926 resultados para Best evidence rule
Resumo:
We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' behavior, as second movers (workers) might react differently to favorable actions by first movers (firms) in the two cases. While our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction, we find mainly secondary treatment effects. Wage offers are not higher when there is an excess supply of firms, and workers do not respond more favorably to a given wage when there is an excess supply of labor. The state of competition does not appear to have strong effects in our data. We also present data from single-period sessions that show substantial gift exchange even without repeated interactions.
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We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners always exist. We model situations where a set of individuals must choose one individual in the group. Agents are connected through some relationship that can be interpreted as expressing neighborhood, and which is formalized by a graph. Our restriction on preferences is as follows: each agent can freely rank his immediate neighbors, but then he is indifferent between each neighbor and all other agents that this neighbor "leads to". Hence, agents can be highly perceptive regarding their neighbors, while being insensitive to the differences between these and other agents which are further removed from them. We show quasi-transitivity of the majority relation when the graph expressing the neighborhood relation is a tree. We also discuss a further restriction allowing to extend the result for more general graphs. Finally, we compare the proposed restriction with others in the literature, to conclude that it is independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.
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Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.
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The aim of this paper is to suggest a method to find endogenously the points that group the individuals of a given distribution in k clusters, where k is endogenously determined. These points are the cut-points. Thus, we need to determine a partition of the N individuals into a number k of groups, in such way that individuals in the same group are as alike as possible, but as distinct as possible from individuals in other groups. This method can be applied to endogenously identify k groups in income distributions: possible applications can be poverty
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Maybe because of the inconclusive nature of the results on the impact of public capital on output at the regional level, the issue of the possible existence of the regional spillovers from public capital formation has received little attention. The objective of this paper is to provide evidence on the possible existence of such spillovers. We consider the case of Spain and its seventeen regions. Our methodological approach consists in estimating an aggregate VAR model for Spain as well as seventeen region-specific VAR models in which both capital installed in the region and capital installed outside the region are allowed to play a role in enhancing regional output. The estimation results can be summarized as follows. The aggregate effects of public capital formation in Spain are important. They cannot, however, be captured in their entirety by the direct effects in each region from public capital installed in the region itself. When for each region both the capital installed in the region and the capital installed outside the region are considered the total disaggregated effect from the seventeen regional models are very much in line with the aggregate results. Furthermore, the aggregate effect seems to be due in almost equal parts to the direct and spillover effects of public capital formation. Ultimately, this paper establishes the relevance of both capital installed in each region and spillover effects in the understanding of the regional decomposition of the aggregate effects of public capital formation. In doing so it opens the door to some tantalizing and potentially highly charged research issues in terms of the determination of the optimal location of public investment projects.
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The present paper aims at analyzing the sources of productivity in Europe to account for its recent underperformance and identify potential geographic idiosyncracies. We study the productivity performance and its sources in a sample of ten European regions belonging to four countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain). Exploiting the increasing availability of disaggregated data at regional level in Europe, we propose both a descriptive statistics and an econometric analysis of productivity sources since 1995. Our main finding is that the sources of labor productivity are rather heterogeneous across our sample but may be associated with regional or national idiosyncracies.
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This paper explores the effects of new business formation on employment growth in Spanish manufacturing industries. New firms are believed to make an important contribution to economic growth but the extent of this contribution is unclear. We consider time lags of new firm formation as explanatory variables of employment change and identify how long the effect of new firm entries on employment lasts. Our main results show that the effects of new business formation are positive in the short term, negative in the medium term and positive in the long term, thus confirming the existence of indirect supply-side effects found in similar studies for other countries. Key words: regional growth, firm entry, time lags and Spanish economy. JEL classifications: L00, L60, R11, R12
Resumo:
Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada a la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, durant l’ octubre del 2006. L’estudi de les haciendas creades a partir de la colonització espanyola als territoris americans no pot ser mai complet si no es pot entrar en la vida quotidiana de les persones que les constitueixen. La millor manera de fer-ho és a través d’assolir d’un exhaustiu estudi dels comportaments demogràfics –natalitat, nupcialitat, mortalitat, migracions—i familiars. L’objectiu d’aquest estudi ha estat localitzar una tipologia documental que permeti aquest treball a la parròquia de Toacazo a Cotopaxi (Equador) i, un cop assolida aquesta fita, fotografiar exhaustivament els registres parroquials, altrament dits registre civil antic. El període treballat va des de l’ 1720, any de fundació de la parròquia fins a 1857, any on s’acaba el tributo de indios o règim que regulava les normes de segregació racial de les poblacions.
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We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.
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We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.
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La aparición de nuevos tipos de aplicaciones, como vídeo bajo demanda, realidad virtual y videoconferencias entre otras, caracterizadas por la necesidad de cumplir sus deadlines. Este tipo de aplicaciones, han sido denominadas en la literatura aplicaciones soft-real time (SRT) periódicas. Este trabajo se centra en el problema de la planificación temporal de este nuevo tipo de aplicaciones en clusters no dedicados.
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We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.
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Assuming the role of debt management is to provide hedging against fiscal shocks we consider three questions: i) what indicators can be used to assess the performance of debt management? ii) how well have historical debt management policies performed? and iii) how is that performance affected by variations in debt issuance? We consider these questions using OECD data on the market value of government debt between 1970 and 2000. Motivated by both the optimal taxation literature and broad considerations of debt stability we propose a range of performance indicators for debt management. We evaluate these using Monte Carlo analysis and find that those based on the relative persistence of debt perform best. Calculating these measures for OECD data provides only limited evidence that debt management has helped insulate policy against unexpected fiscal shocks. We also find that the degree of fiscal insurance achieved is not well connected to cross country variations in debt issuance patterns. Given the limited volatility observed in the yield curve the relatively small dispersion of debt management practices across countries makes little difference to the realised degree of fiscal insurance.
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Na,K-ATPase is the main active transport system that maintains the large gradients of Na(+) and K(+) across the plasma membrane of animal cells. The crystal structure of a K(+)-occluding conformation of this protein has been recently published, but the movements of its different domains allowing for the cation pumping mechanism are not yet known. The structure of many more conformations is known for the related calcium ATPase SERCA, but the reliability of homology modeling is poor for several domains with low sequence identity, in particular the extracellular loops. To better define the structure of the large fourth extracellular loop between the seventh and eighth transmembrane segments of the alpha subunit, we have studied the formation of a disulfide bond between pairs of cysteine residues introduced by site-directed mutagenesis in the second and the fourth extracellular loop. We found a specific pair of cysteine positions (Y308C and D884C) for which extracellular treatment with an oxidizing agent inhibited the Na,K pump function, which could be rapidly restored by a reducing agent. The formation of the disulfide bond occurred preferentially under the E2-P conformation of Na,K-ATPase, in the absence of extracellular cations. Using recently published crystal structure and a distance constraint reproducing the existence of disulfide bond, we performed an extensive conformational space search using simulated annealing and showed that the Tyr(308) and Asp(884) residues can be in close proximity, and simultaneously, the SYGQ motif of the fourth extracellular loop, known to interact with the extracellular domain of the beta subunit, can be exposed to the exterior of the protein and can easily interact with the beta subunit.
Resumo:
The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.