Variable-number tandem repeats genotyping used to aid and inform management strategies for a bovine Johne's disease incursion in tropical and subtropical Australia

The application of variable-number tandem repeats (VNTR) genotyping of Mycobacterium avium subsp. paratuberculosis isolates to assist in investigating incidents of bovine Johne’s disease in a low-prevalence region of Australia is described in the current study. Isolates from a response to detection of bovine Johne’s disease in Queensland were compared with strains from national and international sources. The tandem application of mycobacterial interspersed repetitive unit (MIRU) and multilocus short sequence repeats (MLSSR) genotyping identified 2 strains, 1 that infected cattle on multiple properties with trace-forward histories from a common infected property, and 1 genotypically different strain recovered from a single property. The former strain showed an identical genotype to an isolate from India. Neither strain showed a genotypic link to regions of Australia with a higher prevalence of the disease. Genotyping has indicated incursions from 2 independent sources. This intelligence has informed investigations into potential routes of entry and the soundness of ongoing control measures, and supported strategy and policy decisions regarding management of Mycobacterium avium subsp. paratuberculosis incursions for Queensland.

Predictive modelling to aid the regional-scale management of a vertebrate pest

Extensive resources are allocated to managing vertebrate pests, yet spatial understanding of pest threats, and how they respond to management, is limited at the regional scale where much decision-making is undertaken. We provide regional-scale spatial models and management guidance for European rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus) in a 260,791 km(2) region in Australia by determining habitat suitability, habitat susceptibility and the effects of the primary rabbit management options (barrier fence, shooting and baiting and warren ripping) or changing predation or disease control levels. A participatory modelling approach was used to develop a Bayesian network which captured the main drivers of suitability and spread, which in turn was linked spatially to develop high resolution risk maps. Policy-makers, rabbit managers and technical experts were responsible for defining the questions the model needed to address, and for subsequently developing and parameterising the model. Habitat suitability was determined by conditions required for warren-building and by above-ground requirements, such as food and harbour, and habitat susceptibility by the distance from current distributions, habitat suitability, and the costs of traversing habitats of different quality. At least one-third of the region had a high probability of being highly suitable (support high rabbit densities), with the model supported by validation. Habitat susceptibility was largely restricted by the current known rabbit distribution. Warren ripping was the most effective control option as warrens were considered essential for rabbit persistence. The anticipated increase in disease resistance was predicted to increase the probability of moderately suitable habitat becoming highly suitable, but not increase the at-risk area. We demonstrate that it is possible to build spatial models to guide regional-level management of vertebrate pests which use the best available knowledge and capture fine spatial-scale processes.

1933-1953 German Jewish Children's Aid

The records of the GJCA relate to the entire range of activities involved in receiving and placing refugee children from 1933 through the 1950s. The later materials are records of the European Jewish Children's Aid. Activities included: maintaining the reception center in New Jersey; transportation arrangements; placement in homes; issuing affidavits and passports; granting scholarships; naturalization of children; setting of GJCA policy. By-laws, minutes, reports, correspondence and certificate of incorporation. Correspondence of executive officers, mainly Cecilia Razovsky, 1930s. Correspondence between William Haber and Lotte Marcuse, 1939-40. File of Dr. Solomon Lowenstein. Minutes of meetings of the Finance Committee. Field reports, inter-office memoranda, financial and statistical reports. Correspondence with organizations and governmental agencies: Society of Friends (Quakers) in Vienna; Israelitische Kultusgemeinde of Vienna; Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland; Federation for the Support of Jewish Philanthropic Societies; Department of Justice; New York State Department of Social Welfare; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; American Friends Service Committee; American Jewish Congress; B'nai Brith; National Council of Jewish Women. Correspondence with individuals: Max S. Perlman, William Rosenwald, Paul Felix Warburg. In addition to the general administrative records, there are thousands of case files.

Immigrants Mutual Aid Society, Inc. records, undated, 1938-1980.

Contains the papers of the Society founded in 1938 by recent German speaking Jewish immigrants to Boston to assist their initial adjustment to the economic, cultural, spiritual, and social life of the American community and subsequently, to provide mutual assistance to its membership and aid to other immigrants.

Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Competition for aid and trade policy

This paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries. It is shown that, given consumer preferences, a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid. If, on the other hand, the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries, the result is just the opposite. Finally, we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid. It is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries.

Donor strategy under the fungibility of foreign aid

We develop a political–economic model of aid fungibility: a part of aid is diverted away from its intended target by lobby groups. The size of this diversion – the degree of aid fungibility – is determined endogenously by the recipient government. The donor can affect the equilibrium degree of fungibility by choosing both the size of aid and the timing of its decision. We derive a condition under which the donor's reaction to fungibility is to reduce the amount of aid. Under this condition, if the donor acts as a follower, both the donor and the target group are better off.

Food aid and food production: A theoretical analysis

It has been claimed that food aid leads to permanent dependency as it depresses domestic food prices and thus farmers find it profitable to take land out of food production and into more lucrative activities. This paper develops two alternative scenarios under which the hypothesis about the damaging effect of food aid may not be true. Under the first scenario, it is argued that food production in developing countries is often low due to unfavourable trade policies and if food aid is tied to the removal of bias against the agricultural sector, food aid will not have any disincentive effect on food production. The second exercise argues that the revenue raised by the recipient government by selling aid could be used for R and D in agricultural production.

Foreign aid, domestic investment and welfare

This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two-period, two-country model of trade. Domestic investment is endogenous, providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two. Transfer-induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient. In the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending, such redistribution gives rise to the possibility of temporary aid being both potentially and strictly Pareto improving.

Lobbying by ethnic groups and aid allocation

We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government to allocate more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts political contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption, aid fatigue, and ethnic composition, in the donor country on the allocation of aid.

Logic of aid in an intertemporal setting

The paper studies the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of a simple two-country model of trade. In addition to its usual effects, a transfer of income in one period is assumed to influence the preferences of the recipient country in the following period. The implied changes in the terms of trade over the two periods are consistent with a number of possible outcomes with respect to the intertemporal welfare of the donor, the recipient, and the world as a whole. Particular attention is devoted to the conditions for strict Pareto improvement and the circumstances under which temporary aid transactions are likely to occur.

On the tying of aid to tariff reform

This paper considers the welfare effects of foreign aid that is tied to changes in the recipient's tariff. By constructing a three-country model with tariffs, and by allowing for changes both in the amount of aid and in the tariff rates, we are able to consider the welfare implications of two different rules of aid conditionality: (i) a rule which leaves the donor's welfare unchanged, and (ii) a rule which leaves the recipient government's total revenue unchanged. It is shown that the tying of aid to a tariff reform can, inter alia, be used to ensure Pareto improvement.

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tariffs, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tariff, the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.

The politics of foreign aid: A median voter perspective

The paper presents a model where the median voter in the donor country determines the support of foreign aid. It is first established that an individual in the donor country is affected by the direct benefits (due to altruism) and costs (due to taxes) of giving aid, and by the indirect benefits or costs of a change in the terms of trade. Then it is shown that the latter effect works through changing both the donor country's average income and its distribution of income. Given the stylized facts of a capital-abundant donor country and relatively capital-poor median voter, it is shown how redistribution-of-income effects soften the impact of terms-of-trade changes on the political support for foreign aid.