares four quantitatively different schemes of fiscal stabilisation and proposes a new scheme based on GDP-indexed bonds. The options considered are: (i) A federal budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to euro-area level; (ii) a support scheme based on deviations from potential output;(iii) an insurance scheme via which governments would issue bonds indexed to GDP, and (iv) a scheme in which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combined with gradual withdrawal of fiscal sovereignty. Our comparison is based on strong assumptions. We carry out a preliminary, limited simulation of how the debt-to-GDP ratio would have developed between 2008-14 under the four schemes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and an ‘average’ country.The schemes have varying implications in each case for debt sustainability

Reactive crisis management in construction projects

Patterns of communication and behaviour emerge within a construction project in response to a construction crisis. This paper investigates, within a grounded theory framework, the nature of these patterns, the sociological and psychological forces which shape them and their relationship with crisis management efficiency. A grounded theory is presented in four parts. The first part conceives a construction crisis as a period of social instability, arising from conflicting interest groups, seeking to exercise power in the pursuit of social structures which suit their political and economic interests. The second part sees a construction crisis as a de-sensitizing phenomenon which results in a period of behavioural instability and conflict which is self-perpetuating. The third part cites social structure as an important influence upon construction crisis management efficiency, in determining the efficiency of information flow, and the level of uncertainty between those affected. The fourth part points to the in-built defence mechanisms which construction crises have and to three managerial ironies which make construction crisis management difficult.