Sustained monitoring of the Southern Ocean at Drake Passage: past achievements and future priorities

Drake Passage is the narrowest constriction of the Antarctic Circumpolar Current (ACC) in the Southern Ocean, with implications for global ocean circulation and climate. We review the long-term sustained monitoring programmes that have been conducted at Drake Passage, dating back to the early part of the twentieth century. Attention is drawn to numerous breakthroughs that have been made from these programmes, including (a) the first determinations of the complex ACC structure and early quantifications of its transport; (b) realization that the ACC transport is remarkably steady over interannual and longer periods, and a growing understanding of the processes responsible for this; (c) recognition of the role of coupled climate modes in dictating the horizontal transport, and the role of anthropogenic processes in this; (d) understanding of mechanisms driving changes in both the upper and lower limbs of the Southern Ocean overturning circulation, and their impacts. It is argued that monitoring of this passage remains a high priority for oceanographic and climate research, but that strategic improvements could be made concerning how this is conducted. In particular, long-term programmes should concentrate on delivering quantifications of key variables of direct relevance to large-scale environmental issues: in this context, the time-varying overturning circulation is, if anything, even more compelling a target than the ACC flow. Further, there is a need for better international resource-sharing, and improved spatio-temporal coordination of the measurements. If achieved, the improvements in understanding of important climatic issues deriving from Drake Passage monitoring can be sustained into the future.

The private memory of aggregate shocks

We study constrained efficient aggregate risk sharing and its consequence for the behavior of macro-aggregates in a dynamic Mirrlees’s (1971) setting. Privately observed idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to be independent of i.i.d. publicly observed aggregate shocks. Yet, private allocations display memory with respect to past aggregate shocks, when idosyncratic shocks are also i.i.d.. Under a mild restriction on the nature of optimal allocations the result extends to more persistent idiosyncratic shocks, for all but the limit at which idiosyncratic risk disappears, and the model collapses to a pure heterogeneity repeated Mirrlees economy identical to Werning [2007]. When preferences are iso-elastic we show that an allocation is memoryless only if it displays a strong form of separability with respect to aggregate shocks. Separability characterizes the pure heterogeneity limit as well as the general case with log preferences. With less than full persistence and risk aversion different from unity both memory and non-separability characterize optimal allocations. Exploiting the fact that non-separability is associated with state-varying labor wedges, we apply a business cycle accounting procedure (e.g. Chari et al. [2007]) to the aggregate data generated by the model. We show that, whenever risk aversion is great than one our model produces efficient counter-cyclical labor wedges.

Optimal regulation of oil fields under asymmetric information

Neste trabalho é analisada a relação entre um regulador e uma empresa petrolífera. Há várias incertezas inerentes à essa relação e o trabalho se concentra nos efeitos da assimetria de informação. Fazemos a caracterização da regulação ótima sob informação assimétrica, quando o regulador deve desenhar um mecanismo que induz a firma a revelar corretamente sua informação privada. No caso em que a rma não pode se comprometer a não romper o acordo, mostramos que o regulador pode não implementar o resultado ótimo que é obtido sob informação completa. Nesse caso, o regulador não consegue compartilhar os riscos com a firma de forma ótima. Por fim, é apresentado um exemplo, em que mostramos que a condição de Spence-Mirrlees (SMC) pode não valer. Esse resultado aparece de forma natural no modelo.

Fiscal multipliers in an incomplete markets economy

This paper studies the behavior of fiscal multipliers in two different economic environments: complete markets and incomplete markets. Based on steady state analysis, output multipliers are found within a range between 0.49 and 0.66, when the markets are complete. Under incomplete markets, output multiplier was found in an interval between 0.75 and 0.94. These results indicates that the market structure, which reflects the degree of risk sharing and the intensity of the precautionary motive faced by individuals, plays a key role in determining the fiscal multipliers. In the second part of the paper, was performed an exercise to analyze the dynamic response of macroeconomic aggregates to an exogenous and unexpected rise in government spending financed by lump-sum taxes. In this case, impact output multipliers varies in a range between 0.64 and 0.68, under complete markets, and within 1.05 and 1.20 when markets are incomplete. The results found under incomplete markets are very close to that found on related literature which usually uses an econometric approach or calibrated/estimated New Keynesian models. These results shows that taking into account the deficiencies in the insurance mechanisms can be an interesting way to reconcile theoretical models with the results found on related current literature, without the need of ad-hoc assumptions relative to price stickness.

Insider trading, investment, and liquidity: a welfare analysis

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned "monopolistic" insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim infonnation revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detaiL

Endogenous borrowing constraints and default when markets are incomplete

Incomplete markets and non-default borrowing constraints increase the volatility of pricing kernels and are helpful when addressing assetpricing puzzles. However, ruling out default when markets are in complete is suboptimal. This paper endogenizes borrowing constraints as an intertemporal incentive structure to default. It modeIs an infinitehorizon economy, where agents are allowed not to pay their liabilities and face borrowing constraints that depend on the individual history of default. Those constraints trade off the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and incentives to prevent default. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for the assets' solvency rate.

Teoria da agência e franchising: evidência empírica para o caso brasileiro

O presente estudo tem um duplo objetivo: (i) analisar os determinantes da escolha das firmas por um modelo de franchising na estratégia de expansão de seus negócios, e (ii) analisar como os termos de um contrato de franchising podem potencialmente ser influenciados por questões relativas a compartilhamento de risco, problemas de incentivo relacionados ao risco moral (moral hazard) e restrições de recursos financeiros. Essa discussão se dará seguindo a abordagem empírica proposta por Lafontaine (1992). Os modelos são estimados a partir de dados para uma amostra de 350 redes de franquias brasileiras relativas ao ano de 2011. Os resultados sugerem que a definição do valor da taxa de royalties leva em conta os problemas decorrentes do risco moral por parte dos franqueados e do compartilhamento de risco. Em particular, nos negócios onde o esforço dos franqueados afeta significativamente a provisão dos serviços prestados, observa-se uma tendência de cobrança de menores taxas de royalties e uma relação positiva entre risco e incentivos, com a cobrança de menores taxas de royalties em setores de atividade com maior risco. Em relação ao percentual de unidades franqueadas, obteve-se resultados coerentes com a expectativa teórica para o problema de risco moral do franqueado, de modo que quanto mais importante o trabalho do agente, maior o índice. Entretanto, para a restrição de capital, contrário a expectativa teórica, quanto maior a disponibilidade de recursos maior o número de franquias.

Socio-economic vulnerability to natural disasters in Mexico: rural poor, trade and public response

Includes bibliography

The European Investment Bank and SMEs: key lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean

Incluye Bibliografía

The Economic Case for Fiscal Federalism in Scotland

In this paper we consider the case for assigning tax revenues to Scotland, by which we mean that taxes levied on Scottish tax bases should be returned to the Scottish budget. The budget, however, would continue to be supplemented by transfers from the Westminster budget. This arrangement differs from the current situation whereby public spending is largely financed by a bloc grant from Westminster. Our suggestion falls short of full fiscal federalism for Scotland . meaning that Scotland had control over choice of tax base and of tax rates, and fiscal transfers from Westminster would be minimal. We use propositions drawn from the theory of fiscal federalism to argue for a smaller vertical imbalance between taxes retained in Scotland and public spending in Scotland. A closer matching of spending with taxes would better signal to beneficiaries the true costs of public spending in terms of taxes raised. It would also create more complete incentives for politicians to provide public goods and services in quantities and at qualities that voters are actually willing to pay for. Under the current bloc grant system, the marginal tax cost of spending does not enter into political agents. calculations as spending is out of a fixed total budget. Moreover, the Scottish electorate is hindered in signaling its desire for local public goods and services since the size of the total budget is determined by a rigid formula set by Westminster. At the present time we reject proposals for full fiscal federalism because in sharply reducing vertical imbalance in the Scottish budget, it is likely to worsen horizontal balance between Scotland and the other UK regions. Horizontal balance occurs where similarly situated regions enjoy the same per capita level of public goods and services at the same per capita tax cost. The complete removal of the bloc grant under full fiscal federalism would remove the mechanism that currently promotes horizontal equity in the UK. Variability in own-source tax revenues creates other problems with full fiscal federalism. Taxes derived from North Sea oil would constitute a large proportion of Scottish taxes, but these are known to be volatile in the face of variable oil prices and the pound-dollar exchange rate. At the present time variability in oil tax revenue is absorbed by Westminster. Scotland is insulated through the bloc grant. This risk sharing mechanism would be lost with full fiscal federalism. It is true that Scotland could turn to financial markets to tide itself over oil tax revenue downturns, but as a much smaller and less diversified financial entity than the UK as a whole it would probably have to borrow on less favorable terms than can Westminster. Scotland would have to bear this extra cost itself. Also, with full fiscal federalism it is difficult to see how the Scottish budget could be used as a macroeconomic stabilizer. At present, tax revenue downturns in Scotland - together with the steady bloc grant - are absorbed through an increase in vertical imbalance. This acts as an automatic stabilizer for the Scottish economy. No such mechanism would exist under full fiscal federalism. The borrowing alternative would still exist but on the less favorable terms - as with borrowing to finance oil tax shortfalls.

Cross-country insurance mechanisms in currency unions. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/04, 27 March 2014

Countries in a monetary union can adjust to shocks either through internal or external mechanisms. We quantitatively assess for the European Union a number of relevant mechanisms suggested by Mundell’s optimal currency area theory, and compare them to the United States. For this purpose, we update a number of empirical analyses in the economic literature that identify (1) the size of asymmetries across countries and (2) the magnitude of insurance mechanisms relative to similar mechanisms and compare results for the European Monetary Union (EMU) with those obtained for the US. To study the level of synchronization between EMU countries we follow Alesina et al. (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007). To measure the effect of an employment shock on employment levels, unemployment rates and participation rates we perform an analysis based on Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and Fatas (1995). We measure consumption smoothing through capital markets, fiscal transfers and savings, using the approach by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Afonso and Furceri (2007). To analyze risk sharing through a common safety net for banks we perform a rudimentary simulation analysis. |

Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

Policy recommendations for the new European Commission: priorities for stabilising EMU. EPC Discussion Paper, 30 September 2014

The euro area crisis exposed substantial structural flaws in the currency area’s architecture. Addressing these flaws this discussion paper explores the ways in which the European Institutions can re-evaluate and overcome challenges for a more positive European future. To do this, Janis A. Emmanouilidis, Jan David Schneider, and Fabian Zuleeg recommend that the coming European Commission should develop a new framework to assess the real returns to growth of public and social investment, which could open the path for more flexibility on deficits in future. In close coordination with the European Parliament, the Commission should also review the Country Specific Recommendations with a stronger focus on a smaller number of key priorities for each country. The construction of a fiscal capacity should be made a priority in the new political cycle to resolve the absence of a mechanism to provide effective ex ante fiscal risk sharing in the Eurozone. Furthermore, to boost growth, there is a need to encourage private, public and social investment through a European Investment Programme (EIP) in the short term. Finally, the Commission should ensure that the implementation of an EIP is compatible with the long term goals of a fiscal capacity.

Enhancing the Legitimacy of EMU Governance. CEPS Special Report No. 98/December 2014

This CEPS Special Report investigates ways to enhance the legitimacy of economic governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) without introducing Treaty changes. It suggests changes in the governance framework at both the institutional and economic level. Input-oriented legitimacy can be improved by increasing parliamentary oversight on decisions related to EMU and increasing the accountability of the Eurogroup. Output-oriented legitimacy can be improved by strengthening the ability of EMU to reduce the emergence of negative externalities and to mitigate their impact, through market and fiscal risk-sharing mechanisms.

Euro-area governance: what to reform and how to do it. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/01 February 2015

The Issue Reform of the governance of the euro area is being held back by disagreement on what is at the root of the euro area’s woes. Pre-crisis, the euro area suffered from the built-up of financial imbalances, price and wage divergence and an insufficient focus on debt sustainability. During the crisis, the main problems were slow resolution of banking problems, an inadequate fiscal policy stance in 2011-13 for the area as a whole, insufficient domestic demand in surplus countries and slow progress with structural reforms to overcome past divergences. Policy Challenge Euro-area governance needs to move beyond the improvements brought about by banking union and should establish institutions to prevent divergences of wages from productivity. We propose the creation of a European Competitiveness Council composed of national competitiveness councils, and the creation of a Eurosystem of Fiscal Policy (EFP) with two goals: fiscal debt sustainability and an adequate area-wide fiscal position. The EFP should have the right in exceptional circumstances to declare national deficits unlawful and to be able to force parliaments to borrow more so that the euro-area fiscal stance is appropriate. A euro-area chamber of the European Parliament would have to approve such decisions. No additional risk-sharing would be introduced. In the short term, domestic demand needs to be increased in surplus countries, while in deficit countries, structural reform needs to reduce past divergences.