A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, January 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, Februray 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, March 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Financing constraints, irreversibility and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financingconstraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firmscannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint thatthey can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examinethe cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and outputin the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields threemain results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investmentis reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint onvariable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interactionbetween the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and materialdeliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they arehighly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Testing financing constraints on firm investment using variable capital

We consider a dynamic multifactor model of investment with financing imperfections,adjustment costs and fixed and variable capital. We use the model to derive a test offinancing constraints based on a reduced form variable capital equation. Simulation resultsshow that this test correctly identifies financially constrained firms even when the estimationof firms investment opportunities is very noisy. In addition, the test is well specified inthe presence of both concave and convex adjustment costs of fixed capital. We confirmempirically the validity of this test on a sample of small Italian manufacturing companies.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Firm-specific investment, sticky prices and the Taylor principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest raterules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, April 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

High one year mortality in adults with sickle cell disease and end-stage renal disease.

Adequate pre-dialysis care reduces mortality among end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients. We tested the hypothesis that individuals with ESRD due to sickle cell disease (SCD-ESRD) receiving pre-ESRD care have lower mortality compared to individuals without pre-ESRD care. We examined the association between mortality and pre-ESRD care in incident SCD-ESRD patients who started haemodialysis between 1 June, 2005 and 31 May, 2009 using data provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). SCD-ESRD was reported for 410 (0·1%) of 442 017 patients. One year after starting dialysis, 108 (26·3%) patients with incident ESRD attributed to SCD died; the hazard ratio (HR) for mortality among patients with SCD-ESRD compared to those without SCD as the primary cause of renal failure was 2·80 (95% confidence interval [CI] 2·31-3·38). Patients with SCD-ESRD receiving pre-dialysis nephrology care had a lower death rate than those with SCD-ESRD who did not receive pre-dialysis nephrology care (HR = 0·67, 95% CI 0·45-0·99). The one-year mortality rate following an ESRD diagnosis was almost three times higher in individuals with SCD when compared to those without SCD but with ESRD and could be attenuated by pre-dialysis nephrology care.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, May 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, December 2007

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, October 2007

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

"As you receive with one hand, so should you give with the other": the mutual-help practices of Cape Verdeans on the Lisbon periphery”

Rural Cape Verdeans employ a number of mutual-help practices to mitigate the uncertainties surrounding activities fundamental to their subsistence. One of these practices is djunta mon (‘to work together’), a loosely planned, non-monetized system of allocating labor at peak intervals during the growing season. By means of djunta mon, neighbors or family members work in each other’s fields until the tasks of every landowning participant are complete. Alongside djunta mon in rural Cape Verde exist a number of other non-remunerated mutual-help practices, such as djuda mutua (‘mutual help’) and laja kaza (‘to add concrete to one’s house’). While less visible than djunta mon, they are nonetheless important in completing tasks essential to rural life in the islands. In this thesis, I will attempt to show how Cape Verdean immigrants in Lisbon have adapted the mutual-help practices of rural Cape Verde to a new, transnational context. The iterations of these practices in Lisbon differ from their rural counterparts in that they involve fewer people, occur on a year-round basis, and are concerned primarily with domestic work. They also help people find employment, access childcare, secure interest-free credit, and construct or repair houses. I will argue that extensive mutual-help ties ensure Cape Verdean migrants in Lisbon a sufficient pool of family and friends upon which they can rely for support and assistance. An additional element I will explore is the perception among Cape Verdean immigrants that these mutual-help practices seem to be occurring with less frequency. While this shift is in part due to the availability of other means of support, I will contend that the changing attitude of Cape Verdeans towards mutual help is also due to their encountering neoliberal notions of ‘self-accountability.’ Thus, Cape Verdeans perceive that their mutual-help practices are in decline, while simultaneously needing the material support that they provide.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, June 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program