Bimanual aiming and overt attention: one law for two hands

Reaching to interact with an object requires a compromise between the speed of the limb movement and the required end-point accuracy. The time it takes one hand to move to a target in a simple aiming task can be predicted reliably from Fitts' law, which states that movement time is a function of a combined measure of amplitude and accuracy constraints (the index of difficulty, ID). It has been assumed previously that Fitts' law is violated in bimanual aiming movements to targets of unequal ID. We present data from two experiments to show that this assumption is incorrect: if the attention demands of a bimanual aiming task are constant then the movements are well described by a Fitts' law relationship. Movement time therefore depends not only on ID but on other task conditions, which is a basic feature of Fitts' law. In a third experiment we show that eye movements are an important determinant of the attention demands in a bimanual aiming task. The results from the third experiment extend the findings of the first two experiments and show that bimanual aiming often relies on the strategic co-ordination of separate actions into a seamless behaviour. A number of the task specific strategies employed by the adult human nervous system were elucidated in the third experiment. The general strategic pattern observed in the hand trajectories was reflected by the pattern of eye movements recorded during the experiment. The results from all three experiments demonstrate that eye movements must be considered as an important constraint in bimanual aiming tasks.

Exile or emigrant? Female ex-prisoners who left Ireland 1850-1921

In the popular mind, the concept of 'emigration' usually refers to people voluntarily leaving one country to go to another in search of a new and better life. It presupposes some degree of choice, although it is accepted that for many emigrants, such as those who left Ireland during the nineteenth century, there were few incentives to stay at home. Current scholarship on voluntary and forced movements of people demonstrates that the distinction between the categories of 'voluntary emigrant' and 'forced exile' is often blurred. Orm Overland's study of refugee communities in the United States highlights the fact that, although the differences between the 'emigrant' and the 'exile' may be clear in extreme cases, this is not always true, as there may be 'pressing political or economic reasons behind a decision to emigrate'. Migration scholars Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen also question the adequacy of conceptual models of migration based on what Lindsay Proudfoot and Dianne Hall refer to as the 'straightforward binarism between free and unfree emigration'. The questions raised by these scholars are very relevant to the study of Irish people who left their country during the second half of the nineteenth century immediately after they had been discharged from prison or from Dundrum. Their stories are discussed here against a background of substantial scholarship on emigration from Ireland and on the criminal justice system within Ireland. According to David Fitzpatrick, at least eight million men, women and children emigrated from Ireland between 1801 and 1921. This large-scale movement of people was generally characterised by the voluntary emigration of individuals who funded their own passages. However, it also included schemes of assisted emigration, funded variously by governments, landlords, the poor law authorities, earlier emigrants, and philanthropists. In addition, it included people who were transported from Ireland by means of the criminal justice system a practice that had originated in the seventeenth century. What is less well known is that after the end of transportation from Ireland to eastern Australia in 1853, to Bermuda in 1863 and to Western Australia in 1868, Irish convicts continued to be channelled towards emigration by being offered early release if they agreed to leave Ireland. These people, and especially the women among them, are the subject of this article.

The Role of Dignity in Equality Law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa

This paper examines the link made on occasion between the concept of dignity and substantive equality; it is further noted that dignity can have very different meanings in different contexts. While the notion of dignity does not often play a substantive role in the resolution of decisions, sometimes the underlying understanding of dignity does matter. However, in all cases, judges should avoid the temptation to rely on unarticulated value judgments or subjective notions of dignity. When judges make reference to dignity, they should articulate the values underpinning their conception of it.

The Nineteenth Century Law of the Sea and the British Abolition of the Slave Trade

This study focuses on British attempts during the nineteenth century to outlaw the Atlantic Slave Trade internationally, for which it was successful, after seventy-five years of effort. It considers the lack of willingness to allow Great Britain, at the Congress of Vienna and during the Concert of Europe, to establish a universal treaty outlawing the slave trade. As a result, this mandated a change in British tactics, which would ultimately prove to be successful – the establishment of a web of bilateral agreements which came to included all maritime powers. The study then moves on to consider the evolution of these bilateral agreements while highlighting the relationship between Great Britain and States (Brazil, France, Portugal and the United States) which were obstinate in their willingness to join this bilateral regime. Finally, consideration is given to the move towards the establishment of the 1890 General Act of Brussels; and thus the conclusion of the decades long British foreign policy objective of a universal instrument meant to suppress the Atlantic Slave Trade.

The Definition of Slavery in International Law

On the basis of archival research, this Article considers the negotiation history of both the 1926 Slavery Convention and 1956 Supplementary Convention and demonstrates that an interpretation of the provisions of the definition of slavery consonant with the travaux préparatoires reveal a definition which provides for the possibility of holding States and individuals responsible for not only slavery de jure but also de facto. That understanding is premised on a reading of the definition that speaks not of the ‘ownership’ of one person by another; but of the powers attached to the right of ownership. It is through an exploration of this phrase that a proper understanding of the definition of slavery in international law emerges.

ARTICLE: On the Curious Disappearance of Human Servitude from General International Law

The following study considers the fragmentation of law which occurred in 1956 with regard to the law on servitude. As States were unwilling to go as far as the Universal Declaration on Human in establishing that "no one shall be held in [...] servitude", the negotiators of the 1956 Supplementary Conventions moved to expunge the very term 'servitude' from the text and to replace it with the phrase 'institutions and practices similar to slavery' which could then be abolished 'progressively and as soon as possible'. The negotiation history of the 1956 Convention clear demonstrate that the Universal Declaration on Human was the elephant in the room and that it ultimately lead to a fragmentation of the law as between general international law manifest in the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the one hand and international human rights law on the other. It is for this reason that, for instance the 2001 UN and 2005 Council of Europe trafficking conventions mention both 'practices similar to slavery' and 'servitude' as types of human exploitation to be suppressed in their definition of 'trafficking in persons'.