Buying behavior and competition in the software market

In the actual world, the impact of the software buying decisions has a rising relevance in social and economic terms. This research tries to explain it focusing on the organizations buying decisions of Operating Systems and Office Suites for personal computers and the impact on the competition between incumbent and alternative players in the market in these software categories, although the research hypotheses and conclusions may extend to other software categories and platforms. We concluded that in this market beside brand image, product features or price, other factors could have influence in the buying choices. Network effect, switching costs, local network effect, lock-in or consumer heterogeneity all have influence in the buying decision, protecting the incumbent and making it difficult for the competitive alternatives, based mainly on product features and price, to gain market share to the incumbent. This happens in a stronger way in the Operating Systems category.

Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in Brazil

ABSTRACT OBJECTIVE To analyze Government strategies for reducing prices of antiretroviral medicines for HIV in Brazil. METHODS Analysis of Ministry of Health purchases of antiretroviral medicines, from 2005 to 2013. Expenditures and costs of the treatment per year were analyzed and compared to international prices of atazanavir. Price reductions were estimated based on the terms of a voluntary license of patent rights and technology transfer in the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement for atazanavir. RESULTS Atazanavir, a patented medicine, represented a significant share of the expenditures on antiretrovirals purchased from the private sector. Prices in Brazil were higher than international references, and no evidence was found of a relationship between purchase volume and price paid by the Ministry of Health. Concerning the latest strategy to reduce prices, involving local production of the 200 mg capsule, the price reduction was greater than the estimated reduction. As for the 300 mg capsule, the amounts paid in the first two years after the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement were close to the estimated values. Prices in nominal values for both dosage forms remained virtually constant between 2011 (the signature of the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement), 2012 and 2013 (after the establishment of the Partnership). CONCLUSIONS Price reduction of medicines is complex in limited-competition environments. The use of a Partnership for Productive Development Agreement as a strategy to increase the capacity of local production and to reduce prices raises issues regarding its effectiveness in reducing prices and to overcome patent barriers. Investments in research and development that can stimulate technological accumulation should be considered by the Government to strengthen its bargaining power to negotiate medicines prices under a monopoly situation.

Price linkages in pharmaceutical markets

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Price linkages in pharmaceutical markets

This paper studies the existing price linkage between generics and branded pharmaceuticals, in which the generic price must be a fraction of the latter. Using a vertical differentiation model, we look at the market equilibrium, the effects on the incentives for the brand producer to develop new products, and the possibility of predation by the brand producer over the generic firm. We find that the price linkage increases prices compared to no indexation and it may increase the incentives for the brand producer to expand its set of products. When prices are freely set, the branded firm may also want to expand a new product with a higher quality, but will prefer to remove the original one from the market. Predation may equally occur in both schemes but the price linkage may give fewer incentives for the branded firm to predate while compensating losses with a new drug.

(No)competition in the Spanish retailing gasoline market: a variance filter approach

Various methodologies in economic literature have been used to analyse the international hydrocarbon retail sector. Nevertheless at a Spanish level these studies are much more recent and most conclude that generally there is no effective competition present in this market, regardless of the approach used. In this paper, in order to analyse the price levels in the Spanish petrol market, our starting hypothesis is that in uncompetitive markets the prices are higher and the standard deviation is lower. We use weekly retail petrol price data from the ten biggest Spanish cities, and apply Markov chains to fill the missing values for petrol 95 and diesel, and we also employ a variance filter. We conclude that this market demonstrates reduced price dispersion, regardless of brand or city.

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a strategic market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, such a game approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.

Iceberg transport technologies in spatial competition. Hotelling reborn

Transport costs in address models of differentiation are usually modeled as separable of the consumption commodity and with a parametric price. However, there are many sectors in an economy where such modeling is not satisfactory either because transportation is supplied under oligopolistic conditions or because there is a difference (loss) between the amount delivered at the point of production and the amount received at the point of consumption. This paper is a first attempt to tackle these issues proposing to study competition in spatial models using an iceberg-like transport cost technology allowing for concave and convex melting functions.

Factor shares, the price markup, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.

In a Walrasian labor market, the labor income share is constant under the assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas production function and perfect competition. Given the observed decline of the labor share in recent decades, this paper relaxes these assumptions, proposes a time-series calculation of the aggregate price mark-up reflecting the degree of imperfect competition in the product market, and provides estimates of the elasticity of substitution under such product market imperfections. We focus on Spain and the U.S. and show that the elasticity of substitution is above one in Spain and below one in the U.S. We also show that the price markup drives the elasticity of substitution away from one, upwards in Spain, downwards in the U.S. These results are used to explain the declining path of the labor income share, common to both economies, and their contrasted patterns in terms of capital deepening.

The impact of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical market: A theoretical approach

This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Minimum price variations, time priority and quotes dynamics

We analyze the impact of a minimum price variation (tick) and timepriority on the dynamics of quotes and the trading costs when competitionfor the order flow is dynamic. We find that convergence to competitiveoutcomes can take time and that the speed of convergence is influencedby the tick size, the priority rule and the characteristics of the orderarrival process. We show also that a zero minimum price variation is neveroptimal when competition for the order flow is dynamic. We compare thetrading outcomes with and without time priority. Time priority is shownto guarantee that uncompetitive spreads cannot be sustained over time.However it can sometimes result in higher trading costs. Empiricalimplications are proposed. In particular, we relate the size of thetrading costs to the frequency of new offers and the dynamics of theinside spread to the state of the book.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

Factor shares, the price markup, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor

[spa] La participación del trabajo en la renta nacional es constante bajo los supuestos de una función de producción Cobb-Douglas y competencia perfecta. En este artículo se relajan estos supuestos y se investiga si el comportamiento no constante de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional se explica por (i) una elasticidad de sustitución entre capital y trabajo no unitaria y (ii) competencia no perfecta en el mercado de producto. Nos centramos en España y los U.S. y estimamos una función de producción con elasticidad de sustitución constante y competencia imperfecta en el mercado de producto. El grado de competencia imperfecta se mide a través del cálculo del price markup basado en laaproximación dual. Mostramos que la elasticidad de sustitución es mayor que uno en España y menor que uno en los US. También mostramos que el price markup aleja la elasticidad de sustitución de uno, lo aumenta en España, lo reduce en los U.S. Estos resultados se utilizan para explicar la senda decreciente de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional, común a ambas economías, y sus contrastadas sendas de capital.

Factor shares, the price markup, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor

[spa] La participación del trabajo en la renta nacional es constante bajo los supuestos de una función de producción Cobb-Douglas y competencia perfecta. En este artículo se relajan estos supuestos y se investiga si el comportamiento no constante de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional se explica por (i) una elasticidad de sustitución entre capital y trabajo no unitaria y (ii) competencia no perfecta en el mercado de producto. Nos centramos en España y los U.S. y estimamos una función de producción con elasticidad de sustitución constante y competencia imperfecta en el mercado de producto. El grado de competencia imperfecta se mide a través del cálculo del price markup basado en laaproximación dual. Mostramos que la elasticidad de sustitución es mayor que uno en España y menor que uno en los US. También mostramos que el price markup aleja la elasticidad de sustitución de uno, lo aumenta en España, lo reduce en los U.S. Estos resultados se utilizan para explicar la senda decreciente de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional, común a ambas economías, y sus contrastadas sendas de capital.

Broadband prices in the European Union : competition and commercial strategies

This paper analyses the determinants of broadband Internet access prices in a group of 15 EU countries between 2008 and 2011. Using a rich panel dataset of broadband plans, we show the positive effect of downstream speed on prices, and report that cable and fibre-to-the-home technologies are available at lower prices per Mbps than x DSL technology. Operators’marketing strategies are also analysed as we show how much prices rise when the broadband service is offered in a bundle with voice telephony and/or television, and how much they fall when download volume caps are included. The most insightful results of this study are provided by a group of metrics that represent the situation of competition and entry patterns in the broadband market. We show that consumer segmentation positively affects prices. On the other hand, broadband prices are higher in countries where entrants make greater use of bitstream access and lower when they use more intensively direct access -local loop unbundling-. However, we do not find a significant effect of inter-platform competition on prices.