Fresh News; The Farmers' Market Newsletter, Summer 2005

Newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship

Fresh News; The Farmers' Market Newsletter, Spring 2005

Newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship

Fresh News; The Farmers' Market Newsletter, Winter 2006

Newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship

Fresh News; The Farmers' Market Newsletter, Spring 2006

Newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship

Three essays in control, entrepreneurship and innovation

One of the key emphases of these three essays is to provide practical managerial insight. However, good practical insight, can only be created by grounding it firmly on theoretical and empirical research. Practical experience-based understanding without theoretical grounding remains tacit and cannot be easily disseminated. Theoretical understanding without links to real life remains sterile. My studies aim to increase the understanding of how radical innovation could be generated at large established firms and how it can have an impact on business performance as most businesses pursue innovation with one prime objective: value creation. My studies focus on large established firms with sales revenue exceeding USD $ 1 billion. Usually large established firms cannot rely on informal ways of management, as these firms tend to be multinational businesses operating with subsidiaries, offices, or production facilities in more than one country. I. Internal and External Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Investment The goal of this chapter is to focus on CVC as one of the mechanisms available for established firms to source new ideas that can be exploited. We explore the internal and external determinants under which established firms engage in CVC to source new knowledge through investment in startups. We attempt to make scholars and managers aware of the forces that influence CVC activity by providing findings and insights to facilitate the strategic management of CVC. There are research opportunities to further understand the CVC phenomenon. Why do companies engage in CVC? What motivates them to continue "playing the game" and keep their active CVC investment status. The study examines CVC investment activity, and the importance of understanding the influential factors that make a firm decide to engage in CVC. The main question is: How do established firms' CVC programs adapt to changing internal conditions and external environments. Adaptation typically involves learning from exploratory endeavors, which enable companies to transform the ways they compete (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990). Our study extends the current stream of research on CVC. It aims to contribute to the literature by providing an extensive comparison of internal and external determinants leading to CVC investment activity. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the influence of internal and external determinants on CVC activity throughout specific expansion and contraction periods determined by structural breaks occurring between 1985 to 2008. Our econometric analysis indicates a strong and significant positive association between CVC activity and R&D, cash flow availability and environmental financial market conditions, as well as a significant negative association between sales growth and the decision to engage into CVC. The analysis of this study reveals that CVC investment is highly volatile, as demonstrated by dramatic fluctuations in CVC investment activity over the past decades. When analyzing the overall cyclical CVC period from 1985 to 2008 the results of our study suggest that CVC activity has a pattern influenced by financial factors such as the level of R&D, free cash flow, lack of sales growth, and external conditions of the economy, with the NASDAQ price index as the most significant variable influencing CVC during this period. II. Contribution of CVC and its Interaction with R&D to Value Creation The second essay takes into account the demands of corporate executives and shareholders regarding business performance and value creation justifications for investments in innovation. Billions of dollars are invested in CVC and R&D. However there is little evidence that CVC and its interaction with R&D create value. Firms operating in dynamic business sectors seek to innovate to create the value demanded by changing market conditions, consumer preferences, and competitive offerings. Consequently, firms operating in such business sectors put a premium on finding new, sustainable and competitive value propositions. CVC and R&D can help them in this challenge. Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) presented evidence that CVC investment is associated with value creation. However, studies have shown that the most innovative firms do not necessarily benefit from innovation. For instance Oyon (2007) indicated that between 1995 and 2005 the most innovative automotive companies did not obtain adequate rewards for shareholders. The interaction between CVC and R&D has generated much debate in the CVC literature. Some researchers see them as substitutes suggesting that firms have to choose between CVC and R&D (Hellmann, 2002), while others expect them to be complementary (Chesbrough & Tucci, 2004). This study explores the interaction that CVC and R&D have on value creation. This essay examines the impact of CVC and R&D on value creation over sixteen years across six business sectors and different geographical regions. Our findings suggest that the effect of CVC and its interaction with R&D on value creation is positive and significant. In dynamic business sectors technologies rapidly relinquish obsolete, consequently firms operating in such business sectors need to continuously develop new sources of value creation (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Qualls, Olshavsky, & Michaels, 1981). We conclude that in order to impact value creation, firms operating in business sectors such as Engineering & Business Services, and Information Communication & Technology ought to consider CVC as a vital element of their innovation strategy. Moreover, regarding the CVC and R&D interaction effect, our findings suggest that R&D and CVC are complementary to value creation hence firms in certain business sectors can be better off supporting both R&D and CVC simultaneously to increase the probability of generating value creation. III. MCS and Organizational Structures for Radical Innovation Incremental innovation is necessary for continuous improvement but it does not provide a sustainable permanent source of competitiveness (Cooper, 2003). On the other hand, radical innovation pursuing new technologies and new market frontiers can generate new platforms for growth providing firms with competitive advantages and high economic margin rents (Duchesneau et al., 1979; Markides & Geroski, 2005; O'Connor & DeMartino, 2006; Utterback, 1994). Interestingly, not all companies distinguish between incremental and radical innovation, and more importantly firms that manage innovation through a one-sizefits- all process can almost guarantee a sub-optimization of certain systems and resources (Davila et al., 2006). Moreover, we conducted research on the utilization of MCS along with radical innovation and flexible organizational structures as these have been associated with firm growth (Cooper, 2003; Davila & Foster, 2005, 2007; Markides & Geroski, 2005; O'Connor & DeMartino, 2006). Davila et al. (2009) identified research opportunities for innovation management and provided a list of pending issues: How do companies manage the process of radical and incremental innovation? What are the performance measures companies use to manage radical ideas and how do they select them? The fundamental objective of this paper is to address the following research question: What are the processes, MCS, and organizational structures for generating radical innovation? Moreover, in recent years, research on innovation management has been conducted mainly at either the firm level (Birkinshaw, Hamel, & Mol, 2008a) or at the project level examining appropriate management techniques associated with high levels of uncertainty (Burgelman & Sayles, 1988; Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1993; Kanter, North, Bernstein, & Williamson, 1990; Leifer et al., 2000). Therefore, we embarked on a novel process-related research framework to observe the process stages, MCS, and organizational structures that can generate radical innovation. This article is based on a case study at Alcan Engineered Products, a division of a multinational company provider of lightweight material solutions. Our observations suggest that incremental and radical innovation should be managed through different processes, MCS and organizational structures that ought to be activated and adapted contingent to the type of innovation that is being pursued (i.e. incremental or radical innovation). More importantly, we conclude that radical can be generated in a systematic way through enablers such as processes, MCS, and organizational structures. This is in line with the findings of Jelinek and Schoonhoven (1993) and Davila et al. (2006; 2007) who show that innovative firms have institutionalized mechanisms, arguing that radical innovation cannot occur in an organic environment where flexibility and consensus are the main managerial mechanisms. They rather argue that radical innovation requires a clear organizational structure and formal MCS.

The Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition, February 2007

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.

Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.

Advertising bans

I show that an advertising ban is more likely to increase -- ratherthan decrease -- total consumption when advertising does not bring abouta large expansion of market demand at given prices and when it increasesproduct differentiation (thus allowing firms to command higher prices). Inthis case, the main impact of a ban on advertising is to reduce equilibriumprices and thus increase demand. I argue that this is more likely tohappen in mature industries where consumer goods are ex--ante (i.e.without advertising) similar and advertising is of the `persuasive' type.The ban is the more likely to increase profits of the firms the weakerthe ability of advertising to expand total demand and the less advertisingserves to induce product differentiation.

Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

A subsampling approach to estimating the distribution of diversing statistics with application to assessing financial market risks

In this paper we propose a subsampling estimator for the distribution ofstatistics diverging at either known rates when the underlying timeseries in strictly stationary abd strong mixing. Based on our results weprovide a detailed discussion how to estimate extreme order statisticswith dependent data and present two applications to assessing financialmarket risk. Our method performs well in estimating Value at Risk andprovides a superior alternative to Hill's estimator in operationalizingSafety First portofolio selection.

Toward a theory of labor market institutions

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.

Monetary policy with signal extraction from the bond market

Monetary policy is conducted in an environment of uncertainty. This paper sets upa model where the central bank uses real-time data from the bond market togetherwith standard macroeconomic indicators to estimate the current state of theeconomy more efficiently, while taking into account that its own actions influencewhat it observes. The timeliness of bond market data allows for quicker responsesof monetary policy to disturbances compared to the case when the central bankhas to rely solely on collected aggregate data. The information content of theterm structure creates a link between the bond market and the macroeconomythat is novel to the literature. To quantify the importance of the bond market asa source of information, the model is estimated on data for the United Statesand Australia using Bayesian methods. The empirical exercise suggests that thereis some information in the US term structure that helps the Federal Reserve toidentify shocks to the economy on a timely basis. Australian bond prices seemto be less informative than their US counterparts, perhaps because Australia is arelatively small and open economy.

Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models

Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standardsearch models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired.We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphicto a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selectivehiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costsof unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequallyacross workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfareis lower if hiring is selective.