991 resultados para union power
Resumo:
Shows a new structure, the untapered multifibre union, with similar oscillation behaviour to that of tapered single-mode fibres. As a consequences conical regions are not relevant to the final results. This oscillatory behaviour opens the way to low-cost all-fibre devices such as optical filters
Resumo:
The EU‘s external action includes a preference for regional interlocutors and a tendency to promote regionalism. This work concentrates on the southeast Asian area and it aims at investigating the nature of EU‘s promotion of ASEAN regional integration. The EU‘s ideas and practices of regionalism as well as the single market experience influence the EU‘s international action. The power deriving from the EU‘s institutionalized market is used by the Union in a normative way to diffuse the EU‘s ideas and principles, advance the EU‘s interests and spread its model of economic integration through political dialogue, development cooperation and preferential trade arrangements. This action seems to result in a certain diffusion of the EU‘s ideas and practices in southeast Asia as well as in a subsequent reappropriation and redefinition of external inputs by ASEAN.
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This paper investigates the EU’s international positioning in terms of innovative capabilities and global market performance by using most recent quantitative data on a wide branch of indicators. The EU’s performance is compared to the standings of its most important economic competitors and emerging economic powerhouses: the USA, Japan, China, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa. By doing so, this paper offer insightful and deep information about the EU’s power to compete and rank in international economic affairs. It will be proofed that the European Union ranks in many of the indicators related to innovative capabilities in good position and the EU’s overall global market performance is excellent, whereas the BRICS are underachieving.
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The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a comprehensive security actor. With the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a reaction to the failure of the EU to act during the wars in Yugoslavia/Western Balkans in the 1990s, the EU has a wide range of instruments for crisis prevention, crisis management as well as post-crisis intervention at its disposal. Observers typically agree that “hard power” is no longer sufficient to address the complex security challenges of today’s world while the EU, often criticised for only utilising “soft power”, is now able to exercise “smart power”. Through a comprehensive approach, facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can now use the various instruments at its disposal, such as diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, sanctions, international cooperation and crisis management capabilities in a joined-up manner. This mix of tools and instruments is helping the EU to achieve the aim set out in its European Security Strategy: “a secure Europe in a better world”.
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The ‘Normative Power Europe’ debate has been a leitmotif in the academic discourse for over a decade. Far from being obsolete, the topic is as relevant as when the term was first coined by Ian Manners in 2002.1 ‘To be or not to be a normative power’ is certainly one of the existential dilemmas in the foreign policy of the European Union. This paper, however, intends to move beyond the black-and-white debate on whether the European Union is a normative power and to make it more nuanced by examining the factors that make it such. Contrary to the conventional perception that the European Union is a necessarily ‘benign’ force in the world, it assumes that it has aspirations to be a viable international actor. Consequently, it pursues different types of foreign policy behaviour with a varying degree of normativity in them. The paper addresses the question of under what conditions the European Union is a ‘normative power’. The findings of the study demonstrate that the ‘normative power’ of the European Union is conditioned upon internal and external elements, engaged in a complex interaction with a decisive role played by the often neglected external elements.
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Introduction. Ten years have elapsed since Malta’s accession in the European Union. One can still recall vividly the intense and acrimonious campaign prior to the membership referendum and the ensuing electoral victory that confirmed the Nationalist Party (PN) in power under the leadership of Edward Fenech Adami in 2003. In both cases the Maltese voted in favour of entry into the EU. During both exercises in democracy the Maltese were exposed to the rhetoric of both prophets of doom and prophets of plenty. For the former accession meant a loss of national and territorial independence, for the latter it meant the beginning of opportunity for all and, in some cases, the answer to all of Malta’s woes. Now, ten years later, a further appraisal of Malta’s membership and place in the European Union is called for. The purpose of this paper, however, is to reflect upon how this membership has affected the Roman Catholic Church in Malta and what prospects lie ahead for the Catholic community within Maltese society that remains in a state of constant flux on both the social and the religious level. It traces the major events that have accelerated the transformation of Malta into a secular society. The paper describes how these events, together with pressures that are being brought to bear by secular movements upon Maltese society, are profoundly affecting its Catholic identity and redrawing its moral landscape. It also discusses ways and means by which the Catholic Church in Malta can address these challenges and contribute towards the construction of a more humane Maltese society. In order to achieve this, it must first and foremost remain a coherent witness of a faith that is forever alive, dynamic and relevant.
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Many scholars have analyzed the role of the European Union (EU) in its southern neighborhood by looking at the EU’s policy documents and strategies. As such, it is often argued that the EU is at best a useful partner in democratic reform and at worst an unsuccessful ‘normative power’. However, very few studies have analyzed the EU’s role from the recipients’ point of view: the southern neighboring countries themselves. This paper adopts an ‘outside-in approach’ and explores what the southern neighborhood countries believe the EU should be or do. On the basis of a set of 15 interviews with diplomats from the region and an analysis of 50 newspaper articles from the region on the EU’s relations with its southern neighborhood, this paper seeks to reveal the EU’s real ’added value’ for its southern Mediterranean partners. To what extent does the EU’s own perceived role in its southern neighborhood match the role conception of those countries? Based on the three case studies of Algeria, Jordan and Egypt, the paper finds that there is a clear divergence in role conceptions between the EU and its southern partners. While the EU sees itself as a ‘force for good’ and promoter of norms and democracy in the southern Mediterranean region, the three countries primarily believe that the EU perceives itself foremost as a provider of security and stability in the region, while they primarily expect it to act as a reliable partner for economic cooperation.
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Japan’s two major electricity producing companies reached a preliminary agreement recently to establish a joint venture for the procurement of fossil fuel resources, primarily liquefied natural gas (LNG). The authors of this commentary ask whether this commercial initiative could serve as an example to Europe of how to increase the negotiating power of individual EU member states. They conclude that a private joint gas procurement company may indeed offer a solution for EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, instead of yet another source of confrontation. Given the political volatility in the region, it could well be the key to balancing out the need for security of supply with an offer to guarantee security of demand, thereby creating the climate for stable commercial relations.
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During Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev’s working visit to Minsk on 18 July, Russia and Belarus signed a general contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Belarus. The signature brought to an end the complex negotiations which had been underway since January 2009 involving the leadership in Minsk, the Russian government and Atomstroyexport, the Russian company that will be the main contractor of the investment. However, the power plant’s future ownership structure, management arrangements and terms and conditions of profit sharing remain unclear. The Belarusian leadership hopes that with the launch of the nuclear power plant, it will be able to reduce gas imports from Russia, gas being the main resource used in producing heat and electricity in Belarus. This should in turn reduce the costs of energy generation. In addition, Minsk expects that the new investment will allow it to export electricity surpluses to the European Union, including Poland. Agreements concerning the power plant have been concluded over the last year or so and, according to these, Russia has acquired partial control of the Belarusian electricity grid, especially with regard to the transmission of energy to foreign markets. Russia is also the sole creditor and contractor for the investment, and the sole future provider of nuclear fuel. Therefore, implementation of the project will exacerbate Minsk’s already significant dependence on Moscow in energy and political terms.
Resumo:
There are two reasons for the virtual nature of the West’s dialogue with Ukraine. The first is institutional as the EU has until now only been willing to use ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ in ‘enlargement-heavy’ (i.e. full membership) whereas it has only used ‘carrots,’ but never ‘sticks’, in ‘enlargement-light’ (i.e. the DCFTA). European Council Foreign Relations Senior Fellows Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson argue that the EU should be more willing to use both carrots and sticks; that is integrating its soft and hard power. The second is a disconnection between the West and Kyiv over definitions of democracy. The Ukrainian authorities have until now wanted to have their cake and eat it, too; rolling back democracy in Kyiv while claiming to sign up to ‘European values’ in Brussels.
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As evidenced by the disparities seen in the world, development does not occur uniformly around the world. Global superpowers like the United States and the European Union collectively dominate other parts of the world simply because of their ability to develop at a faster rate. With the rise of globalization and the increasing connectivity of the world economy, the world has reached a time where it is imperative that those nations and unions holding power to commit to elevating their fellow nations through supportive policy ties. The United States and the European Union, as leading global nations, have an important role in developing the economies of other countries; by taking various policy measures, the US and EU can create stronger economic ties to Africa and create a advantageous relationship for all the regions involved.
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The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.
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The European Union and Singapore are vastly different entities, each with its own regional and global priorities and policies. Both actors employ a range of tools and instruments to aid in their foreign policy objectives, including in the projection of their soft power. It is worth analysing and comparing the specific instruments of these two actors’ soft power strategies, including but not limited to their stated objectives and perceived effectiveness. This paper will compare the role of higher education and scholarships in diffusing soft power through a comparative case study of the Erasmus Mundus scholarship program and the Singapore Scholarship administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It will look at the ways in which these programs have shaped the standing of the actors in diffusing their norms and objectives in the regional and international arena. A comparative analysis of these programs will hopefully provide some insight into the proximity between foreign policy-making and higher education internationalisation. This paper will begin with an overview of the aforementioned programs and related schemes, before dissecting and comparing the intent and the policy-making processes behind these, and concludes with a discussion on the present and future role of higher education as a strategic soft power tool.
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Summary. On 11 March 2011, a devastating earthquake struck Japan and caused a major nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The disaster confirmed that nuclear reactors must be protected even against accidents that have been assessed as highly unlikely. It also revealed a well-known catalogue of problems: faulty design, insufficient back-up systems, human error, inadequate contingency plans, and poor communications. The catastrophe triggered the rapid launch of a major re-examination of nuclear reactor security in Europe. It also stopped in its tracks what had appeared to be a ‘nuclear renaissance’, both in Europe and globally, especially in the emerging countries. Under the accumulated pressure of rising demand and climate warming, many new nuclear projects had been proposed. Since 2011 there has been more ambivalence, especially in Europe. Some Member States have even decided to abandon the nuclear sector altogether. This Egmont Paper aims to examine the reactions of the EU regarding nuclear safety since 2011. Firstly, a general description of the nuclear sector in Europe is provided. The nuclear production of electricity currently employs around 500,000 people, including those working in the supply chain. It generates approximately €70 billion per year. It provides roughly 30% of the electricity consumed in the EU. At the end of 2013, there were 131 nuclear power reactors active in the EU, located in 14 countries. Four new reactors are under construction in France, Slovakia and Finland. Secondly, this paper will present the Euratom legal framework regarding nuclear safety. The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) Treaty was signed in 1957, and somewhat obscured by the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. It was a more classical treaty, establishing institutions with limited powers. Its development remained relatively modest until the Chernobyl catastrophe, which provoked many initiatives. The most important was the final adoption of the Nuclear Safety Directive 2009/71. Thirdly, the general symbiosis between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be explained. Fourthly, the paper analyses the initiatives taken by the EU in the wake of the Fukushima catastrophe. These initiatives are centred around the famous ‘stress tests’. Fifthly, the most important legal change brought about by this event was the revision of Directive 2009/71. Directive 2014/87 has been adopted quite rapidly, and has deepened in various ways the role of the EU in nuclear safety. It has reinforced the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities. It has enhanced transparency on nuclear safety matters. It has strengthened principles, and introduced new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire life cycle of nuclear installations, and in particular, nuclear power plants. It has extended monitoring and the exchange of experiences by establishing a European system of peer reviews. Finally, it has established a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonized nuclear safety guidelines. In spite of these various improvements, Directive 2014/87 Euratom still reflects the ambiguity of the Euratom system in general, and especially in the field of nuclear safety. The use of nuclear energy remains controversial among Member States. Some of them remain adamantly in favour, others against or ambivalent. The intervention of the EAEC institutions remains sensitive. The use of the traditional Community method remains limited. The peer review method remains a very peculiar mechanism that deserves more attention.
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On July 15, 2014 the European Parliament confirmed the new European Commission President. An absolute majority was needed for this purpose, and the 422 votes “For” cleared the 376-vote threshold in the legislative body of 751 members. A Grand Coalition has been formed among the three largest political parties: the European People’s Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliances of Socialists Democrats (S&D), and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). Considering policy decisions going forward, the European Union (EU) faces the pressing question: Will there be more, less, or similar power from the EU? There are a greater number voices from across the political spectrum contributing to the democratic plurality. European leaders may regain trust by acknowledging that future governance will not be “business as usual” as the reform agenda gets underway. 2014 has been an exciting and important year in European politics. “This time is different” was the motto for the European Parliament’s election campaign. This essay analyzes recent EU political trends with the new Commission leadership and the Parliamentary elections results. The Parliamentary elections, held in late May, and the new European Commission, planned to be in place in the autumn, influence the leadership direction of the 28-member bloc. Additionally, this year on July 1 Croatia celebrated the first anniversary of joining the EU in 2013. Leading the way for candidate countries, Croatia embraces the democratic politics and capitalist market economics embodied by the EU. The greater number of seats held by newer political parties in the European Parliament demonstrates increasing plurality in the EU democracy. The Parliamentary elections have taken place every 5 years since 1979. In this eighth legislative session, the EPP and the S&D remain the largest parties represented, with 221 and 191 seats respectively. As the EU has evolved, a greater number of voices influence politics. The ongoing point of contention on a host of policies is national sovereignty in relation to pooled sovereignty in the EU. The European Parliament is important for democracy in EU governance since it is the direct link from the national citizens to their elected leaders at the supranational level. The representatives of the European Commission are appointed by the national governments of Member States, and their heads of government are the representatives to the European Council. These three political institutions – the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Council – together with other important institutions, including the European Court of Justice Luxembourg, form the EU. The new European Commission President is Jean-Claude Juncker, former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Luxembourg (1995-2013). After being nominated by the European Council on June 27, his candidacy was voted on by the European Parliament on July 15, according to the guidelines of the Lisbon Treaty. The leadership for the President of the European Commission has been an important issue, considering Britain’s deliberations on whether or not to stay in the EU in the face of a future national referendum. Voting on June 27, among the European Council on the nomination of Commission President-Designate Juncker, was 26 in favor and 2 opposed. Only Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary, joined David Cameron, the prime minister of the United Kingdom (UK), with a negative vote (Spiegel and Parker 2014). The UK had not been supportive, being concerned that Juncker embraces the policies of a federalist, prioritizing an ever-closer union above the interests of individual Member States. Historically, since joining the predecessor institution of the European Economic Community in 1973, the UK has had a relatively independent attitude about participation in the EU.