Exterior view of the Boehm family hat factory; Novy Jicin, Czech Republic Businesses

Tovarna na Klobouky Fv. Boehm

Managing flexible work arrangements in small not-for-profit firms: The influence of organisational size, financial constraints and workforce characteristics

Small, not-for-profit organisations fulfil a need in the economy that is typically not satisfied by for-profit firms. They also operate in ways that are distinct from larger organisations. While such firms employ a substantial proportion of the workforce, research addressing human resource management (HRM) practices in these settings is limited. This article used data collected from five small not-for-profit firms in Australia to examine the way one significant HRM practice – the provision and utilisation of flexible work arrangements – operates in the sector. Drawing on research from several scholarly fields, the article firstly develops a framework comprising three tensions in not-for-profits that have implications for HRM. These tensions are: (1) contradictions between an informal approach to HRM vs. a formal regulatory system; (2) employee values that favour social justice vs. external market forces; and (3) a commitment to service vs. external financial expectations. The article then empirically examines how these tensions are managed in relation to the specific case of flexible work arrangements. The study reveals that tensions around providing and accessing flexible work arrangements are managed in three ways: discretion, leadership style and distancing. These findings more broadly inform the way HRM is operationalised in this under-examined sector.

G20 host Australia faces hard truths of multinational profit shifting

The G20 Finance Ministers have the opportunity this weekend to endorse the initial recommendations of the OECD on how to address the global problem of multinational tax avoidance. The work of the OECD on the issue to date is substantial. Most notable is the adoption by many nations, including Australia, of the Common Reporting Standard for the automatic exchange of tax information. This standard will allow significant inroads to be made into tax avoidance, particularly by individuals sheltering money offshore. This is the first step in an ambitious tax reform program. There is a long way to go if we are to end the issue now known as Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). This week’s release of the first of the OECD recommendations contains some positive signs that further advances will be made. It also recognises some hard truths.

ACE Research Vignette 050: What makes new migrant businesses grow? Connections or location?

This series of research vignettes is aimed at sharing current and interesting research findings from our team of international Entrepreneurship researchers. In this vignette, Dr. Roxanne Zolin and Dr. Artemis Chang consider both the role of ethnic connections and location in an ethnic neighbourhood on new migrant business growth.

Transfers of Family Businesses to Non-Family Buyers - The Selling Business Family Perspective

This study focuses on business families and how they handle transitions such as business transfers. It also tries to shift the balance of research away from successions and towards business transfers as a key topic for family business researchers. In addition, it contributes to the family business research field by further highlighting the importance of the various different contributions in the family business from business family members other than the entrepreneurial founder. Based on interviews with both business family members and business brokers, it appears as important for business families who are selling their family business that it is managed in a similar way in the future regardless of the shift in ownership and management. It is also important that the employees can stay with the business. However, employees are seldom regarded as potential buyers of the family business; most preferably, from the point of view of business family members, this should be somebody who is similar to themselves. Business transfers can be lengthy processes, but once the family business is sold, previous owners most often want to leave the family business. This disengagement can be difficult for business family members if they have not managed to build up some other identity outside the family business environment. Money may compensate for the loss in the short run, but something else is needed in the long run, since the management of money is usually not perceived as that interesting. A family business transfer can have great influence on the members of the business family who is selling, and therefore it is suggested that personal due diligence could be of some help when planning the transfer. That tool can help business family members to analyse their own personal situation, but it may also make it easier to understand how the other business family members feel about the forthcoming change. Everyone is influenced in different ways during a family business transfer, and awareness of this fact may make it easier for the whole business family to adjust to their new environment.

Determinants of Profit Sharing in the Finnish Sector

This study investigates the role of factors that determine individual employee’s and firms participation in profit sharing schemes. Using a large panel data of Finnish employees for the period 1996-2000 we analyse individual and workplace characteristics that make firms employ profit sharing schemes and workers susceptible of receiving profit sharing bonuses. In particular two links between profit sharing schemes and workers performance have been analysed. First, in looking at profit sharing as an incentive device the results show a positive link between firm size and monitoring costs. Second, we find that younger individuals with higher mean salary and capacity to bear risk are more susceptible to profit sharing schemes. The industrial sector in which the individual is employed is also an important determinant factor. We find weak evidence of a relationship between performance of firms and employment of profit sharing schemes at the industrial sector level.

Optimal advertisement-innovation mix for maximizing the discounted flow of profit

Due to boom in telecommunications market, there is hectic competition among the cellular handset manufacturers. As cellular manufacturing industry operates in an oligopoly framework, often price-rigidity leads to non-price wars. The handset manufacturing firms indulge in product innovation and also advertise their products in order to achieve their objective of maximizing discounted flow of profit. It is of interest to see what would be the optimal advertisement-innovation mix that would maximize the discounted How of profit for the firms. We used differential game theory to solve this problem. We adopted the open-loop solution methodology. We experimented for various scenarios over a 30 period horizon and derived interesting managerial insights.

Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green Versus Scitovsky on Profit and Utility Maximization

I contrast the theoretical foundation of profit maximization of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green’s “Microeconomics” against that provided by Scitovsky in a paper of 1943. Whereas Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green try to show that profit maximization can be derived from utility maximization, Scitovsky categorically states the contrary view. I argue, first, that the foundation provided by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green is not sound and, secondly, that Scitovsky’s line of reasoning opens a better way to model business behavior.

Profit and Cost in "Modern" Post-Marxian Profit Theory: A Case Study from Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

In this paper, I examine the treatment of competitive profit of professor Varian in his textbook on Microeconomics, as a representative of the “modern” post-Marxian view on competitive profit. I show how, on the one hand, Varian defines profit as the surplus of revenues over cost and, thus, as a part of the value of commodities that is not any cost. On the other hand, however, Varian defines profit as a cost, namely, as the opportunity cost of capital, so that, in competitive conditions, the profit or income of capital is determined by the opportunity cost of capital. I argue that this second definition contradicts the first and that it is based on an incoherent conception of opportunity cost.