The European League for Non-Western Studies and E-learning

Leiden’s Faculty of Arts invited on May 20th the members of the ELNWS for a workshop on e-learning for Non-Western studies. The aim of the workshop was to take a closer look at the possibilities of e-learning as a means of realizing co-operation between our universities. During our discussions, and looking back on the past academic years, we attempted to position our own academic community on the Internet, in the sense of 'looking for, finding and putting it on, or giving it a location' in the omnipresent Internet. In order to investigate the ways in which e-learning can be used as a tool to stimulate European co-operation within the field of Non-Western studies, Leiden’s Faculty of Arts rewards one initiative between two or more European universities of the ELNWS with financial support.

Academic cooperation to foster research and advocacy competences in the occupied Palestinian territory (West Bank)

Palestinians living in the West Bank, a territory occupied by the State of Israel according to International Law, face deprived access to land and a limited ability to move freely which pertains to the presence of Israeli settlements and other infrastructure (closures, restricted or forbidden roads, etc.). This confinement has significant impacts on their economic and social livelihoods, and it is even worsening with the on-going construction of a 709 km long Barrier which mainly runs inside the West Bank. With regard to this situation, there is a clear need to strengthen the capacity of civil society and its representatives to apply sound research processes as a basis for improved advocacy for Palestinian human rights. Monitoring processes and tools are needed to assess the impacts of the Palestinians’ confinement, particularly in relation to the Barrier’s construction. Reliable data has also to be collected, managed, and above all, shared. These challenges have been addressed within the Academic Cooperation Palestine Project (ACPP) that brings together academic partners from the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) West Bank (WB), and Switzerland as well as other international academic institutions and Palestinian governmental and non-governmental agencies. ACPP started in early 2011 and is designed as a large cooperation networking platform involving researchers, students, public servants and experts from the oPt WB. A large set of actions have already been developed during the first year of the project, including courses, training, and research actions. First relevant results and impacts of the different actions are presented in this paper. Taken as a whole, the project produces valuable results for all partners: useful advocacy material for the Palestinian partners, and a unique “real-scale laboratory” where investigations are jointly conducted to develop novel confinement and change indicators.

Kyiv's gas strategy: closer cooperation with Gazprom or a genuine diversification. OSW Commentary No. 110, 2013-07-16

In recent months Kyiv has been intensifying its efforts to diversify Ukraine’s gas supply routes with a view to reducing the country’s dependence on imports from Russia. One of the steps which Kyiv has taken has been to make the unprecedented decision to start importing gas from its Western neighbours. In November 2012, Ukraine’s state-owned Naftogaz began importing gas through Poland under a two-month contract with RWE (the imports continued into 2013 under a separate deal), while in the spring of 2013 Ukraine started importing gas from Hungary. Kyiv is also currently looking into the possibility of purchasing gas from Slovakia. Furthermore, since 2010 the Ukrainian government has been working on the construction of an LNG terminal near Odesa. The authorities have declared that this will allow Ukraine to import up to 5 billion m3 of LNG a year by 2015. The government has also taken measures to increase domestic production, including from non-traditional sources, and it plans to replace gas-based with coal-based technologies in local power stations. Finally, in January 2013, the government signed a 50-year production sharing agreement with Shell. This paves the way for the development of Ukraine’s shale gas deposits.

Hegemony Without Stability: The fiscal and political vulnerabilities of monetary union. ACES Cases No. 2011.2

The crisis has forced the Euro area to establish an emergency fund that supports member states experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. The difficulties of coming up with such a fund for Greece and other Euro area members stands in marked contrast to the balance of payments support that non-Euro members like Hungary received, swiftly and quietly. In order to solve this puzzle, we first establish the difference between EU interventions and IMF programs and, second, trace the evolution of crisis management with France and Germany in the lead. The lens of hegemonic stability theory suggests that the Franco-German leadership is too weak to provide stability and the extensive use of conditionality is one symptom of this weakness. Providing incentives for cooperation "after hegemony" (Keohane) is the unresolved issues troubling the monetary union. Its dominant powers must acknowledge that markets perceive monetary union to be already politically more integrated than its lack of fiscal integration suggests.

Quantifying Non-Tariff Measures for TTIP. Paper No. 12 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 116/July 2015

This paper provides an overview of methods employed to quantify non-tariff measures (NTMs) and then analyses their differences and looks at what these mean for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. The authors find several similarities in the approaches taken. Because all studies conclude that NTMs matter, they argue that policy-makers are right to focus on ‘regulatory cooperation’ in TTIP. Given the significant differences in NTMs across sectors, policy-makers are urged to dive deep into sector-specific elements of NTMs and focus on those sectors where the largest potential gains can be made (i.e. where NTMs are highest, such as in agriculture, automobiles, steel, textiles and insurance services). An area identified for further research is the fact that unlike trade taxes (i.e. tariffs), regulatory barriers to trade are not generally targeted as the primary policy objective, but rather stem from other strategic policy concerns such as consumer safety and/or social and environmental protection. This element should be further investigated.

Illinois emergency operations plan : non operational copy.

"The Illinois Emergency Operations Plan, (IEOP), was developed in cooperation with the office of the Governor, constitutional officers, executive departments and agencies, and the American Red Cross ... This IEOP revision contains specific new language dealing with the threat of a catastrophic earthquake or a terrorism incident involving a weapon of mass destruction"--Foreword.

Image scoring and cooperation in a cleaner fish mutualism

Humans are highly social animals and often help unrelated individuals that may never reciprocate the altruist's favour(1-5). This apparent evolutionary puzzle may be explained by the altruist's gain in social image: image-scoring bystanders, also known as eavesdroppers, notice the altruistic act and therefore are more likely to help the altruist in the future(5-7). Such complex indirect reciprocity based on altruistic acts may evolve only after simple indirect reciprocity has been established, which requires two steps. First, image scoring evolves when bystanders gain personal benefits from information gathered, for example, by finding cooperative partners(8-10). Second, altruistic behaviour in the presence of such bystanders may evolve if altruists benefit from access to the bystanders. Here, we provide experimental evidence for both of the requirements in a cleaning mutualism involving the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus. These cleaners may cooperate and remove ectoparasites from clients or they may cheat by feeding on client mucus(11,12). As mucus may be preferred over typical client ectoparasites(13), clients must make cleaners feed against their preference to obtain a cooperative service. We found that eavesdropping clients spent more time next to 'cooperative' than 'unknown cooperative level' cleaners, which shows that clients engage in image-scoring behaviour. Furthermore, trained cleaners learned to feed more cooperatively when in an `image-scoring' than in a 'non-image-scoring' situation.

The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.

Hungarian international development cooperation:context, stakeholders and performance

This paper explores the domestic and international context of Hungary's emerging international development policy. Specifically, it looks at three factors that may influence how this policy operates: membership in the European Union (EU) and potential ‘Europeanization’, Hungary's wider foreign policy strategy, and the influence of domestic stakeholders. In order to uncover how these factors affect the country's international development policy, semi-structured interviews were carried out with the main stakeholders. The main conclusions are: (1) While accession to the EU did play a crucial role in restarting Hungary's international development policy, the integration has had little effect since then; (2) international development policy seems to serve mainly Hungary's regional strategic foreign policy and economic interests, and not its global development goals; and (3) although all the domestic development stakeholders are rather weak, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) still seems to play a dominating role. Convergence with European requirements and best practices is, therefore, clearly hindered by foreign policy interests and also by the weakness of non- governmental stakeholders.

Hungarian International Development Cooperation: Context, Stakeholders and Performance

This paper explores the domestic and international context of Hungary's emerging international development policy. Specifically, it looks at three factors that may influence how this policy operates: membership in the European Union (EU) and potential ‘Europeanization’, Hungary's wider foreign policy strategy, and the influence of domestic stakeholders. In order to uncover how these factors affect the country's international development policy, semi-structured interviews were carried out with the main stakeholders. The main conclusions are: (1) While accession to the EU did play a crucial role in restarting Hungary's international development policy, the integration has had little effect since then; (2) international development policy seems to serve mainly Hungary's regional strategic foreign policy and economic interests, and not its global development goals; and (3) although all the domestic development stakeholders are rather weak, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) still seems to play a dominating role. Convergence with European requirements and best practices is, therefore, clearly hindered by foreign policy interests and also by the weakness of non- governmental stakeholders.

International cooperation against climate change: institutions, policies and their efficiency

In the 20th century nature of the world economy has started to change significantly, and the former state-centric constellation disappeared. Several development factors that induced the change are still active and nowadays we live in a much different world. The world economy consists of transnational networks; these complicated systems have a great impact on the world of states. The transnational actors’ (multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations etc) influence became very essential as they are able to mobilize the society, have high expertise (think tanks), but it is also important to note their financial strength and moral effects (norm entrepreneurs).

Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

Building Regional Security: Cooperation in the 21st Century: The Case of the Caribbean Regional Security System [RSS]

Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly. The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware. The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox. The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives. Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century. Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes. Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean. RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

Building an alternative economic network? Consumer cooperation in Scotland from the 1870s to the 1960s

Peer reviewed