Old Akkadian inscriptions in Chicago Natural History Museum; texts of legal and business interest / Ignace J. Gelb, Professor of Assyriology, The Oriential Institute, The University of Chicago.

v.44:no.2(1955)

Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment, and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other's agendas.

Assessment of current anglo-saxon proposals about criminal justice and the justification of legal punishment: Moore, Duff and Finnis on retribution, and the challenging compatibility with the up-and-coming Restorative Justice

Pendent

Decision Errors, Legal Uncertainty and Welfare: a General Treatment

This paper provides a general treatment of the implications for welfare of legal uncertainty. We distinguish legal uncertainty from decision errors: though the former can be influenced by the latter, the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. We show that an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare. However, for any given level of decision errors, information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always, even when there is complete legal uncertainty, when sanctions on socially harmful actions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one’s perception about the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, previously established under restrictive assumptions. The first is that Effects-Based enforcement procedures may welfare dominate Per Se (or object-based) procedures and will always do so when sanctions are optimally set. The second is that optimal sanctions may well be higher under enforcement procedures involving more legal uncertainty.

Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.

The Security Council and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force: Legal, Normative, and Social Aspects.

Tal i com estableix la Carta de les Nacions Unides, el Consell de Seguretat determina l’existència d’una amenaça a la pau, un trencament de la pau o un acte d’agressió i decideix les mesures que han de fer-se servir per restaurar la pau i seguretat internacionals, també l’ús de la força. L’objectiu d’aquest article és explorar la legitimitat d’aquest ús de la força. Amb aquest objectiu, el text parteix d’una definició centrada en les seves dimensions legal, normativa i social. En segon lloc, s’analitzarà com aquestes dimensions estan representades als debats del Consell de Seguretat de la guerra d’Irak de 2003, un dels usos de la força més controvertits i que més debat ha generat als darrers anys. Finalment, l’anàlisi proposat permet treure algunes conclusions sobre les bases canviants de la legitimitat de l’ús de la força.

A Preliminary Analysis of Insects of Medico-legal Importance in Curitiba, State of Paraná

A survey of the carrion fauna was made at two sites in Curitiba, State of Paraná, with the objective of describing the insects associated with carrion and setting up a preliminary data-base for medico-legal purposes in south Brazil. Vertebrate exclusion experiments were carried out in each season between 1994 and 1995 with a 250 g laboratory-bred rat (Rattus norvegicus). Five stages of decomposition were identified: fresh, bloated, decaying, dry and adipocere-like. Some species showed seasonal and site preference and so could be used to identify the probable place and season where death took place. Sarconesia chlorogaster (Diptera, Calliphoridae) was restricted to an open field site and to cooler months. Hemilucilia semidiaphana (Diptera, Calliphoridae) and Pattonella resona (Diptera, Sarcophagidae) were restricted to the forest site and warmer months. Phaenicia eximia (Diptera, Calliphoridae) and Oxyletrum discicolle (Coleoptera, Silphidae) were present at both sites throughout the year and could be useful for population level analysis. Dissochaetus murray (Coleoptera, Cholevidae) was present throughout the year at the forest site and was associated with the adipocere-like stage. Ants played an important role producing post-mortem injuries to the carcasses. Insects of 32 species are reported as being useful in community level approaches

Do Legal Immigrants and Natives Compete in the Labour Market? Evidence from Catalonia

The precondition for labour-market competition between immigrants and natives is that both are willing to accept jobs that do not differ in quality. To test this hypothesis, in this paper we compare the working conditions between immigrants and natives in Catalonia. Comparing immigrants’ working conditions in relation to their native counterparts is not only a useful analysis for studying the extent to which immigrants and low-skilled native workers are direct competitors in the labour market, but also allows us to contribute to the literature on this issue by moving away from the conventional approach used in previous studies. Our results indicate that: i) natives and immigrants display a different taste for job (dis)amenities; ii) Catalan-born workers might be in direct competition with EU15 immigrants, while non-Catalan Spanish workers might be competing with Latin American immigrants, and; iii) African-born immigrants are the group in the Catalan workforce that by far face the worst working conditions.

Donation after Circulatory Death Legal-Guidance March 2011 (PDF 333 KB)

Donation after Circulatory Death. Legal Guidance