On the efficiency of recursive evaluations with applications to risk theory

On the efficiency of recursive evaluations with applications to risk theoryCette thèse est composée de trois essais qui portent sur l'efficacité des évaluations récursives de la distribution du montant total des sinistres d'un portefeuille de polices d'assurance au cours d'un période donnée. Le calcul de sa fonction de probabilité ou de quantités liées à cette distribution apparaît fréquemment dans la plupart des domaines de la pratique actuarielle.C'est le cas notamment pour le calcul du capital de solvabilité en Suisse ou pour modéliser la perte d'une assurance vie au cours d'une année. Le principal problème des évaluations récursives est que la propagation des erreurs provenant de la représentation des nombres réels par l'ordinateur peut être désastreuse. Mais, le gain de temps qu'elles procurent en réduisant le nombre d'opérations arithmétiques est substantiel par rapport à d'autres méthodes.Dans le premier essai, nous utilisons certaines propriétés d'un outil informatique performant afin d'optimiser le temps de calcul tout en garantissant une certaine qualité dans les résultats par rapport à la propagation de ces erreurs au cours de l'évaluation.Dans le second essai, nous dérivons des expressions exactes et des bornes pour les erreurs qui se produisent dans les fonctions de distribution cumulatives d'un ordre donné lorsque celles-ci sont évaluées récursivement à partir d'une approximation de la transformée de De Pril associée. Ces fonctions cumulatives permettent de calculer directement certaines quantités essentielles comme les primes stop-loss.Finalement, dans le troisième essai, nous étudions la stabilité des évaluations récursives de ces fonctions cumulatives par rapport à la propagation des erreurs citées ci-dessus et déterminons la précision nécessaire dans la représentation des nombres réels afin de garantir des résultats satisfaisants. Cette précision dépend en grande partie de la transformée de De Pril associée.

On-line event detection by recursive dynamic principal component analysis and gas sensor arrays under drift conditions

Leakage detection is an important issue in many chemical sensing applications. Leakage detection hy thresholds suffers from important drawbacks when sensors have serious drifts or they are affected by cross-sensitivities. Here we present an adaptive method based in a Dynamic Principal Component Analysis that models the relationships between the sensors in the may. In normal conditions a certain variance distribution characterizes sensor signals. However, in the presence of a new source of variance the PCA decomposition changes drastically. In order to prevent the influence of sensor drifts the model is adaptive and it is calculated in a recursive manner with minimum computational effort. The behavior of this technique is studied with synthetic signals and with real signals arising by oil vapor leakages in an air compressor. Results clearly demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed method.

Report on a Review of Statewide Procurement for contracts established between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008

Report on a Review of Statewide Procurement for contracts established between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011

Twelve regularly scheduled lettings and three emergency/special lettings were held by the Iowa Department of Transportation for construction and maintenance work during the period covered by this report. At these lettings, projects totally $741,289,234 were approved.

Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition - Behavioral Effects of the Fundamental Transformation

In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the presence of a "fundamental transformation" (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown before.

Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.

Consumer Advisory: Cell Phone Contracts, January 2014

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Cell Phone Contracts

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investmentand the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk ofbeing replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates atrade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractualrelationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificingmanagerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increasesthe return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, wheremanagerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection undershort-term contract. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, theoptimal level of investor protection increases with development.

Radiotherapy and temozolomide for newly diagnosed glioblastoma: recursive partitioning analysis of the EORTC 26981/22981-NCIC CE3 phase III randomized trial.

PURPOSE: The European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer and National Cancer Institute of Canada trial on temozolomide (TMZ) and radiotherapy (RT) in glioblastoma (GBM) has demonstrated that the combination of TMZ and RT conferred a significant and meaningful survival advantage compared with RT alone. We evaluated in this trial whether the recursive partitioning analysis (RPA) retains its overall prognostic value and what the benefit of the combined modality is in each RPA class. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Five hundred seventy-three patients with newly diagnosed GBM were randomly assigned to standard postoperative RT or to the same RT with concomitant TMZ followed by adjuvant TMZ. The primary end point was overall survival. The European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer RPA used accounts for age, WHO performance status, extent of surgery, and the Mini-Mental Status Examination. RESULTS: Overall survival was statistically different among RPA classes III, IV, and V, with median survival times of 17, 15, and 10 months, respectively, and 2-year survival rates of 32%, 19%, and 11%, respectively (P < .0001). Survival with combined TMZ/RT was higher in RPA class III, with 21 months median survival time and a 43% 2-year survival rate, versus 15 months and 20% for RT alone (P = .006). In RPA class IV, the survival advantage remained significant, with median survival times of 16 v 13 months, respectively, and 2-year survival rates of 28% v 11%, respectively (P = .0001). In RPA class V, however, the survival advantage of RT/TMZ was of borderline significance (P = .054). CONCLUSION: RPA retains its prognostic significance overall as well as in patients receiving RT with or without TMZ for newly diagnosed GBM, particularly in classes III and IV.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).