Cross-Border Cooperation Between Spain and Portugal: A case Study of the Southern Regions

After centuries of lack of contacts between Spain and Portugal, the democratization of both countries allowed for a rapprochement which today is becoming more intensive. The crucial factor of the growing integration of Spanish and Portuguese border regions into a cross-border region is naturally the INTERREG programme. Both regions are disadvantaged within the European Union and their respective countries as poor regions. They have the status of a ‘double periphery’. In the 1980s and particularly 1990s actors on both sides of the border intensified their contacts in order to overcome their double peripherality. The growing number of projects, the improvement of infrastructures and the revival of associationism will certainly change the quality of life of these regions, which are still among the lowest in both countries. The continuation of the INTERREG programme after 2007-2013 will be an important consolidating tool for the further development of cross-border cooperation.

More than cheap talk? Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on human rights and democracy

Malgrat els esforços de la UE en la promoció de la democràcia i un compromís comú per la democràcia i els drets humans al EMP, no hi ha signes de convergència cap al model liberal democràtic propugnat per la UE. No obstant això, l'abast i la intensitat de la cooperació multilateral, transnacional i bilateral han augmentat constantment en tota la regió des de mitjans de 1990. La cooperació en el camp de la promoció de la democràcia es caracteritza per la forta dinàmica de normativa sectorial, i la diferenciació geogràfica, però està clarament situada en un marc regional i altament estandarditzat. Si bé la convergència política o la política sembla poc probable en el curt o mitjà termini, democràcia i drets humans estan fermament establerts en una agenda regional comú

How can Brazil’s leading role in South America contribute to boosting security cooperation between the EU and Mercosur?

The primary goal of this paper is to discuss how the leading position of Brazil in South America could contribute to boost security cooperation between the European Union and Mercosur. Both parties share common foreign and security policy concerns, including immigration, terrorism and drug trafficking. Through its great influence on the regional security agenda, Brazil could seek closer bilateral cooperation with Europe in tackling these global challenges, acting at the same time as a representative of regional interests.

The Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS): study protocol for a randomised controlled trial.

BACKGROUND: Despite recent advances in acute stroke treatment, basilar artery occlusion (BAO) is associated with a death or disability rate of close to 70%. Randomised trials have shown the safety and efficacy of intravenous thrombolysis (IVT) given within 4.5 h and have shown promising results of intra-arterial thrombolysis given within 6 h of symptom onset of acute ischaemic stroke, but these results do not directly apply to patients with an acute BAO because only few, if any, of these patients were included in randomised acute stroke trials.Recently the results of the Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS), a prospective registry of patients with acute symptomatic BAO challenged the often-held assumption that intra-arterial treatment (IAT) is superior to IVT. Our observations in the BASICS registry underscore that we continue to lack a proven treatment modality for patients with an acute BAO and that current clinical practice varies widely. DESIGN: BASICS is a randomised controlled, multicentre, open label, phase III intervention trial with blinded outcome assessment, investigating the efficacy and safety of additional IAT after IVT in patients with BAO. The trial targets to include 750 patients, aged 18 to 85 years, with CT angiography or MR angiography confirmed BAO treated with IVT. Patients will be randomised between additional IAT followed by optimal medical care versus optimal medical care alone. IVT has to be initiated within 4.5 h from estimated time of BAO and IAT within 6 h. The primary outcome parameter will be favourable outcome at day 90 defined as a modified Rankin Scale score of 0-3. DISCUSSION: The BASICS registry was observational and has all the limitations of a non-randomised study. As the IAT approach becomes increasingly available and frequently utilised an adequately powered randomised controlled phase III trial investigating the added value of this therapy in patients with an acute symptomatic BAO is needed (clinicaltrials.gov: NCT01717755).

The Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs and the Enlargement of the European Union

This working – paper will be focused on three key issues: • How will affect the enlargement to the Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation. Especially, the absortion of Schenguen Agreements and the overall JHA by the candidate countries. • The enlargement impact over the European Immigraton Policy and the specific policies carried out by the EU Member States. The main question is the free movement of persons safeguard, in order to protect external borders of European Union. • An analysis of September, 11 attacks against U.S.A might be necessary to understand the future changes on JHA policy.

Alternation and Cooperation in a Two-party System: Implications for Resource-Based Developing Economies

This paper studies cooperation in a political system dominated by two opportunistic parties competing in a resource-based economy. Since a binding agreement as an external solution might be difficult to enforce due to the close association between the incumbent party and the government, the paper explores the extent to which co-operation between political parties that alternate in office can rely on self-enforcing strategies to provide an internal solution. We show that, for appropriate values of the probability of re-election and the discount factor cooperation in maintaining the value of a state variable is possible, but fragile. Another result is that, in such political framework, debt decisions contain an externality element linked to electoral incentives that creates a bias towards excessive borrowing.

Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

Treatment and outcomes of acute basilar artery occlusion in the Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS): a prospective registry study.

BACKGROUND: Treatment strategies for acute basilar artery occlusion (BAO) are based on case series and data that have been extrapolated from stroke intervention trials in other cerebrovascular territories, and information on the efficacy of different treatments in unselected patients with BAO is scarce. We therefore assessed outcomes and differences in treatment response after BAO. METHODS: The Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS) is a prospective, observational registry of consecutive patients who presented with an acute symptomatic and radiologically confirmed BAO between November 1, 2002, and October 1, 2007. Stroke severity at time of treatment was dichotomised as severe (coma, locked-in state, or tetraplegia) or mild to moderate (any deficit that was less than severe). Outcome was assessed at 1 month. Poor outcome was defined as a modified Rankin scale score of 4 or 5, or death. Patients were divided into three groups according to the treatment they received: antithrombotic treatment only (AT), which comprised antiplatelet drugs or systemic anticoagulation; primary intravenous thrombolysis (IVT), including subsequent intra-arterial thrombolysis; or intra-arterial therapy (IAT), which comprised thrombolysis, mechanical thrombectomy, stenting, or a combination of these approaches. Risk ratios (RR) for treatment effects were adjusted for age, the severity of neurological deficits at the time of treatment, time to treatment, prodromal minor stroke, location of the occlusion, and diabetes. FINDINGS: 619 patients were entered in the registry. 27 patients were excluded from the analyses because they did not receive AT, IVT, or IAT, and all had a poor outcome. Of the 592 patients who were analysed, 183 were treated with only AT, 121 with IVT, and 288 with IAT. Overall, 402 (68%) of the analysed patients had a poor outcome. No statistically significant superiority was found for any treatment strategy. Compared with outcome after AT, patients with a mild-to-moderate deficit (n=245) had about the same risk of poor outcome after IVT (adjusted RR 0.94, 95% CI 0.60-1.45) or after IAT (adjusted RR 1.29, 0.97-1.72) but had a worse outcome after IAT compared with IVT (adjusted RR 1.49, 1.00-2.23). Compared with AT, patients with a severe deficit (n=347) had a lower risk of poor outcome after IVT (adjusted RR 0.88, 0.76-1.01) or IAT (adjusted RR 0.94, 0.86-1.02), whereas outcomes were similar after treatment with IAT or IVT (adjusted RR 1.06, 0.91-1.22). INTERPRETATION: Most patients in the BASICS registry received IAT. Our results do not support unequivocal superiority of IAT over IVT, and the efficacy of IAT versus IVT in patients with an acute BAO needs to be assessed in a randomised controlled trial. FUNDING: Department of Neurology, University Medical Center Utrecht.

When federalism is not enough? Paths to cooperation in Federal democracies

This paper explores an overlooked issue in the literature on federations and federalism: the relationship between federalism and democracy. Starting from the assumption that federalism per se is not enough to guarantee cooperative intergovernmental dynamics between different levels of governments, this article analyzes how democracy reinforces cooperative intergovernmental relations under a federal design. Drawing from empirical evidence of federations in the making – Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Spain – this article shows that in countries where the federal design was built under democratization, namely Brazil, Spain and South Africa, intergovernmental dynamics evolved under an increasingly cooperative mode of interaction.

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Genetic team composition and level of selection in the evolution of cooperation

In cooperative multiagent systems, agents interac to solve tasks. Global dynamics of multiagent teams result from local agent interactions, and are complex and difficult to predict. Evolutionary computation has proven a promising approach to the design of such teams. The majority of current studies use teams composed of agents with identical control rules ("geneti- cally homogeneous teams") and select behavior at the team level ("team-level selection"). Here we extend current approaches to include four combinations of genetic team composition and level of selection. We compare the performance of genetically homo- geneous teams evolved with individual-level selection, genetically homogeneous teams evolved with team-level selection, genetically heterogeneous teams evolved with individual-level selection, and genetically heterogeneous teams evolved with team-level selection. We use a simulated foraging task to show that the optimal combination depends on the amount of cooperation required by the task. Accordingly, we distinguish between three types of cooperative tasks and suggest guidelines for the optimal choice of genetic team composition and level of selection