881 resultados para state-owned enterprises
Resumo:
La crisis financiera hipotecaria de 2008 en la que se declaró en quiebra el banco de inversión Lehman Brothers, se desarrolló en un ambiente que contemplaba apalancamientos financieros excesivos y el uso de derivados financieros de crédito innovadores. Razón por la cual, a partir del estudio de caso de quiebra de este banco de inversión y el análisis de las causas y consecuencias del ambiente desregulatorio que surgió en Estados Unidos desde la década de los 30 hasta el 2000, se orienta la investigación a indagar sobre lo que sucede en términos regulatorios y empresariales en el mercado de valores colombiano y así lograr definir objetivos que permitan el crecimiento del mercado de derivados exóticos en Colombia bajo un marco de responsabilidad financiera y ética empresarial.
Resumo:
O projeto destina-se a analisar a gestão dos bens patrimonias na empresa pública. Procurar-se-á obter um diagnóstico de como as empresas públicas, em especial empresas situadas no município de São Paulo, conduzem a gestão o seu patrimônio, relativamente a eficiência e produtividade, diante de uma economia globalizada e da privatização emergente.A pesquisa será fundamentada em levantamentos de conceitos e práticas da gestão pública, comparando-a com a gestão da empresa privada. Será realizado também, um inquérito (pesquisa) através de entrevistas pessoais, em algumas empresas públicas, para se levantar e avaliar as dificuldades, e as práticas reais conduzidas.Torna-se oportuno ressaltar que este não será um trabalho que focará os aspectos contábeis e de legislação que a empresa pública está submetida, ainda que tais aspectos estão contemplados no estudo.
Resumo:
Esta dissertação é um estudo de caso exploratório sobre a atuação do Departamento de Coordenação e Governança das Empresas Estatais (DEST), vinculado à Secretaria-Executiva do Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão, na análise e na aprovação das propostas de participação nos lucros ou resultados (PLR) dos empregados das empresas estatais em que a União é acionista majoritária. Quatro empresas estatais que apresentaram propostas de PLR para o exercício de 2008 foram selecionadas qualitativamente. As informações coletadas a partir das propostas das empresas, de documentos oficiais do DEST se manifestando sobre o assunto, do marco legal existente e das entrevistas com representantes do órgão foram analisadas criticamente com base na teoria da agência, da literatura sobre mensuração de desempenho no setor público, das reformas administrativas no Brasil e dos pressupostos do novo institucionalismo. Com isso, foi possível: (i) analisar o DEST e o marco legal da PLR enquanto as instituições intermediando o processo entre as propostas e as aprovações; (ii) caracterizar as preferências do DEST em relação aos programas de PLR; (iii) caracterizar as propostas de PLR das empresas estatais; (iv) caracterizar os resultados que as instituições em consideração estão produzindo; (v) analisar os fatores limitantes e/ou facilitadores para o funcionamento das instituições; e (vi) levantar as percepções de ex- e atuais envolvidos no processo de análise e aprovação das propostas no DEST acerca da PLR nas empresas estatais enquanto instrumento de incentivo à produtividade. Como resultado, verificou-se (i) que as aprovações do DEST refletem apenas parcialmente as preferências do órgão com relação ao formato dos programas e (ii) que a atuação do DEST varia de intensidade entre os eixos que compõem os programas (seleção de indicadores, estabelecimento de metas, definição do montante e forma de sua distribuição).
Resumo:
O estudo investiga a accountability vertical das empresas estatais federais brasileiras realizadas através dos portais web. Para tanto, foram levantadas, na literatura, informações relevantes para a melhor compreensão do alcance do termo accountability, de forma a permitir o desenvolvimento de modelo de análise a ser utilizado no trabalho. O modelo proposto compreende 3 dimensões: “Transparência”, “Interação e Participação” e “Prestação de Contas e Resultado” a cada dimensão corresponde um conjunto de variáveis, ponderadas junto a um painel de especialistas. Realizou-se então a análise da accountability vertical das empresas estatais através dos respectivos portais web. Constatou-se que apenas 56% das empresas estatais investigadas possuem informações relativas à accountability e que 34% dos portais web não tinham variáveis relativas às dimensões propostas no modelo. Tais constatações levam à conclusão de que há espaço para aumentar a accountability vertical das empresas estatais federais por meio dos portais web.
Resumo:
RESUMO Ao identificar a existência de lacuna teórica, o presente trabalho definiu como seu objetivo: Estabelecer os alicerces de uma epistéme sobre o fenômeno por meio do desenvolvimento de um arcabouço capaz de a) direcionar e dar sustentação à construção e ao desenvolvimento coletivo de uma Teoria Científica das Empresas e Participações Societárias Estatais – TEPSES, e de b) identificar elementos que viabilizem o desenvolvimento de respostas à questão aplicada central: Como devem os governos definir as missões, os critérios de desempenho e os mecanismos de governança das empresas estatais em um ambiente em mudança? Considerando sua materialidade, a relevância estratégica dessas empresas para os Estados contemporâneos, suas implicações para os processos de globalização e a administração uma ciência aplicada a demandarem nível de análise societal e abordagem multiparadigmática, o arcabouço e seus elementos proporcionaram resposta a várias inquietações e problemas expressos, alguns por mais de meio século, por autoridades no campo como Pritchett, Seidman, Sherwood, Shepherd, Aharoni, Millward, Hinds e Baumol. Oferecendo por redução fenomenológica uma definição de conceito universal para as empresas estatais e introduzindo, inter allia, os conceitos de capacidade essencial de Estado em seu intervalo – CEEi e de estatal patrimonial, que permitiram a construção de uma escala de interesses públicos; o arcabouço teórico focado rueschemeyeriano da TEPSES, constrói pontes entre os hemisférios da grande dicotomia do direito e entre aspectos de governanças pública e corporativa, por meio de tipologias lazarsfeldianas. Em suas seis dimensões iniciais e trinta e três relações o arcabouço foi aplicado por sondagem plausibilística ao caso das estatais diretas brasileiras, apresentando elevado grau de plausibilidade e qualidade, inclusive segundo critérios de Wacker. As formulações e explicitações da TEPSES oferecem respostas e possibilidades de tratamento a várias questões científicas mais amplas como: o paradoxo do conhecimento na regulação de Balleisen, a armadilha de Schneider, a dúvida de Ikeda/Mises e a reabertura da questão de adequação organizacional pelo nobel Simon; proporcionando ainda extensões a: tipologia de estruturas de governança do nobel Williamson, as concepções de sociedade prismática de Riggs, a definição da administração como ciência aplicada do nobel Simon, as formulações institucionalistas de Acemoglu e Robinson e as abordagens sobre intervenção de Estado do nobel Stiglitz. O arcabouço da TEPSES possibilita: a) a cada país, construir sua própria tipologia empírica de empresas estatais e assim geri-las a partir de respostas customizadas à questão aplicada central, analisar sua adequação como instrumento de políticas públicas e desenvolver critérios para suas privatizações; b) a gestores, pesquisadores e estudiosos de caso situar e analisar suas empresas a partir do arcabouço; c) às pesquisas pretéritas, terem seus dados reinterpretados à luz de um novo referencial e d) a todos, a possibilidade de conectarem seus trabalhos à epistéme da qual a TEPSES é alicerce e repositório. Conclui-se que o grau de relevância, em nível global, do fenômeno é na realidade muito superior à sua materialidade e ao grau de relevância atribuído inicialmente, devido à identificação de sua condição como fator empírico de capacidades de Estado, uma vez que à ausência e deficiências dessas capacidades são atribuídos colapsos e débâcles de vários Estados nacionais, que resultaram em elevadíssimos e incalculáveis custos humanos.
Resumo:
Esta pesquisa aborda a influência política sobre os investimentos feitos por empresas estatais ou State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Para tanto, comparou-se os dados de empresas privadas com os de SOEs. O argumento empregado nessa pesquisa é que o governo utiliza sua influência sobre as SOEs para conseguir suporte para realizar mudanças nas políticas. Portanto, espera-se que quanto maior for o potencial conflito entre Principal-Principal, maiores serão os investimentos realizados pelas SOEs (H1). O conflito entre Principal-Principal (PP) ocorre quando existe o conflito de interesses entre duas categorias de principal: acionistas controladores e acionistas minoritários. O segundo argumento refere-se ao desempenho das companhias. Nesse caso, espera-se que o desempenho seja pior nas SOEs em que o estado seja o acionista majoritário (H2). Nesse estudo, foram abordadas companhias que estão listadas no mercado de ações, inclusive empresas estatais que têm o governo como seu acionista majoritário (com participação de mais de 50% no capital acionário). A base de dados utilizada neste estudo foi construída a partir de dados secundários na qual, após tratamento, é composta de 96.379 observações de empresas de 41 países entre os anos de 2002 e 2011. Esta pesquisa faz uso de um quase-experimento utilizando a técnica de diferença em diferença (Difference-in-Differences). O Quase-experimento ocorre quando um evento exógeno afeta a variável explicativa. Os resultados confirmaram a hipótese H1, porém não confirmaram a hipótese H2. Diante da análise dos resultados, este estudo sugere que os políticos usam a sua influência sobre as empresas em que o governo é o acionista majoritário com objetivo de obter ganhos políticos/privados.
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
In that decade, a different solution was required, because the Latin American economies, with only a few exceptions, were already regulated, protected and supervised by the State. One notable exception was the Chilean economy, which, at the onset of the 1970s, had been among the most controlled economies in the region after Cuba. Beginning in 1976/1977, Chile's economy underwent profound restructuring with the adoption of neoliberal policies, involving a reduction in customs tariffs, a decrease in State subsidies, the first steps towards the privatization of state-owned enterprises and a loosening of controls both over prices and production processes in general. The Chilean experience initially gave good results, but in 1982 Chile fell into a deep recession, caused to some extent by the continued fixing of one of the most important prices, that of the Chilean peso on the foreign exchange market, together with inadequate regulation of the banking sector.
Resumo:
Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS
Resumo:
This work highlights opportunities and obstacles to success in four task forces typically found at different times in states of conflict, transition, and development. They include: refugee return, media issues, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and efforts to promote business development. Based on over 180 in-depth interviews and observations of dozens of meetings during five lengthy field research trips to the Bosnian region between 1999 and 2005, this manuscript analyzes how these four task forces differed in terms of context, strategy, organization, and management in an attempt to understand the co-evolution of international development needs and the interorganizational forms that address them.
Resumo:
International efforts to help Bosnia and Herzegovina privatize its state-owned enterprises proved dif.cult, but the complex web of interorganizational relationships (IORs) among international donors, implementers, contractors, and local players, at times, seemed even more daunting to effective implementation of reforms than the technical dif.culties of the task itself. By employing a theoretical framework of IOR development over time, important stages in the evolution of the International Advisory Group on Privatization were identi.ed, and variables within each discussed. Analysis employed linear and nonlinear process logics to help explain what linked some variables withinand betweenthese various phases. Insights seemed valuable for practitioners seeking to implement interdependent tasks, organizational representatives trying to form relationships with others, and scholars trying to understand process theories of IOR formation. In addition, this research provides an introduction to the complexities of international development assistance — a crucially important and under-researched arena.
Resumo:
Since the late eighties, economists have been regarding the transition from command to market economies in Central and Eastern Europe with intense interest. In addition to studying the transition per se, they have begun using the region as a testing ground on which to investigate the validity of certain classic economic propositions. In his research, comprising three articles written in English and totalling 40 pages, Mr. Hanousek uses the so-called "Czech national experiment" (voucher privatisation scheme) to test the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). He took as his inspiration Kreinin's recommendation: "Since data concerning the behaviour of windfall income recipients is relatively scanty, and since such data can constitute an important test of the permanent income hypothesis, it is of interest to bring to bear on the hypothesis whatever information is available". Mr. Hanousek argues that, since the transfer of property to Czech citizens from 1992 to 1994 through the voucher scheme was not anticipated, it can be regarded as windfall income. The average size of the windfall was more than three month's salary and over 60 percent of the Czech population received this unexpected income. Furthermore, there are other reasons for conducting such an analysis in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the privatisation process took place quickly. Secondly, both the economy and consumer behaviour have been very stable. Thirdly, out of a total population of 10 million Czech citizens, an astonishing 6 million, that is, virtually every household, participated in the scheme. Thus Czech voucher privatisation provides a sample for testing the PIH almost equivalent to a full population, thus avoiding problems with the distribution of windfalls. Compare this, for instance with the fact that only 4% of the Israeli urban population received personal restitution from Germany, while the number of veterans who received the National Service Life Insurance Dividends amounted to less than 9% of the US population and were concentrated in certain age groups. But to begin with, Mr. Hanousek considers the question of whether the public percieves the transfer from the state to individual as an increase in net wealth. It can be argued that the state is only divesting itself of assets that would otherwise provide a future source of transfers. According to this argument, assigning these assets to individuals creates an offsetting change in the present value of potential future transfers so that individuals are no better off after the transfer. Mr. Hanousek disagrees with this approach. He points out that a change in the ownership of inefficient state-owned enterprises should lead to higher efficiency, which alone increases the value of enterprises and creates a windfall increase in citizens' portfolios. More importantly, the state and individuals had very different preferences during the transition. Despite government propaganda, it is doubtful that citizens of former communist countries viewed government-owned enterprises as being operated in the citizens' best interest. Moreover, it is unlikely that the public fully comprehended the sophisticated links between the state budget, state-owned enterprises, and transfers to individuals. Finally, the transfers were not equal across the population. Mr. Hanousek conducted a survey on 1263 individuals, dividing them into four monthly earnings categories. After determining whether the respondent had participated in the voucher process, he asked those who had how much of what they received from voucher privatisation had been (a) spent on goods and services, (b) invested elsewhere, (c) transferred to newly emerging pension funds, (d) given to a family member, and (e) retained in their original form as an investment. Both the mean and the variance of the windfall rise with income. He obtained similar results with respect to education, where the mean (median) windfall for those with a basic school education was 13,600 Czech Crowns (CZK), a figure that increased to 15,000 CZK for those with a high school education without exams, 19,900 CZK for high school graduates with exams, and 24,600 CZK for university graduates. Mr. Hanousek concludes that it can be argued that higher income (and better educated) groups allocated their vouchers or timed the disposition of their shares better. He turns next to an analysis of how respondents reported using their windfalls. The key result is that only a relatively small number of individuals reported spending on goods. Overall, the results provide strong support for the permanent income hypothesis, the only apparent deviation being the fact that both men and women aged 26 to 35 apparently consume more than they should if the windfall were annuitised. This finding is still fully consistent with the PIH, however, if this group is at a stage in their life-cycle where, without the windfall, they would be borrowing to finance consumption associated with family formation etc. Indeed, the PIH predicts that individuals who would otherwise borrow to finance consumption would consume the windfall up to the level equal to the annuitised fraction of the increase in lifetime income plus the full amount of the previously planned borrowing for consumption. Greater consumption would then be financed, not from investing the windfall, but from avoidance of future repayment obligations for debts that would have been incurred without the windfall.
Resumo:
This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.
Resumo:
While India's state-owned enterprises are widely believed to be inefficient, there is a dearth of studies that document such inefficiency on any rigorous basis. Yet, since improvement in firm efficiency is one of the basic objectives of privatization, it is important to assess whether efficiency is indeed lower in the public sector than in the private sector. This paper compares the performance of state-owned enterprises with those of private sector firms in respect of technical efficiency. The comparison is made in eight different sectors over the period 1991-92 to 1998-99. We measure technical efficiency using the method of Data Envelopment Analysis. Judging by the average levels of technical efficiency, no conclusive evidence of superior performance on the part of the private sector is found.
Resumo:
An E15 Initiative think piece: Investment incentives rank among the most important policy instruments governments employ to influence the locational decisions of multinational firms. In the wake of the recent increase in locational competition and the growing impact of investment incentives and support measures for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the need for enhanced disciplines on investment incentives has gained political and academic salience. This think piece explores the evolution of investment incentives from a development and rule-making perspective. It summarises the existing literature and examines current practices and recent trends in FDI flows and the use of various investment incentives. This is followed by a discussion of the reasons for the observed stalemate in attempts at disciplinary rule-making. The paper concludes by putting forth recommendations for data gathering and transparency that could further the move toward improved global governance founded on the increasing complementarities of trade, investment, and competition law and policy as the core pillars of a more open, inclusive, and just world economy.