The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Problemas de agência no setor público: o papel dos intermediadores da relação entre poder central e unidades executoras

Este estudo teve como objetivo central identificar de que forma a alocação de indivíduos como intermediadores das relações de agência impacta os conflitos inerentes à relação principal-agente no âmbito da administração pública. Para tanto, foi considerado o contexto do arranjo contratual existente entre o Escritório de Gerenciamento de Projetos da Secretaria Municipal da Casa Civil (CVL/EGP-Rio), representante do poder central da Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, e os órgãos e entidades executoras dos projetos e metas estratégicos definidos por esse poder central. A revisão bibliográfica apontou a existência de quatro problemas de agência principais, os quais dizem respeito às diferenças de motivações e objetivos, às assimetrias de informação, às distintas propensões ao risco e aos diferentes horizontes de planejamento. Foram realizadas dez entrevistas semi-estruturadas com ocupantes do cargo de Analista de Gerenciamento de Projetos e Metas (AGPM), que atuam como intermediadores da relação de agência entre CVL/EGP-Rio e unidades executoras. Os resultados do estudo indicam que o intermediador da relação de agência analisada é capaz de provocar redução naqueles conflitos de agência relacionados com as diferenças de motivações e objetivos e com as assimetrias de informação. Quanto aos problemas de agência que dizem respeito às distintas propensões ao risco e aos diferentes horizontes de planejamento, a pesquisa demonstra que o intermediador não promove qualquer impacto, seja no sentido de acentuá-los ou atenuá-los.

Região, regionalização e rede política: um estudo sobre a atuação da Associação dos Municípios do Araguaia-Tocantins (AMAT)

A discussão sobre região pretende dar subsídios para compreender as dinâmicas territoriais no Brasil e suas implicações a nível regional tendo como seu principal agente de uma nova proposta de regionalização para o Pará a Associação dos Municípios do Araguaia-Tocantins (AMAT), cuja implicação resulta em novas formas de conceber a região e sua forma de operacionalização metodológica, a regionalização, sendo usada nesta pesquisa enquanto instrumento para se confirmar hipótese. Tendo como norteador do trabalho a problemática: em que medida pode-se efetivar uma regionalização do estado do Pará, a partir dos arranjos sócios-políticos com os quais são estabelecidas representatividades, a partir das ações da AMAT? O que levou a rede política constituída pela AMAT no sudeste do Pará a se diferenciar e consolidar de forma a ter destaque no Estado? O estabelecimento das redes políticas possui a capacidade de incorporar a dimensão territorial na execução de suas estratégias para pensar e gerir um projeto regional junto aos municípios partícipes, conseqüentemente melhorando a atuação municipal? Tendo como hipótese central, que o processo de adensamento da rede política no sudeste do Pará é responsável pela insurgência de processo de novas sub-regionalizações como a que vemos com a proposta de criação de um novo estado, com o desmembramento da mesorregião do sudeste paraense. O percurso metodológico foi feito através da reconstituição histórica das transformações territoriais, com vistas a compreender as novas regionalizações, a partir de uma visão de totalidade da qual nosso recorte faz parte e sofre rebatimento, utilizando entrevistas, pesquisa secundária e estudo bibliográfico.

Adenopatia cervical tuberculosa em crianças: aspectos epidemiológicos, clínicos e laboratoriais

A tuberculose constitui um sério problema de saúde pública, sendo o M. tuberculosis o principal agente da doença no Brasil. Entre as formas extra pulmonares, a ganglionar periférica é uma das mais freqüentes na infância, apesar de pouco estudada. Com o objetivo de avaliar a incidência e conhecer os aspectos epidemiológicos, clínicos e laboratoriais da tuberculose ganglionar foram atendidas no ambulatório do Hospital Ofir Loiola, no período de janeiro de 1995 a dezembro de 1996, 73 crianças entre 0-14 anos, de ambos os sexos, portadoras de linfadenopatia cervical. A amostra foi dividida em dois grupos: o primeiro constituído por 61 crianças com adenopatias de outras etiologias e o segundo formado de 12 pacientes com etiologia tuberculosa. Nesse período, para as adenopatias tuberculosas, a taxa anual de incidência na área metropolitana de Belém, por 100 mil habitantes, foi de 1,03 e para o grupo de outras etiologias a incidência foi de 4,27 e 6,15 para os anos de 1995 e 1996, respectivamente. Verificou-se que a maioria das adenopatias na infância foram inespecíficas (64,4%), entretanto, quando consideradas somente as de etiologia conhecida, o risco relativo de ser tuberculose foi de 1,17. A análise comparativa entre os dois grupos não revelou diferença estatisticamente significativa no que tange à faixa etária, sexo, estado nutricional, apresentação clínica inicial, cadeias ganglionares comprometidas e características dos linfonodos. Em ambos foi observado maior incidência em pré-escolares e no sexo masculino. O comprometimento do estado nutricional pode ter contribuído para o aumento da morbidade em 41,7% dos casos de tuberculose. A presença de massa cervical constitui a queixa principal nos dois grupos embora durante o exame tenha sido constatado comprometimento ganglionar generalizado em 75,1% das crianças com adenopatia tuberculosa. Quanto à duração dos sintomas, os casos de adenopatia tuberculosa foram atendidos a partir do primeiro mês de doença e tiveram como manifestação clínica abscesso frio em 25% dos casos. A fonte de infecção foi identificada em 1/3 dos pacientes. A reação tuberculínica com leitura >10mm foi positiva em 63,6% das crianças tuberculosas. Entre os exames bacteriológicos realizados, a cultura constituiu o elemento fundamental para o diagnóstico de tuberculose, obtendo-se 100% de positividade nos exames realizados; a baciloscopia foi de menor importância. O exame histopatológico com lesão granulomatosa compatível com tuberculose foi observado em 88,9% dos casos. O comprometimento pulmonar associado esteve presente em 27, 3% das crianças tuberculosas. A resposta à terapêutica com esquema padronizado pelo Ministério da Saúde foi satisfatória, não tendo sido observados efeitos colaterais aos medicamentos utilizados.

Influência do ruído de tráfego em edifícios e proposta de solução desenvolvida com auxílio de modelos numéricos

No Brasil, é grande o número de casas e apartamentos que sofrem a influência da poluição sonora. Atualmente, esta questão ganhou importante destaque no cenário local, uma vez que Belém-PA foi eleita a “Capital Nacional do Ruído” por vários anos, segundo dados obtidos pelo IBGE. Dentre os tipos mais comuns de poluição sonora, percebe-se que há uma maior queixa por parte da sociedade em relação ao c, o qual é inerente ao cotidiano de qualquer grande cidade. À medida que os problemas de ruído de tráfego aumentam, cresce a preocupação com o grau de incômodo gerado na população, justificando o desenvolvimento de meios para quantificar e reduzir tal desconforto, além da busca por uma regulamentação desta situação, através de normas brasileiras. Portanto, a condição do ruído de tráfego, enquanto principal agente de incômodo da população, no que se refere à poluição sonora, vem justificar a necessidade de realização de um estudo que vise o desenvolvimento de elementos de edificações, de novas geometrias e de composição de materiais existentes, tais que se minimize a penetração do ruído de tráfego aos ambientes internos dessas edificações. Assim, este trabalho apresenta os resultados de estudos do comportamento acústico em edificações situadas frontalmente às vias de grande fluxo de veículos e que sofrem interferências ocasionadas pelo ruído de tráfego gerado em excesso, por essas fontes veiculares. Para tanto, foram realizadas medições em campo numa edificação de 25 andares, em fase avançada de construção e escolhida como piloto para o presente estudo, o qual apresenta uma modelagem numérica da edificação modelo, com o auxílio do software ODEON.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

The EU’s Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power?

This article focuses on the EU’s strategy for choosing regulatory venues to negotiate trade agreements. It analyses the existence of a clear venue hierarchy since the late 1990s and the recent change leading to a blurring of any clear preference for using bilateral, inter-regional or multilateral settings. The article challenges domestic explanations of the EU’s choice of venue, stressing the autonomy of the Commission as a major factor. Using a principal-agent framework, it shows that the Commission’s agenda-setting powers, the existence of interest divergence among principals (e.g. Member States, business groups) and the multi-level system facilitate agency.

Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks

The salvage of historic shipwrecks involves a debate between profit-oriented salvagers, who wish to maximize profit, and archeologists, who wish to maximize historical value. We use a principal-agent model to derive the optimal reward scheme for salvagers, including a minimum duty of care in conducting the salvage operation. A review of U.S. and international law suggests that, while there is an emerging recognition of the need to devote greater care to salvaging those wrecks that are located, current doctrines provide inadequate incentives to locate historic wrecks in the first place.

Contractual Difficulties in Environmental Management and the Protection of Biodiversity: The Case of Conservation and Mitigation Banking

This paper offers a principal-agent model of feasible private contracting in mitigation and conservation banking aimed at the protection of natural habitat and bio-diversity of US wetlands and uplands. It is shown that while it is straightforward to design an incentive contract, such a contract may not achieve the federally mandated objective of no net loss of habitat. This is because the minimum payment required as an economic incentive to private agents may be greater than what they should receive for the habitat values that they actually created in the field. This possible problem is shown to derive from nonconvexity in the production possibility set between the biological value of land as natural habitat and in non-habitat uses such as in urban development. The paper concludes with a consideration of several institutional devises that may promote the convergence of private contracting and the attainment of no net loss. These include the payment of subsidies, greater accuracy in the identification of actual quality by the principal, and the use of several incentive alignment devises.

The Border Management Programme in Central Asia: Explaining the European Union's Choice of Implementing Partners. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 3/2014

Between 2003 and 2014 the European Union’s (EU) Border Management Programme in Central Asia was implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). However, the latter’s implementing responsibilities have just come to an end, with the next phase of the programme to be implemented by an EU member state consortium. This paper seeks to explain why the EU chose the UNDP to implement the programme in the first place; why the programme was redelegated to the UNDP over successive phases; and why, in the end, the EU has opted for a member state consortium to implement the next phase of the programme. The paper will draw on two alternative accounts of delegation: the principal-agent approach and normative institutionalism. Ultimately, it will be argued that both the EU’s decision(s) to delegate (and redelegate) implementing responsibilities to the UNDP, and its subsequent decision to drop the organisation in favour of an EU member state consortium, were driven for the most part by a rationalist ‘logic of consequentiality’. At the same time, a potential secondary role of a normative institutionalist ‘logic of appropriateness’ – as a supplementary approach – will not be discounted.

Discussions in Europe on Variable Compensation in the Financial Sector. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper no. 20, February 2014

Bonuses – which are often used to mitigate principal-agent problems and to encourage employees to work harder – have increased tremendously in the financial sector during the last decade, and have often been seen as a contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2008. The recent European Union (EU) action to adopt a policy that restricts bonuses paid to bankers may seem promising at first, but this does not address the real issues behind variable rewards. Compensation policies should be changed to encourage responsible risk-taking and decision-making through the implementation of broader performance metrics, forfeitable holdbacks and hybrid bonds. Furthermore, a change in organisational culture is needed to improve ethical behaviour leading to a re-balancing of stakeholders’ interests in the financial sector.

The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.

The curious absence of inter-municipal co-operation in England

In Europe local authorities often work with their neighbouring municipalities, whether to address a specific task or goal or through the course of regular policy making and implementation. In England, however, inter-municipal co-operation (IMC) is less common. Councils may work with service providers from the private and non-profit sectors but less often with neighbouring local authorities. Why this is the case may be explained by a number of historical and policy factors that often encourage councils to compete, rather than to work collaboratively with each other. The present government has encouraged councils to work in partnership with other organizations but there are few examples of increased horizontal cooperation between local authorities. Instead the prevailing model remains fixed on vertical co-working predicated on a principal-agent relationship between higher and lower tiers of government.

A korrupció társadalmi és intézményi szerkezete

A tanulmány első részében a megbízó-megbízott-kliens modellt fogalmi keretként alkalmazva a korrupció négy ideáltípusát mutatjuk be: míg a vesztegetést és zsarolást a megbízott és kliens közti, addig a hűtlen kezelést és csalást a megbízó és megbízott közti tranzakcióként definiáljuk. A korrupció ezen alaptípusait irányított gráfok segítségével ábrázoljuk. Ezt követően a korrupciós ügyletek szereplőinek lehetséges (pl. a tranzakciós költségek és a lebukási kockázatok csökkentésére irányuló) motivációit vizsgáljuk, vagyis azt, hogy mely tényezők ösztönzik leginkább a korrupciós helyzetek szereplőit arra, hogy tranzakcióikat különböző típusú személyes, üzleti, politikai és egyéb intézményes kapcsolathálókba ágyazzák. A második részben – támaszkodva korábbi kutatásaink eredményeire – néhány tipikus magyarországi korrupciós tranzakció társadalmi és intézményi beágyazottságát mutatjuk be. Négy esettanulmányt elemzünk részletesen, a bemutatott tipikus (pl. pártfinanszírozáshoz, vagy engedélyek megszerzéséhez kapcsolódó) korrupciós hálózatokat pedig többszereplős, bonyolult és multiplex gráfokkal ábrázoljuk. Végül a komplex hálózatok evolúciós vonatkozásait a szereplők számának, a kapcsolatok komplexitásának, valamint a személyi és/vagy intézményi beágyazottság mértékének tükrében vizsgáljuk. ______ In the first part of the paper four idealtypical corruption transactions are explicated in terms of the principal-agent-client model: bribery and extortion are described as two different types of agent-client relationship, while embezzlement and fraud as two different types of principal-agent relationship. The main idea is to describe these elementary corruption transactions as simple directed graphs. The next section of the paper takes into consideration different kinds of possible motivations (such as the reduction of risks or transaction costs) of the principals, agents and clients, in order to embed their corruption transactions in various kinds of personal, business, political and other institutional networks. In the second part of the paper some typical and stable network configurations are presented, based on a recent empirical corruption research carried out in Hungary. Certain corruption cases (such as party financing or granting of permit) are analyzed in details, and are described as complex and multiple networks. The paper concludes in showing some signs of the evolution of corruption networks in Hungary in terms of the number of actors, of the complexity of network configurations, of the level of personal or institutional embeddedness, and of the multiplexity of relationships.

Speciális kockázatok és kockázatkezelés a kockázatitőke-finanszírozásban (The special risks and risk management of venture capital)

A tanulmányban a szerzők arra a kérdésre keresik a választ, hogy az aszimmetrikus információk hatására a vállalkozók és a befektetők között kialakuló megbízó-ügynök viszonynak melyek a speciális vetületei a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás vonatkozásában. A szerzők arra a következtetésre jutottak, hogy a hiányos információk, a megbízó-ügynök viszony, illetve az ügyletek speciális jellege miatt fokozottan jelentkező ügynökprobléma kezelésére a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás szereplői speciális kockázatkezelési technikákat alkalmaznak. Ilyenek a magas elvárt hozamok, a szigorú kiválasztási kritériumok, a speciális befektetési vagy szindikátusi szerződések, a befektetést követő monitoring tevékenység, a több lépcsőben történő finanszírozás és a portfólióvállalatok hálózatba szervezése. A speciális kockázati megközelítés következtében a befektetéseket opciós szemlélet is áthatja. _____ This paper focuses on the special aspects of imperfect information in case of venture capital financing including principal-agent relationship between entrepreneurs and investors as well as adverse selection that evolves as a result of information asymmetries. The authors’ finding is that venture capital is able to manage the problems caused by imperfect information via applying divers risk management techniques such as high profit expectations, scrutiny of portfolio-companies, the use of special contracting stipulations and syndicate agreements, the monitoring of investments, multi-staged financing of companies and the integration of portfolio-companies into networks. In addition to the risk management techniques the authors also give the interpretation of the unique attitude of venture capital toward uncertainty and its special real option-like risk valuation approach that makes venture capitalists capable of handling high uncertainty under imperfect information.