Hitting emissions targets with (statistical) confidence in multi-instrument Emissions Trading Schemes

A means of assessing, monitoring and controlling aggregate emissions from multi-instrument Emissions Trading Schemes is proposed. The approach allows contributions from different instruments with different forms of emissions targets to be integrated. Where Emissions Trading Schemes are helping meet specific national targets, the approach allows the entry requirements of new participants to be calculated and set at a level that will achieve these targets. The approach is multi-levelled, and may be extended downwards to support pooling of participants within instruments, or upwards to embed Emissions Trading Schemes within a wider suite of policies and measures with hard and soft targets. Aggregate emissions from each instrument are treated stochastically. Emissions from the scheme as a whole are then the joint probability distribution formed by integrating the emissions from its instruments. Because a Bayesian approach is adopted, qualitative and semi-qualitative data from expert opinion can be used where quantitative data is not currently available, or is incomplete. This approach helps government retain sufficient control over emissions trading scheme targets to allow them to meet their emissions reduction obligations, while minimising the need for retrospectively adjusting existing participants’ conditions of entry. This maintains participant confidence, while providing the necessary policy levers for good governance.

Supervision as control system : the design of supervision as a regulatory instrument in the social services sector in Sweden

In this article, the prevailing official view of supervision as a regulatory instrument is examined as it applies to the social services sector in Sweden. The study is based on a comparison of the views expressed on the design of supervision as a regulatory instrument by two government commissions, the Supervision Commission and the Commission on Supervision within the Social Services (UTIS), and on the positions taken by the Government regarding the definitions of the concept of supervision proposed by these commissions. The view of supervision as a regulatory instrument expressed in these policy documents is analysed with the help of a theoretical framework describing the components, their functions and the governance characteristics of control systems. In the framework separate interrelated characteristics of the components are identified and summarized into two models of control systems. The analysis shows that supervision in the Swedish social services sector can be described in terms of both a disciplinary and non-disciplinary system. By its system theoretical basis and the identification of interrelated characteristics the study contributes to a broadened understanding of the construction and functions of supervision as a regulatory instrument and of how supervision within the Swedish social sector is meant to be designed.

Bounds on policy relevant parameters with discrete policy variation

When estimating policy parameters, also known as treatment effects, the assignment to treatment mechanism almost always causes endogeneity and thus bias many of these policy parameters estimates. Additionally, heterogeneity in program impacts is more likely to be the norm than the exception for most social programs. In situations where these issues are present, the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) parameter estimation makes use of an instrument to avoid assignment bias and simultaneously to account for heterogeneous effects throughout individuals. Although this parameter is point identified in the literature, the assumptions required for identification may be strong. Given that, we use weaker assumptions in order to partially identify the MTE, i.e. to stablish a methodology for MTE bounds estimation, implementing it computationally and showing results from Monte Carlo simulations. The partial identification we perfom requires the MTE to be a monotone function over the propensity score, which is a reasonable assumption on several economics' examples, and the simulation results shows it is possible to get informative even in restricted cases where point identification is lost. Additionally, in situations where estimated bounds are not informative and the traditional point identification is lost, we suggest a more generic method to point estimate MTE using the Moore-Penrose Pseudo-Invese Matrix, achieving better results than traditional methods.

The competitive real exchange-rate regime, inflation and monetary policy

Includes bibliography

Sustainable Wastewater Management: Is it Possible to Regulate Micropollution in the Future by Learning from the Past? A Policy Analysis

This paper applies a policy analysis approach to the question of how to effectively regulate micropollution in a sustainable manner. Micropollution is a complex policy problem characterized by a huge number and diversity of chemical substances, as well as various entry paths into the aquatic environment. It challenges traditional water quality management by calling for new technologies in wastewater treatment and behavioral changes in industry, agriculture and civil society. In light of such challenges, the question arises as to how to regulate such a complex phenomenon to ensure water quality is maintained in the future? What can we learn from past experiences in water quality regulation? To answer these questions, policy analysis strongly focuses on the design and choice of policy instruments and the mix of such measures. In this paper, we review instruments commonly used in past water quality regulation. We evaluate their ability to respond to the characteristics of a more recent water quality problem, i.e., micropollution, in a sustainable way. This way, we develop a new framework that integrates both the problem dimension (i.e., causes and effects of a problem) as well as the sustainability dimension (e.g., long-term, cross-sectoral and multi-level) to assess which policy instruments are best suited to regulate micropollution. We thus conclude that sustainability criteria help to identify an appropriate instrument mix of end-of-pipe and source-directed measures to reduce aquatic micropollution.

Life cycle assessment as a policy-support tool: the case of taxis in the city of Madrid

This paper examined the potentialities of Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) as instrument for policy-support. To this respect, the adoption of an initiative within the Madrid Air Quality Plan (AQP) 2011–2015 regarding the substitution of diesel taxis with hybrid, natural gas and LPG alternatives was studied. Four different scenarios were elaborated, a business-as-usual scenario (BAU), the scenario of the AQP, and two extreme-situation scenarios: all-diesel (ADI) and all-ecologic (AEC). Impacts were characterized according to the ILCD methodology, focusing especially on climate change (CC) and photochemical ozone formation (PO). SimaPro 7.3 was used as analysis and inventory-construction tool. The results indicate that the shift to ecologic alternatives reduced impacts, especially those related to CC and PO. For the complete life cycle, reductions of 13% (CC) and 25% (PO) were observed for AQP against BAU (CC:1365 GgCO2, PO:13336 MgNMVOC). Deeper reductions were observed for AEC (CC:34%, PO:59%), while ADI produced slight increases in impacts if against BAU. The analysis of the use-phase revealed that the central and highest speed zones of the city benefit from the adoption of AQP. This is especially evident in zone 7, with reductions of 16% in CC and 31% in PO respectively against BAU (CCzone1:3443 kgCO2/veh·km, POzone7:11.1 kgNMVOC/veh·km).

Putin’s grand design to destroy the EU’s Eastern Partnership and replace it with a disastrous neighbourhood policy of his own. CEPS Commentary, 17 September 2013

This new Commentary by Michael Emerson and Hrant Kostanyan shows how the pressure exerted by President Putin on Armenia to withdraw from the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement it had negotiated with the EU and to join the Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia customs union is but the most recent in a long series of ongoing moves by Russia to destroy the Eastern Partnership. In their view, the message to be hammered home to those unsure of the economic arguments is that you do not have to have an exclusive customs union to enjoy deep integration for goods, services, people and capital, and of course even less for hard security relationships. High-quality free trade agreements are the logical instrument for those who want excellent relations with more than one big neighbour.

So far apart and yet so close: Should the ECB care about inflation differentials? Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2014/10 September 2014

Inflation rates can differ across regions of monetary unions. We show that in the euro area, the US, Canada, Japan and Australia, inflation rates have been substantially and persistently different in different regions. Differences were particularly substantial in the euro area. Inflation differences can reflect normal adjustment processes such as price convergence or the Balassa-Samuelson effect, or can reflect the different cyclical position of regions. But they can also be the result of economic distortions resulting from segmented markets or unsustainable demand and credit developments fueled by low real interest rates. In normal times, the European Central Bank cannot influence such developments with its single interest rate instrument. However, unconventional policy measures can have different effects on different countries depending on the chosen instrument, and should be used to reduce fragmentation and ensure the proper transmission of monetary policy. The new macro prudential policy tools are unlikely to be practical in addressing inflation divergences. It is crucial to keep the average inflation rate close to two percent so that inflation differentials are possible without deflation in some parts of the euro area, which in turn might endanger area-wide financial stability and price stability.

Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. CEPS Working Document No. 400, September 2014

While EU and US sanctions against Russia over its aggression in Ukraine, and Russia’s counter-sanctions, are much discussed due to their evident political significance, less attention has been given to Russia’s punitive sanctions against the three Eastern European states – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – that have signed with the EU Association Agreements (AA), which include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) provisions. This paper therefore documents these trade policy restrictions and embargoes imposed by Russia, and provides some first indications of their impact. The immediate impact on trade flows, especially for agri-food products, has been substantial, albeit with some leakage through Belarus. The main instrument for the Russian measures has been allegations of non-conformity with Russian technical standards, although the correlation of these allegations with movements in Russia’s geopolitical postures makes it obvious that the Russian technical agencies are following political guidelines dressed up as scientific evidence. These measures also push the three states into diversifying their trade marketing efforts in favour of the EU and other world markets, with Georgia already having taken significant steps in this direction, since in its case the Russian sanctions date back to 2006. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s threat to cancel CIS free trade preferences infiltrated trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia, leading on 12 September to their proposed postponement until the end of 2015 of the ‘provisional’ implementation of a large part of the AA/DCFTA. This was immediately followed on 16 September by ratification of the AA/DCFTA by both the Rada in Kyiv and the European Parliament, which will lead to its full and definitive entry into force when the 28 EU member states have also ratified it. However Putin followed the day after with a letter to Poroshenko making an abusive interpretation of the 12 September understanding.

Rebalancing the EU-Russia-Ukraine gas relationship. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2014/15, DECEMBER 2014

The October 2014 agreement on gas supplies between Russia, Ukraine and the European Union did not resolve the Ukraine-Russia conflict over gas. The differences between parties in terms of objectives, growing mistrust and legacy issues make it unlikely that a long-term stable arrangement will be achieved without further escalation. Without EU pressure and support, Ukraine is likely to enter a new unfavourable gas arrangement with Russia, which could have repercussions beyond the energy sector. Key highlights: To reduce prices and increase the security of imports, the EU as a bloc should redefine its gas relationship with Russia and Ukraine and overcome the diverging interests of EU member states on second-order issues. Implementation of a joint strategy rests on enforcement of EU competition and gas market rules, a strengthened role for the Energy Community and the establishment of a market-based instrument for supply security. For Ukraine, the EU should serve as an anchor for comprehensive gas sector reform. Contingent on Ukraine’s reform efforts, EU financial and technical assistance, the enabling of reverse flows from the EU to Ukraine and pressure on Gazprom, should eventually enable Ukraine to obtain a sustainable gas-supply contract with Russia. This should make a sustainable and mutually beneficial Russia-Ukraine-EU gas relationship possible. However, during the transition, the EU should be prepared for possible frictions.

EU Sanctions: A Relevant Foreign Policy Tool? EU Diplomacy Paper No. 3, May 2014

This paper examines an instrument which establishes an explicit link between economic power and foreign policy of the European Union (EU): restrictive measures or sanctions. As the EU is increasingly confronted with situations requiring a firm response, sanctions – arguably the EU’s ‘hardest’ tool – have become somewhat of a standard reaction. To what extent are sanctions a relevant tool for EU external action? By looking at several case studies from a set of 47 autonomous EU sanction cases, this paper acknowledges the many internal and external difficulties the EU faces when using the sanctions tool. However, it also shows that despite those challenges, the ‘hard’ and coercive nature of the sanction instrument nevertheless make it a relevant foreign policy tool which allows the EU to react to external crises.

The UN General Assembly Resolution on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings - an Example for Europe. IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/04 • May 2013

Summary. The EU’s attempts to adopt an EU-wide instrument on the right to access to legal aid in criminal proceedings have not been successful so far. The important issue was originally part of Measure C of the Roadmap for criminal procedural rights,1 but due to political difficulties legal aid was dropped from the agenda. However, on a different plane agreement was reached on this topic as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted the world’s first international instrument dedicated to access to legal aid in December 2012.2 This policy brief argues that the EU should carry on in the ‘spirit’ of these recent developments and adopt a directive providing suspects and defendants with access to legal aid. 1 Council Resolution of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ C 295/1, 4 December 2009; hereafter will be referred to this Council Resolution as the ‘Roadmap’; for further information see M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The EU Roadmap for Strengthening Procedural Rights of Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings’, 4 EUCrim (2009), 157-161. 2 United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems, A/Res/67/187, 20 December 2012; from here on will be referred to this as the ‘Resolution’.

Capital Markets Union: a vision for the long term. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/05 April 2015

Capital Markets Union (CMU) is a welcome initiative. It could augment economic risk sharing, set the right conditions for more dynamic development of risk capital for high-growth firms and improve choices and returns for savers. This offers major potential for benefits in terms of jobs, growth and financial resilience. • CMU cannot be a short-term cyclical instrument to replace subdued bank lending, because financial ecosystems change slowly. Shifting financial intermediation towards capital markets and increasing cross-border integration will require action on multiple fronts, including increasing the transparency, reliability and comparability of information and addressing financial stability concerns. Some quick wins might be available but CMU’s real potential can only be achieved with a long-term structural policy agenda. • To sustain the current momentum, the EU should first commit to a limited number of key reforms, including more integrated accounting enforcement and supervision of audit firms. Second, it should set up autonomous taskforces to prepare proposals on the more complex issues: corporate credit information, financial infrastructure, insolvency, financial investment taxation and the retrospective review of recent capital markets regulation. The aim should be substantial legislative implementation by the end of the current EU parliamentary term.

The Emission Trading Scheme reform: will the Commission's proposal save the system? EPC Policy Brief, 29 May 2015

The European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), proposed by the Commission in 2001, entered into force in 2005. It was the flagship instrument of an ambitious policy aiming to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses in the EU by making emission allowances a freely tradable ‘financial commodity’. However, in recent years, the cracks in the system have begun to show as the price of these CO2 emission allowances has dropped. In this Policy Brief, Jørgen Knud Henningsen argues that the envisaged ETS reform may not be enough to address the system’s shortcomings, and that there should be a more open discussion about its potential if it is to contribute to the EU’s goal of a largely de-carbonised economy by 2050.