Hillary Clinton's Race: Did She Match the Presidential Prototype?

The present research addresses how voters’ perceptions of Hillary Clinton’s warmth and competence influenced decisions to vote for her in the 2008 Democratic primary. We apply research on gender stereotypes and perceptions of women leaders to demonstrate that voters perceived Clinton as highly competent but relatively less warm. Further, this research examines how perceptions of Clinton’s warmth and competence contributed to decisions to vote for her. Results suggest that perceptions of Clinton’s warmth and competence differentially predicted voting behavior for voters strongly and less strongly identified with their political party. This research provides a descriptive analysis of how voters’ beliefs about leaders can be colored by gender, and how such beliefs contribute to electing women candidates.

SOCIAL-CLASS, CLASS ORIGINS AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP IN THE REPUBLIC-OF-IRELAND

As Laver (1992) notes, people who write about Irish politics frequently describe Ireland as a rather peculiar place. One aspect of this peculiarity is that voters in the Republic of Ireland do not behave like their European counterparts. In particular, Irish voting patterns appear to be only weakly structured by social class. Recent contributions to the debate employing a more sophisticated categorisation of classes have led to some qualification of the 'politics without social bases' description, but still lead to the broad conclusion that any relationship which does exist between social divisions, on the one hand, and party preference, on the other, is, at most, quite marginal. In this paper we draw on data from the 1990 European Values Study to re-examine this issue. We apply a variety of models to the data, including logit regression and diagonal reference models (Sobel 1981, 1984) to explore the complex fashion in which class and political preferences are related in Ireland. We argue that the relationship between such preferences and social divisions are, in fact, greater than has been hitherto thought. In particular, we show the importance of taking into account not only social class but also class origins and class mobility in understanding the nature of political partisanship in the Republic of Ireland.

Consensus in organizations:Hunting for the social choice conundrum in APA elections

According to the axiomatic literature on consensus methods, the best collective choice by one method of preference aggregation can easily be the worst by another. Are award committees, electorates, managers, online retailers, and web-based recommender systems stuck with an impossibility of rational preference aggregation? We investigate this social choice conundrum for seven social choice methods: Condorcet, Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality, the Single Transferable Vote, Coombs, and Plurality Runoff. We rely on Monte Carlo simulations for theoretical results and on twelve ballot datasets from American Psychological Association (APA) presidential elections for empirical results. Each of these elections provides partial rankings of five candidates from about 13,000 to about 20,000 voters. APA preferences are neither domain-restricted nor generated by an Impartial Culture. We find virtually no trace of a Condorcet paradox. In direct contrast with the classical social choice conundrum, competing consensus methods agree remarkably well, especially on the overall best and worst options. The agreement is also robust under perturbations of the preference prole via resampling, even in relatively small pseudosamples. We also explore prescriptive implications of our findings.

Bicameralism in the Republic of Ireland: The Seanad Abolition Referendum

Whether or not a legislature is uni- or bi-cameral has been found to have important consequences. Ireland's 1937 constitution provided for a directly elected lower chamber (Dáil Éireann) and an indirectly elected upper chamber (Seanad Éireann). With the appointment to government in 2011 of two political parties with a common electoral commitment to abolish bicameralism, the subsequent coalition agreement included a promise to hold a referendum offering voters the option to move to a unicameral parliamentary system. On 4 October 2013, the electorate voted to retain the upper chamber, albeit by a narrow majority of 51.7 per cent, on a turnout of 39.17 per cent. The outcome was arguably surprising, given that opinion polls signalled a plurality of voters favoured abolition, and there was a general public antipathy towards political institutions in the midst of a major economic crisis. Public opinion research suggests that a combination of factors explained voting behaviour, including a lack of interest amongst those who did not vote. A cost savings argument was a significant factor for those favouring abolition, while concerns over government control of the legislative process appear to have been most prominent in the minds of those who voted to retain the upper chamber.

Parties, cleavages, and issue evolution: The case of the religious-secular cleavage in Chile

Several recent articles have reached different conclusions regarding the impact of the religious–secular cleavage in Chile. The resolution of this debate has important consequences for the understanding of cleavages. Studies subscribing to the view that parties have considerable agency in the maintenance of cleavages have found that religiosity no longer affects vote choice, while studies rooted in a sociological perspective argue that religiosity still matters. We show that the reason for the discrepant results is because a partisan realignment is underway, whereby religious voters are gradually shifting their loyalties from the parties of the left to the parties of the right, matching a division that has taken place at the elite level. These results are consistent with an issue evolution perspective, which provides a clearer articulation of how cleavages form than either the agency or the sociological approaches.

Party agency and the religious-secular cleavage in post-Communist countries: The case of Romania

Research focusing on several post-communist countries has found evidence of social cleavage effects on political behaviour similar to those found in Western Europe. In some post-communist countries, however, social cleavage effects appear far weaker (if at all). To understand why this is the case, I perform a case study of Romania, focusing on the religious–secular cleavage. Drawing upon research that emphasises the role of parties in forming cleavages, I argue that the reason for the absence of social cleavage effects is due to party competition for the same group of voters by parties from opposing ends of the ideological spectrum. By shifting their positions, some parties have prevented the appearance of cleavages by shaping individuals' perceptions of the parties and, in doing so, have even altered individuals' own left–right self-placements.

What’s information got to do with it? Third-party voting in plurality systems

Although strategic voting theory predicts that the number of parties will not exceed two in single-member district plurality systems, the observed number of parties often does. Previous research suggests that the reason why people vote for third parties is that they possess inaccurate information about the parties’ relative chances of winning. However, research has yet to determine whether third-party voting persists under conditions of accurate information. In this article, we examine whether possessing accurate information prevents individuals from voting for third-placed parties in the 2005 and 2010 British elections. We find that possessing accurate information does not prevent most individuals from voting for third-placed parties and that many voters possess reasonably accurate information regarding the viability of the parties in their constituencies. These findings suggest that arguments emphasizing levels of voter information as a major explanation for why multiparty systems often emerge in plurality systems are exaggerated.

Explaining the multiparty systems of Western Europe prior to the adoption of proportional representation

The literature has difficulty explaining why the number of parties in majoritarian electoral systems often exceeds the two-party predictions associated with Duverger’s Law. To understand why this is the case, I examine several party systems in Western Europe before the adoption of proportional representation. Drawing from the social cleavage approach, I argue that the emergence of multiparty systems was because of the development of the class cleavage, which provided a base of voters sizeable enough to support third parties. However, in countries where the class cleavage became the largest cleavage, the class divide displaced other cleavages and the number of parties began to converge on two. The results show that the effect of the class cleavage was nonlinear, producing the greatest party system fragmentation in countries where class cleavages were present – but not dominant – and smaller in countries where class cleavages were either dominant or non-existent.

Emotions and voting in EU referendums

There is an emerging scholarship on the emotional bases of political opinion and behaviour and, in particular, the contrasting implications of two distinct negative emotions - anger and anxiety. I apply the insights in this literature to the previously unresearched realm of the emotional bases of voting in EU referendums. I hypothesise that anxious voters rely on substantive EU issues and angry voters rely on second-order factors relating to domestic politics (partisanship and satisfaction with government). Focusing on the case of Irish voting in the Fiscal Compact referendum, and using data from a representative sample of voters, I find support for the hypotheses and discuss the implications of the findings for our understanding of the emotional conditionality of EU referendum voting. 

The Northern Ireland Assembly Election 2011

Following the first full term of regional government in the province since 1972, the Northern Ireland Assembly election held on 5 May 2011 saw the continuation of several trends. Foremost, the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin bolstered further their positions as leaders of their respective communities, with the Social Democratic and Labour Party and Ulster Unionist Party losing yet more ground. Building on their decision to enter power-sharing government together in 2007, the two largest parties framed themselves as the progressive choice for voters. As this was the first Assembly election since St Andrews (2006), much of the campaign dialogue centred on the prospect of a Sinn Féin First Minister, a concern highlighted by both unionist parties. The campaign also focused on ‘normal’ socio-economic political issues and possible institutional reform. The absence of inter-party conflict led to the campaign being perceived as the most mundane in living memory, with fears of a record low turnout realised.

The Promise of Peace:Revisiting the Northern Irish Model

The Northern Ireland peace process is often eulogized as a successful model of conflict transformation. Although the process exhibited many of the problems that beset other societies seeking to move from conflict to a negotiated peace (including disagreements over the functioning of institutions and the meanings of cultural symbols, unresolved issues relating to the effects of political violence on victims and survivors and society at large; and the residual presence of violent and political ‘spoiler’ groups), the resilience of political dialogue has proven remarkable.
This collection revisits the promise of ‘a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning’ a decade and a half on from the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The book will bring together academics from across a number of disciplines, including management and organizational behaviour, law, politics, sociology, archaeology and literature.

The different contributions aim to assess what impact it has made in the legal, policy, and institutional areas it specifically targeted: political reform, human rights and equality provision, working through legacies of the past (including police reform, prisoner release and victims' rights) and the building of new relationships within the island of Ireland and between Ireland and Britain. With the emergence of first-time voters who had no direct experience of the violence the book explores what the Agreement offers for future generations.

The book is the culmination of a 12-month research project sponsored by the British Academy and Leverhulme that addressed the following aspects of the peace process:
Peace walls: The euphemistically named peace walls remain one of the most visible reminders of Northern Ireland’s divisions and they are famously the only material manifestations of the conflict that have grown in number and extent since the 1998 Agreement. They were originally placed between antagonistic neighbouring communities – often at their request – at times of heightened tensions. Research under this theme explored the lack of ongoing engagement with their continuing presences, evolving meanings and impact on the communities that reside beside them needs to be overtly addressed.
Cultural division: Cultural differences have often been seen as lying at the heart of the ‘Irish problem’. Despite this, art and artists have increasingly been seen as having the potential to develop new discourses. Research explored the following questions: What role can the arts play in re-imagining the spaces opened up by the promises of the 1998 Agreement? What implication does the confrontation with the legacies of conflict have for artistic practices? What impact do the arts have on constructions of identity, on narratives of history, and on electoral politics?
Institutional transformation: This strand of research explored the significance of the process of organizational change which followed the establishment of the 1998 on political and other public policy institutions such as the police and prison services. It suggested that the experience and lessons learned from such periods of transition have much to contribute to how Northern Ireland begins to address political polarization in other areas of public service infrastructure, chiefly around the sectarian monoliths of education and housing.
Working through the past: ‘Legacy’ issues have gained increasing prominence since 1998: issues to do with public symbolism (particularly relating to the flying of flags and parading), defining victimhood, securing victims’ rights, recovery of the ‘disappeared’, reintegrating ex- prisoners back into society, and the possibilities for truth recovery and reconciliation have all acquired salient and emotive force. Although the 1998 Agreement promised to ‘honour the dead’ through a ‘new beginning’, it is increasingly unclear as to whether an agreed narrative about the past is possible – or even worthwhile pursuing. Research under this theme looked at the complex relationship between memory, commemoration and violence; how commemorative events are performed, organized, policed and represented. It also addressed the fraught issue of how to come to terms with Northern Ireland’s divided and bloodied past.

The editors are in the process of guiding contributors to adapt their papers, which were presented to a series of workshops on the above themes, to the purposes of the book. In particular, the contributors will be guided to focus on the related aims of assessing the extent of change that has occurred and providing an assessment of what remains to be done. To that end, contributors are asked to engage directly with the questions that close the ‘Introduction’, namely: To what extent has the ‘promise’ of the 1998 Agreement been fulfilled? To what extent has the 1998 Agreement given rise to forms of exclusion? To what extent has the 1998 Agreement shaped new forms of debate, dispute and engagement? In the absence of that guidance having been sent out yet, the outlines below are, for the time being, the abstracts of their original papers.

Motivações do gestor e instrumentos contabilísticos utilizados na gestão dos resultados: o caso das autarquias locais

Face aos princípios orientadores do New Public Management a política orçamental, continuando a ser primordial na avaliação do desempenho do gestor público, deixou de ser o seu único meio de avaliação, constituindo a informação proporcionada pela contabilidade financeira uma ferramenta essencial para aferir a racionalidade, a economia, a eficiência e a eficácia da aplicação dos recursos na satisfação das necessidades dos cidadãos/eleitores. O presente trabalho de investigação tem como objectivo proporcionar conhecimento acerca dos incentivos que podem motivar o gestor autárquico à prática da gestão dos resultados bem como identificar os procedimentos contabilísticos utilizados para essa gestão. O trabalho desenvolvido assentou em pressupostos das teorias da agência e da escolha pública que permitiram formular as hipóteses a testar no estudo empírico. Os resultados obtidos confirmam o pressuposto fundamental de ambas as teorias: na presença de uma relação de agência em que existem conflitos de interesse entre o gestor e o principal, o gestor procura actuar oportunisticamente no seu interesse próprio, maximizando o seu bem-estar. Confirmam, igualmente, que numa perspectiva de sinalização de desempenho e competência, com vista à reeleição, o autarca procede à gestão dos resultados tendo como objectivo evitar divulgar resultados negativos e procurar divulgar resultados positivos próximos de zero num nível que não seja considerado excessivo por parte, nomeadamente, do cidadão, dos grupos de interesse e dos partidos políticos.

Novos dilemas, velhas soluções? - patronagem e governos partidários

A patronagem tem sido considerada uma importante dimensão do modelo de governos partidários. Contudo, a concepção convencional da utilização da patronagem remete para a distribuição de cargos na administração pública a ocorrer para efeitos de recompensa por serviços prestados ao partido no governo, ou como mecanismo de compensação relativamente à incapacidade do partido no governo de converter as preferências em políticas públicas. Esta perspectiva não é inteiramente satisfatória. A crescente complexificação e fragmentação dos processos de governação, juntamente com o poder das estruturas administrativas no processo de políticas públicas parece impelir os governos partidários a procurarem novas formas de controlar a máquina administrativa do Estado. Através do controlo político da administração, os partidos no governo procuram obter uma máquina administrativa responsiva e accountable, o que pode ter consequências para a prossecução dos objectivos de controlo de políticas públicas dos partidos no governo. Deste modo, a patronagem – definida como a distribuição de cargos na cúpula dirigente da administração pública e semi-pública – pode converter-se num recurso chave para os partidos ao nível do controlo do processo de políticas públicas, permitindo-lhes assegurar um papel na governação democrática moderna. Este estudo permite confirmar, em primeiro lugar, a incapacidade de, durante o período democrático, institucionalizar mecanismos legais que possam promover a profissionalização da administração pública. Tal decorre da acentuada tendência para a revisão do enquadramento legal, que acompanha a alternância partidária no governo, sem contudo, permitir configurar um quadro legal capaz de restringir a discricionariedade política formal sobre a máquina administrativa do Estado. Em segundo lugar Portugal surge, no contexto dos 19 países europeus analisados, entre os países com maior amplitude na discricionariedade política formal. Tal como os seus congéneres do Sul da Europa, Portugal tem sido considerado como um país onde a patronagem pode penetrar os níveis hierárquicos mais baixos, motivada por questões de recompensa partidária. Esta narrativa negligencia, contudo, as consideráveis diferenças que existem entre níveis hierárquico, ignorando as diferentes motivações para a patronagem. Além disso, a perspectiva de políticos, dirigentes e outros observadores, sugere que a utilização efectiva dos mecanismos de controlo ex ante é limitada em Portugal, quando comparado com outras democracias europeias, apontando para o limitado poder explicativo da legislação em relação ao recurso à patronagem. Esta investigação pretende, assim, reanalisar a narrativa relativa à influência partidária e ao papel da patronagem para os governos partidários em Portugal. Desta forma, o estudo da importância da patronagem para os governos partidários foi baseado na análise dos padrões de patronagem em Portugal, através da análise empírica de 10482 nomeações para a cúpula da estrutura dirigente. Esta análise quantitativa foi complementada por entrevistas a 51 dirigentes, ministros e observadores privilegiados, que especificam a operacionalização da patronagem e as estratégias utilizadas pelos partidos políticos. A análise destas duas fontes permitiu confirmar, em primeiro lugar, a existência de influências partidárias nas nomeações para a cúpula dirigente. Em segundo lugar, este estudo permite confirmar a coexistência das duas motivações da patronagem. Com efeito, a lógica das nomeações enquanto recompensa pode subsistir, ao mesmo tempo que tende a emergir um valor instrumental das nomeações, com estas a serem utilizadas (também) para reforçar o controlo político e reduzir os riscos associados ao processo de delegação. Contudo, as diferentes motivações da patronagem podem variar consoante o nível hierárquico e a fase do ciclo governativo. Enquanto instrumento de poder, a patronagem pode ser identificada nos níveis hierárquicos mais elevados. Pelo contrário, as motivações de recompensa emergem nas posições hierárquicas mais baixas, menos sujeitas ao controlo dos partidos da oposição e dos eleitores. A patronagem de poder tende, ainda, a ser mais saliente nas etapas iniciais dos mandatos governativos, com as motivações de recompensa a poderem ser identificadas no final dos mandatos. Em terceiro lugar, os resultados sugerem que a utilização da patronagem depende da competição partidária, com a acção fiscalizadora dos partidos da oposição a poder limitar as nomeações para cargos na cúpula da estrutura administrativa sem, contudo, poder impedir as nomeações para os níveis hierárquicos menos visíveis (estruturas intermédias, serviços periféricos e gabinetes ministeriais). Em quarto lugar, a politização estrutural emerge como uma estratégia que permite aos governos partidários contornarem a indiferença da administração pública face a novas prioridades políticas, ao mesmo tempo que parece emergir como um instrumento que permite legitimar as opções políticas dos governos partidários ou adiar decisões nas áreas sectoriais menos importantes para os governos partidários. De uma forma geral, os governos partidários parecem recorrer a velhos instrumentos como a patronagem, com uma solução para os novos dilemas que se colocam ao controlo partidário do processo de políticas públicas.

Qualified exceptionalism: the US Congress in comparative perspective

The framers of the American Constitution devised a singular bicameral legislative body, which invested substantial power in both a broadly representative lower chamber and a second "deliberative" chamber that was both insulated from the voters and unrepresentative of the population as a whole. Until the early 20th Century, the singular U.S. Congress changed little, but with growing national responsibilities, it sought to construct organizational forms that could address a consistently stronger executive. Since the 1980s, the Congress has relied increasingly on stronger parties to organize its activities. This development, embraced in turn by Democrats and Republicans, has led to changes that have edged the Congress in the direction of parliamentary democracies. We conclude this analysis has real, but limited utility, as congressional party leaders continue to barter for votes and, in the context, of narrow chamber majorities, often rely heavily on presidential assistance on divisive issues that are important to their party brand. Yet, the traditional features of the American separated system - bicameralism, the committee systems, and the centrifugal forces emanating from diverse congressional districts, increasingly complex policy issues, and the fear of electoral retribution - also remain strong, and effectively constrain the influence of leaders.'Qualified exceptionalism' thus most aptly describes the contemporary American Congress, which remains 'exceptional,' but less than unique, as it responds to many of the same forces, in some of the same ways (e.g., strong parties), as do many other representative assemblies around the world.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).